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ABSTRACT
SAM FLANDERS: Essays on Microeconomics
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser.)
This dissertation consists of three essays on applied microeconomic theory, focusing on
matching markets. The ﬁrst two essays focus on ﬁnding closed form solutions to matching
problems. Both generalize Gary Becker's well-known assortative matching results to more
general environments. Becker studied a frictionless one-to-one matching environment with
vertical or quality-based univariate preferences and found that, the higher one's type, the
higher the type of their match will be, an implication that has been extremely inﬂuential in
empirical work. The ﬁrst paper generalizes this analysis to an environment where agents care
about many traits instead of just one and have more general preferences, rather than restrict-
ing attention to vertical preferences. The latter generalizes it to a univariate environment
where agents can have any ideal type and preference is decoupled from type, such that diﬀer-
ent agents of the same type can have diﬀerent preferences. Both papers provide closed-form
matching functions and make empirical predictions about the structure of matching. Theo-
retical and empirical interest in matching is currently shifting to richer settings where agents
have varied preferences and must make tradeoﬀs between various traits they care about, so
foundational work on the qualitative structure of sorting in these settings is necessary to
provide intuition for researchers and to direct empirical questions, and closed-form matching
functions can make theoretical models with embedded matching problems tractable.
In the third essay, I study a search model of online dating with nontransferable utility
where agents are vertically diﬀerentiated, self-report quality, and must go on costly dates to
verify a match's quality. We show that these per-date costs induce some agents to over-report
their type, consistent with the stylized facts of online dating platforms where users frequently
over-report characteristics like height and income, a phenomenon known as catﬁshing. This
make agents less picky by preventing high types from rejecting some low types, and since
externalities in matching markets without transfers can make agents ineﬃciently picky, these
iii
costs can improve total market surplus. A monopolist platform owner may also have an
incentive to increase per-date costs in order to increase proﬁts. Thus, inducing lying amongst
users can actually be optimal for a platform.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
CATFISH: LYING IN MATCHING MARKETS WITH CHEAP TALK
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies matching markets with catﬁsh, a neologism for someone who attempts
to attract matches on an online dating platform by lying about themselves. Online dating
has become a common component of dating and partnership formation, and is a fast growing
market, taking in $1.08 billion in revenue for dating sites and $572 million for dating apps in
2014.1 Lying is an important factor in search on these platforms; the distributions of reported
types for traits like income and male height tend to be shifted right on online dating platforms
relative to the broader population, suggesting misreporting,2 and one industry study found
that 20% of women and 33% of men admit to lying on their online dating proﬁles.3 This
report also oﬀers advice on how to account for such misreporting, advising women to assume
the men you meet might not be quite as tall, as successful or as connected as they say they
are, and then decide whether you'd still consider dating them regardless, suggesting that
misreporting is an important factor in agent search strategies. We study a stylized model
motivated by this issue, with a two sided (men and women) platform allowing agents to
search for matches on the other side4 where agents can misreport their type.
Speciﬁcally, we model a one-to-one nontransferable utility (NTU) matching market with
1http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dating-business-love-on-the-rocks-1433980637
2http://blog.okcupid.com/index.php/the-biggest-lies-in-online-dating/
3http://www.ayi.com/dating-blog/ayi-top-online-dating-proﬁle-lies/
4This analysis can easily be extended to a same-sex dating market.
random search5 and time discounting where agents pursue long term (permanent) matches.
Agents are vertically diﬀerentiated,6 are distributed over a continuum of types, and self-
report type. When agents meet, they see one another's reports and choose whether to enter
a type veriﬁcation phase (date) or to part and return to search. If they go on a date, they
see each other's true type. They then decide whether or not to match permanently.
Going on a date is costly, allowing some agents to proﬁtably lie. Before a date, agents
weigh the expected payoﬀ from continued searching against the beneﬁt of matching today
less the cost of the date, accepting a match if the latter is higher. However, after the date
this per-date cost is sunk and drops from the agent's decision, making them less selective.
That is, once you've already made the eﬀort to meet and learn about someone you should be
less picky, since if you start your search over again you'll have to make a costly investment
in learning about the next person. Thus, some agents will be rejected for a date if they
truthfully report their type, but, if they get a date by pooling with more attractive peers,
they will be accepted after the date when standards are lower.
We focus on an equilibrium with a minimal amount of pooling, which we term the Lim-
ited Pooling equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agents self partition into classes, where each
agent only matches within their class. Classes will typically be largerand thus agents less
choosywhen per-date costs are higher, since these costs allow lower quality agents to pool
with and match to higher types who would like to reject them ex-ante.
We study how a strategic platform charging a single ﬁxed fee7 can utilize per-date costs
to improve ﬁrm proﬁts or maximize surplus as a social planner. We ﬁrst consider the case
where per-date costs are prices (for example, a price to communicate with an individual
you're interested in). Externalities endemic to NTU search markets make agents too picky.
In particular, agents don't care about their match's payoﬀ, or the payoﬀ of other agents in
the market, only their own. Without transfers, other agents have no way of making them
5Over time, agents receive random draws from the set of agents on the other side of the market.
6Each type is characterized by a level of quality, and all agents prefer higher quality matches to lower
quality matches.
7We discuss a schedule of ﬁxed fees in Appendix 1.6.1.
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internalize these costs. Thus agents will chase after high quality matches, ignoring the fact
that if they get a high quality match, someone else must get a low quality match, so their
gain is another's loss. Thus the social planner will want agents to be less picky, since choosy
behavior results in surplus loss due to time discounting and beneﬁts the social planner much
less than it does the individual. Thus, per-date costs can counter this excessive pickiness,
and we ﬁnd that a social planner will utilize positive per-date prices to make agents less
picky and increase total surplus.
A proﬁt seeking monopolist 8platform will also charge positive per-date prices.9 In this
environment, the platform fully extracts surplus from the lowest quality agent who joins,
while leaving rents to all higher class agents due to the lack of price discrimination. By
forcing higher types to match to lower types they'd like to reject, per-date costs can be
interpreted as inducing a transfer from high types to low types, which allows the platform
to extract more surplus from agents by making the indiﬀerent agent better oﬀ (and willing
to pay more) at a cost to the rents of high type agents, which the platform does not value.
We also consider the case where per-date costs are frictions, and a platform has access
to technology that can lower per-date frictions at a cost to the platform. Some online
dating platforms in fact oﬀer technologies such as video-chat and ID veriﬁcation to lower
informational frictions. Even in this case, we ﬁnd that a monopolist platform often prefers
high per-date costs, despite their great cost to agents. Per-date costs can again be interpreted
as inducing a transfer from high types to low types, increasing the ﬁxed fee the platform can
charge. With appropriately chosen per-date costs, this beneﬁt oﬀsets the direct surplus losses
due to per-date frictions. Thus, in this environment platforms often do not have an incentive
to induce truth-telling or informative reporting, and in fact may beneﬁt from inducing lying
if lowering frictions is even slightly costly. A social planner will generally prefer to lower
8A platform with signiﬁcant market power may be a reasonable approximation of the online dating market
as the market is fairly concentrated and the fact and much of the market outside of the two largest ﬁrms,
IAC and eHarmony, is highly diﬀerentiated niche platforms like JDate and ChristianMingle.
9Explicit per-date prices are currently uncommon in dating platforms, though some platforms, like Ashley
Madison and It's Just Lunch, have utilized them. More common are contracts that limit the number of
contacts one can make in a given period of time and charge a premium for unlimited contacts, which has
qualitatively similar eﬀects but is less tractable to model.
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per-date frictions to zero if the cost to the platform of this technology is suﬃciently low, but
there are special cases where even a social planner will prefer higher per-date frictions.
In the broader set of equilibria, the ability to freely report type allows for many forms
of pooling, including highly non-monotonic reporting where, for example, agents in a high
type class and a low type class make the same report while agents in an intermediate quality
class make reports that uniquely identify their class. However, we ﬁnd that, regardless of
reporting strategies, equilibria are characterized by a class partition where, after going on
a date, agents will only match to draws whose true type is within their class. Hence, this
paper contributes to the literature by extending the coarse, class based form of positively
assortative matching (PAM)10 found previously in NTU search models like Macnamara and
Collins (1990) and Burdett and Coles (1997) to an environment with cheap talk and costly
type veriﬁcation.
It also contributes to the literature on two-sided platformsspeciﬁcally, the literature on
strategic matching platforms. In particular, we show how informational frictions can be
proﬁtably used by a strategic platform to counteract externalities in matching markets. A
recent survey of the search and matching literature by Chade, Eeckhout, and Smith (2015)
identiﬁed the nature and implications of externalities in matching markets as one of the major
open questions in the ﬁeld, so this analysis addresses an important hole in the literature.
We'll now describe some additional salient features of the online dating market. It features
signiﬁcant concentration, with eHarmony taking in $310 million in revenue in 2014 and
platforms owned by the IAC (Match, Tinder, OkCupid, etc.) taking in $601 million, almost
all of which was from dating websites, where total dating site revenue was $1.08 billion. 11.
Membership is slightly less concentrated, with IAC platforms serving 21% of users in 2014
and eHarmony serving 13% 12. The remainder of the market is composed of small platforms,
many of which are niche dating sites, and recent dating app entries. Platforms typically either
10Higher types match with higher types, lower types match with lower types.
11http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/04/06/online-datings-age-wars-inside-
tinder-and-eharmonys-ﬁght-for-our-love-lives/
12http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dating-business-love-on-the-rocks-1433980637
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oﬀer a single service at a positive price, or a free, ad-supported service and a premium paid
service with additional amenities, such as unlimited messaging, better search options, and
video chat. Many platforms engage in second degree price discrimination, oﬀering signiﬁcant
discounts for longer contracts. Typical contract lengths are 1, 3, 6, or 12 months. Few major
platforms engage in overt demographic based price discrimination, although Tinder prices
based on age.
While this paper focuses on an application to online dating markets, matching markets
with search and costly type veriﬁcationand thus an incentive for lower quality agents to
pool with higher quality agentsappear in a variety of contexts, notably in job search. While
the NTU assumption is less palatable for job search, as wages are often bargained over and
can be set ﬂexibly by the employer, there are also often limits to the degree of transferability.
Among other things, ﬁrms may have their wage setting abilities constrained by regulations
like minimum wages, and progressive taxation makes larger transfers more costly. Hence,
the eﬃciency and proﬁtability of positive per-date frictions we ﬁnd assuming NTU may
extendperhaps with some attenuationto partially transferable utility (PTU) environments
that may more credibly model applications like job search. Additionally, in some job search
applications like the market for medical residents, wage oﬀers are extremely compressed due
to the market structure, making NTU a reasonable assumption. While the National Resident
Matching Program ends with a one-shot assignment game based on rankings reported by each
side, hospitals and students meet in time consuming and costly interviews before reporting
their preferences, suggesting a search model like the present may capture some stylized
characteristics of such markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the related lit-
erature and this paper's place within it. Section 1.3 lays out the basic theoretical framework
this paper uses, characterizes the set of equilibria in this environment, and provides equilib-
rium selection arguments. Section 1.4 incorporates a strategic platform that can change the
magnitude of the per-date costs. Section 1.5 concludes. Section 1.6 is the appendix, which
includes proofs for many of the propositions in the paper, as well as analysis of the model
with alternative assumptions, such as diﬀerent matching technologies.
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1.2 Related Literature
This paper follows a rich literature on search and matching. In particular, it ﬁts within the
literature on search and matching with NTU. McNamara and Collins (1990) ﬁrst studied
the NTU search environment with a continuum of types and found the distinctive partition
or class equilibrium common in this literature, where agents in each class only match within
their class. Burdett and Coles (1997) extended this analysis to a steady state environment
with exogenous inﬂows of agents and endogenous outﬂows. The present paper is closely
related to this strand of the literature. In particular, the constant returns to matching model
can be interpreted as Burdett and Coles with an additional reporting stage. Eeckhout (1999)
extends this result to multiplicatively separable preferences, and Chade (2001) extends it
to ﬁxed search costs. Smith (2006) looks at even more general preferences, situating the
partition result in a larger class of equilibria where partitioning does not necessarily hold.
There is a parallel literature for the transferable utility (TU) assumption, with Shimer and
Smith (2000) studying equilibria in the analogous TU environment. Generally, TU makes
characterizing equilibria, payoﬀs and agent behavior more diﬃcult.
There is also a small literature on strategic matching platforms with search. Bloch
and Ryder (2000) study a monopolist platform environment that can oﬀer frictionless NTU
matches for a ﬁxed fee or a ﬁxed proportion of match surplus, with an outside option of
NTU search. Damiano and Li (2007) study vertically diﬀerentiated agents and a monopolist
that creates a continuum of platforms and sets prices to induce agents to join their assigned
platform and match with identical agents. Given the simplicity of observed contracts in this
market and the potential frictional costs of partitioning agents into many small platforms,
our paper instead considers what a less ambitious platform can do in an environment where
draw rates proportional to the mass of agents on a platform make inﬁnite partition of the
space into measure zero platforms ineﬃcient. Damiano and Li (2008) study competition
between matching markets.
This paper also relates to the literature on cheap talk and information transmission. The
cheap talk literature was pioneered in Crawford and Sobel (1982). Applications of cheap talk,
signaling, and information transmission to matching markets include Hoppe et al. (2009) and
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Hopkins (2012), who study matching with signaling. Bilancini and Boncinelli (2013) address
a similar NTU environment but assume only one side has unobservable types and consider a
binary choice between type certiﬁcation and full information matching and hiding one's type
and matching randomly. The present paper diﬀers from these works by focusing on a cheap
talk environment. Ko and Konishi (2010) study a proﬁt-maximizing platform matching
ﬁrms and workers in a many-to-one environment, where ﬁrms and workers report match-
speciﬁc wage oﬀers and desired wages, respectively. They ﬁnd that manipulating reporting
by curtailing the message space can improve proﬁts. A current working paper, Hagenbach
et al. (2015), studies an environment very similar to ours, with an initial reporting stage
and a costly type veriﬁcation stage before permanent matching in a search environment
with vertical diﬀerentiation and NTU. However, they consider a two point type distribution,
while our analysis focuses on the class structure that only appears non-degenerately in a
model with a continuum of types. We also study strategic platforms, while they focus on a
nonstrategic platform.
This paper also relates to the literature on two-sided platforms, pioneered in Rochet and
Tirole (2003, 2006) and Armstrong (2006). More recent work includes Weyl (2010), Bedre-
Defolie and Calvano (2013), and Lee (2013). In contrast to the majority of this literature,
which takes advantage of simple, exogenous speciﬁcations for network externalities, this
paper explicitly models the special case of network eﬀects induced by a search model of
matching.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Preliminaries
We model a heterosexual market on an online dating platform and denote the two sides men
(m) and women (w). Agents are characterized by a single vertical characteristic representing
quality or attractiveness, where every agent strictly prefers higher quality matches. Quality
for side j is distributed over [q
j
, qj], qj > 0.
13 When agents join the platform, the platform
13If q = 0 there can be inﬁnitely many classes, which poses diﬃculties for certain aspects of the analysis.
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solicits a report on their true type qˆ ∈[q
j
, qj], representing their online dating proﬁle. On the
platform, agents engage in bilateral search for partners in continuous time, with a discount
rate of r ∈ (0,∞). Agents receive random draws from from the endogenous distribution of
agents on the other side Gj(q, t) according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α, where
Gj is continuous14
When they meet, each agent observes the other's report, and they make an ex-ante
decision whether or not to propose a date. If both propose a date, they pay a per-date
cost,15 learn each other's true type, and make an ex-post decision whether to propose a
match. If both propose a match they marry forever. If either rejects in the ﬁrst stage
they part costlessly, while if either rejects after the date they part having paid the per
date cost. Inﬂow into the platform is exogenous and time invariant, with the cumulative
distribution given by Fj(q), where Fj is twice diﬀerentiable and has full support on [qj, qj].
The corresponding density is given by fj(q). The total mass of inﬂow is equal for both sides
and normalized to 1. Outﬂow is determined endogenously by the rate of acceptances and
the mass on the platform. The mass of agents on the platform is given by N .
Total match surplus is given by a function u(qm, qw) ≡ ψm(qm)φm(qw) + ψw(qw)φw(qm),
where each agent's payoﬀ is multiplicatively separable into an own type component ψ and a
match's type component φ. Both are weakly increasing twice diﬀerentiable positive functions,
with φ is strictly increasing. We assume non-transferable utility (NTU), where uw(qm, qw) ≡
ψw(qw)φw(qm) and um(qm, qw) ≡ ψm(qm)φm(qw). This means that agents cannot bargain
over the apportionment of surplus, perhaps due to social norms, which may be plausible
in some matching markets such as dating markets. NTU, along with the multiplicative
separability of each agent's own type and match type in their payoﬀ, ensures the very simple
and tractable class structure common to this literature. Per-date cost for an agent of type
qj on side j is ψj(qj)c. This is a strong assumption, but it is also necessary to preserve the
14We'll prove this later.
15We assume agents cannot match sight-unseen. This seems consistent with most marriage/partnership
formation, where some amount of quality veriﬁcation precedes commitment. Even arranged marriages typi-
cally involve reconnaissance by relatives.
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class structure of the equilibrium.16 When ψ = 1, as in the commonly assumed case where
utility is simply match's type, per-date costs can be thought of as either a price imposed by
the platform or the opportunity or eﬀort cost of going on a date. When ψ 6= 1, per date costs
should be thought of as opportunity costs that are increasing in type. 17 Unless otherwise
noted, agents have an outside option of zero, such that every possible match is preferable to
remaining unmatched.
We'll focus on stationary equilibria where
• Assumption 1 (STN) : Each agent believes Gj(q, t) = Gj(q).
Further assume stationary agent strategies, where a strategy is an agent's ex-ante date
decision for each reported type and ex-post match decision for each true type. Let µi(qˆ) be
agent i's belief about the distribution of q given a report qˆ. Following Burdett and Coles
(1997) and extending the deﬁnition to a game of incomplete information, we utilize the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 Given (Gm, Gw), a Bayesian perfect partial equilibrium (BPPE) is a strategy
proﬁle and beliefs µ where STN is satisﬁed, agents maximize utility subject to their belief about
other agents' types and actions and follow sequential rationality, and beliefs are consistent
with Bayes rule wherever possible.18
This deﬁnition identiﬁes a set of candidates for a steady state equilibrium, which we will
later winnow down by requiring that inﬂows equal outﬂows.
We can now establish several useful properties of the agents' strategies and payoﬀs. First,
we'll establish that agents follow cutoﬀ strategies:
16We'll relax this assumption in numerical simulations in Appendix 1.6.1.
17Note that, if φw = φm, we can deﬁne a new trait x
′ = φ(x) and ﬁnd a distribution H such that
F (φ−1(x′)) = H(x′). Thus, when we assume symmetric payoﬀs it will suﬃce to consider φ(x) = x. However,
when we make distributional assumptions we must note that they will change when types are mapped back
into the original distribution.
18Also assume agents reject ex-post matches when indiﬀerent and accept ex-post matches they strictly
prefer to continued search when they believe the probability of beign accepted is zero.
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Lemma 1 In a BPPE each agent x accepts all draws above some cutoﬀ q
x
ex-post and rejects
all draws below. Each agent x accepts all draws with expected discounted match quality above
a cutoﬀ ex-ante and rejects all draws below. Each agent accepts a strictly positive measure
of ex-post matches in equilibrium.
Proof. After true type is revealed, an agent chooses between a continuation value indepen-
dent of current draw and the value of the draw. Accepting is costless, so they must accept if
the utility of the draw exceeds the continuation value and reject otherwise. Before true type
is revealed, agents choose between a continuation value independent of the current report
and the expected discounted match quality associated with that report.
Accepting a zero measure of dates or matches yields a continuation value of zero. Ac-
cepting any agent yields a strictly positive payoﬀ ex-post, thus agents must have a cutoﬀ
below the maximal type on the other side.
Let Uw(q|qˆ) denote woman q′s expected discounted lifetime utility when reporting qˆ.
qwE(q|qˆ) ≡ Uw(q|qˆ)/ψw(q) is then the expected discounted match quality. Given symmetric
deﬁnitions for men, we can easily show that higher type agents get matches of weakly better
discounted quality (and thus higher utility) and that agents with higher quality matches
must have weakly higher types:
Lemma 2 If an agent is of type x > x′, qjE(x|qˆx) ≥ qjE(x′|qˆx′). If qjE(x|qˆx) > qjE(x′|qˆx′),
x > x′.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, any agent that will accept x' ex-post must accept x and x can
always mimic the x' strategy. Thus an x agent can always obtain at least as high expected
match quality as an x' agent.
We will make one of two assumptions about the rate of draws agents face. Speciﬁcally,
we'll assume they face linear returns to matching (LRM) in the main body of the paper, and
consider the case of constant returns to matching (CRM)
19 in Appendix 1.6.2.
19Note that LRM is sometimes referred to as a quadratic search technology, owing to the quadratic nature
of the total number of draws in the market as a function of the number of agents, and CRM is sometimes
referred to as a linear search technology based on the linear rate of total draws in the market as a function
of the total number of agents.
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• Assumption 2A (LRM) : Agents receive a rate of draws α proportional to the mass
of agents on the platform, normalized to N .
• Assumption 2B (CRM) : Agents receive a constant rate of draws α, normalized to
1.
Linear returns to matching means that the frequency of draws is proportional to the mass
of agents on the platform and that thick markets make search faster. Most past work on
search with NTU has focused on the constant returns to matching environment, and this
may be more appropriate for traditional forms of partner search where ﬁnding potential
matches is time consuming and these frictions put an upper bound on the number of draws
an agent can consider, regardless of the size of the market. However, on an online dating
platform, we'll argue that linear returns may be more realistic. With easy search, ﬁltering,
and detailed information available with a single click, it's plausible that more agents on the
platform means more draws, since one may quickly exhaust a small list of potential matches
by paring it down to a handful of likely matches.
In fact, the linear returns environment is signiﬁcantly more tractable than the constant
returns one: since there are no per-draw costs in this model, having to eliminate more agents
outside of your acceptance region imposes no cost, and thus changes in the mass of agents
outside your class has no eﬀect on your optimization problem. This can be motivated by the
nearly costless ﬁltering out of undesired matches that may be achieved on a search platform.
With CRM, by contrast, more agents in other classes means it will take longer to get a draw
from your class, making behavior in each class dependent on behavior in every other class.
Deﬁne λ ≡ Pr[match|q, qˆ] and γ ≡ Pr[date|q, qˆ]. Given that the continuation value of a
woman of type q reporting qˆ (and the case for men is symmetric) is their lifetime expected
utility, Uw(q|qˆ), and is also equal to the ex-post cutoﬀ draw qwl(q, qˆ), the dynamic program
for this environment gives us the following optimization condition ex-post for a small time
period dt:
Uw(q|qˆ) = Uw(q|qˆ)(1− λαdt) + λαdtE[φw(q
′)ψw(q)|q, qˆ,match]− γαdtψw(q)c
(1 + rdt)
(1.3.1)
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Where c does not appear on the left-hand side (LHS) because the per-date cost has
already been paid when the ex-post match decision is being made. Taking the limit as
dt→ 0, we have
Uw(q|qˆ) = (αλE[φw(q
′)|q, qˆ,match]− αγc)ψw(q)
λα + r
(1.3.2)
and applying the equality between continuation and cutoﬀ acceptance utility,
φw(qwl(q, qˆ))ψw(q) =
(αλE[φw(q
′)|q, qˆ,match]− αγc)ψw(q)
λα + r
(1.3.3)
Notice that this speciﬁcation for the cutoﬀ means that the way one's own type enters
the utility function doesn't aﬀect agent behavior, and thus only matters when one considers
welfare or adds prices to the model.
Because the continuation value is the same for both the ex-post and ex-ante decisions,
but ex-ante the per-date cost is not sunk, the ex-ante cutoﬀ is simply φ−1w (φw(qwl(q, qˆ)) + c)
if type is certain or expected discounted match quality equal to the same.
Lemma 3 Ex-post cutoﬀs and optimal strategies are independent of ψj.
Proof. Direct inspection of 1.3.3.
1.3.2 The Set of Equilibria
Ex-Post matching structure
We can now analyze ex-post matching behavior. While the structure of reporting can be
quite complex, ex-post matching behavior is simple and highly consistent with previous
research on NTU search models with observable types. In particular, Proposition 1 shows
that agents will partition themselves into classes in equilibrium. First, we'll formally deﬁne
the terminology:
Deﬁnition 2 We'll call an interval of types a class if every agent with a type in that class
accepts any type from that interval ex-post and only forms ex-post matches with types within
the class. Deﬁne the lower bound of a class n on side j qj(n).
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Note that this is a condition on the second stage where type has been revealed. Agents in a
given class may reject agents within their class ex-ante, and accept dates from agents outside
their class depending on the reporting structure.
Proposition 1 The distribution of agents on each side is partitioned by intervals (or classes)
of agents where, for each class n, men(women) in class n will accept any woman(man) in
their corresponding class n ex-post, will reject any woman(man) below class n, and will be
rejected by any woman(man) above class n.
Proof. Consider a qm man. qm men are accepted by every woman ex-post and must accept
women above a cutoﬀ strictly below qw by Lemma 1. Thus, there is a nontrivial interval
over which every qm man accepts matches ex-post. Denote the lower bound qw(1) for the
highest type man's cutoﬀ type (in the distribution of women) and qm(1) for women. Then
by Lemmas 1 and 2, every agent must accept this interval ex-post as they have lower types.
Since women will accept men above qm(1) ex-post, a man above that type can mimic any
man's strategy. Thus, every man above qm(1) will get the same payoﬀ in expectation and
thus the same cutoﬀ qw(1). We'll call the interval of women (qw(1), qw] class 1 of side w and
denote the nth class class n. A symmetric analysis yields (qm(1), qm], class 1 of side m. We
can proceed inductively from here. Given that every woman above qw(n) rejects any man at
or below qm(n), qm(n) type agents face a problem analogous to qm men, and accept every
woman in an interval whose lower limit is deﬁned as qw(n + 1). Similarly, every lower type
man accepts all women in (qw(n+1), qw(n)]. Thus every woman in class n+1 is accepted by
the same set of men and must have the same payoﬀ in expectation and thus the same cutoﬀ
qm(n + 1). A symmetric analysis shows that every man in (qm(n + 1), qm(n)] only accepts
women above qw(n+ 1).
Figure 1.3.1 shows the class structure of an equilibrium. Agents in each class only match
to agents in the same class on the opposite side. An agent in class 3, for example will accept
anyone in a classes 1, 2, or 3 ex-post, and will be rejected ex-post by every agent in classes 1
and 2. Note that the length of classes can vary based on density and the class cutoﬀs need
not be symmetric if the distributions are not. This class structure ensures that agents in
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Figure 1.3.1: The class structure of an equilibrium.
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Figure 1.3.2: This diagram shows inter-class pooling, as in Proposition 2.
each class must have a higher payoﬀ than agents receive in any lower class.
Lemma 4 Suppose type q is in class m and type q′ is in class n. If m>n, qjE(q) > qjE(q′).
Proof. Suppose not. Then the q and q′ agents receive the same payoﬀ and thus must have
the same ex-post cutoﬀ. But then they are in the same class. Contradiction.
Reporting Structure
We can now address the reporting stage of the game. While the ex-post class structure
was simple, there are a wide range of possible reporting structures, including pooling over
multiple classes. Because of the bilateral nature of the signaling, it's important to note the
possibility of asymmetric reporting where, for example, every woman pools and every man
reports their class. The redundancy of the two sided reporting and acceptance decisions
means that, so long as one side reports their class and accepts everyone ex-ante, the other
side can simply accept only the the class they will match to ex-post.
Deﬁnition 3 On a given side, we'll call an interval a contiguous pool if there is a report qˆ
such that, for every type in the interval, some agent of that type reports qˆ or another report
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that is accepted by the same set of agents ex-ante.
Pools, then, are deﬁned based on reporting and the ex-ante dating stage. This is in contrast
to classes, which are deﬁned based on ex-post acceptance decisions. The following proposition
shows that, for any any contiguous set of classes n through n+k, an equilibrium exists where
all agents in each of these classes pool on a single report qˆ. That is, any pooling structure
that nests contiguous sets of classes within pools can be supported in equilibrium. Figure
1.3.2 shows an example with two classes pooling on a single report: all agents in classes 1
and 2 make the same report qˆ. Note that the cutoﬀs for these classes are endogenous in the
reporting structure.
Proposition 2 Any contiguous pool (qj(n+ k), qj(n− 1)] can be supported in a BPPE.
Proof. Suppose that, for each side j, all agents in classes n through n+ k pool on a single
report qˆj, no agent outside (qj(n+k), qj(n−1)] reports qˆj and every agent rejects any report
made only by agents outside of their class. Then if a pooling agent makes any report other
than qˆj they will never receive a match, yielding a non-positive payoﬀ. Thus there is no
proﬁtable deviation for pooling agents. If each other class i forms a pool where all agents
report qˆij, this is an equilibrium, so a BPPE exists.
We will now provide a lemma that establishes the range of characteristics pools can have
in equilibrium. In particular, it shows that pool cutoﬀs can coincide with class cutoﬀs as
above or appear within classes, with the possibility of multiple pools within a class and
mutual rejection by agents within the same class but in diﬀerent pools, even though they
would like to match ex-post.
Lemma 5 For any contiguous pool in a BPPE, on at least one side of the market, one of
the following holds for the lower(upper) bound of the pool:
i) The lower(upper) bound is also the lower(upper) cutoﬀ of the lowest(highest) class with
reports in the pool.
ii) the non-endogenous pool cutoﬀ induces indiﬀerence between reporting within the pool
and giving any report given by agents in the lowest(highest) pooling class but outside the pool.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider the lower bound case. Suppose i) and ii) are vio-
lated and the pool is consistent with equilibrium. Then there is a report made in equilibrium
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by an agent in the lowest pooling class with a diﬀerent payoﬀ than some other report made
by an agent outside pool but in the class. Then agents in that class have a strict incentive
to give the higher payoﬀ report and the assumed reporting is not optimal. Contradiction.
The above lemma could be presented more tersely by giving a more general form of ii., but
this formulation provides more intuition about the range of possible reporting strategies. It
suggests several diﬀerent sorts of equilibria, and we will describe examples for both cases. If
reports satisfy i) for both bounds, classes are nested within pools and agents can't proﬁtably
leave the pool by reporting above, where they'll get rejected, or reporting below, where they'll
get a lower payoﬀ. If reports satisfy ii) for both bounds, agents will reject one another ex-ante
even though they are in the same class. For example, suppose a report qˆm is made by some
men in class n and some outside of it, and qˆw is made by some women in class n and some
outside. If men reporting qˆm always reject women reporting qˆw and vice versa, deviating to
accepting may yield a costly date with no match and will never yield a match, so it is strictly
better to reject. This can be supported if the payoﬀ for each report on a given side in class
n is equal, e.g. half of n men of each type in the class report qˆm1 and only accept qˆw1 and
the other half report qˆm2 and only accept qˆw2 , and women behave symmetrically. Note that
reports need not satisfy the same case for both the top and the bottom bounds the upper
bound could satisfy i) while the lower bound satisﬁes ii)
This can analysis can trivially be extended to pools that are discontiguous but can be
represented as a ﬁnite union of contiguous pools. In fact, we can quite easily ﬁnd equilibria
where, for example, classes 1 and 3 pool on a single report despite rejecting one another
ex-post while class 2 agents make a report that uniquely identiﬁes their class.
Corollary 1 Suppose the support of a pool can be expressed as the union of a ﬁnite set of
intervals. Then each interval must satisfy Lemma 5.
Thus we see that the structure of reporting can be highly non-monotonic, and agents within
a given class can even reject each other ex-ante. However, the underlying ex-post matching
structure retains the coarsely assortative class structure found in previous research in this
environment with observable types.
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The Limited Pooling Equilibrium
Having established some characteristics of the set of possible equilibria, we will now introduce
the equilibrium20 of interest for the remainder of this paper. Unlike many other equilibria
in this environment, this equilibrium looks very similar to those found in Macnamara and
Collins (1990) and Burdett and Coles (1997), with agents only dating within their class. The
primary diﬀerence from equilibria with observable types is that there is a region between
the ex-ante and ex-post (class) cutoﬀs for each class that, with observable types, would be
rejected by the agents in the class. However, since per-date costs induce a lower ex-post
cutoﬀ, agents in this interval can pool with those above them and get accepted due to the
laxer ex-post standards.
Deﬁnition 4 (Limited Pooling Partial Equilibrium (LPPE)) We'll call a BPPE an LPPE
if each agent makes a report only made by agents in their class and accepts every report
made by agents in their class.21
We can now easily characterize the equilibrium pooling structure and the relationship
between the ex-ante and ex-post acceptance decisions:
Lemma 6 (1) In any LPPE, agents between the ex-ante and ex-post cutoﬀs must pool with
agents above the ex-ante cutoﬀ such that the expected quality of that report exceeds the ex-ante
cutoﬀ.
(2) In any LPPE, agents will always accept after a date.
Proof. Consider an agentm(w) in class n. Suppose a report qˆ is never made by women(men)
above the ex-ante cutoﬀ in class n. Then m(w)'s continuation value is higher than the
expected payoﬀ of dating and matching to the qˆ woman(man) and he must reject. Thus
women(men) below the ex-ante cutoﬀ must pool with agents above it to gain acceptance in
their class. It is immediate that any agent with a type below the ex-ante cutoﬀ must pool
20Formally, a set of equilibria with reporting strategies that lead to equivalent payoﬀs for all agents.
21Note that there is a larger set of equivalent equilibria where every agent accepts every agent in their class
ex-ante and only goes on dates with agents in their class, but where, for example, men make informative
reports and accept all matches and women make uninformative reports and are selective. It is without loss
to consider the special case of Deﬁnition 4.
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Figure 1.3.3: The pooling structure of an LPPE.
with an agent of a type above the ex-ante cutoﬀ for the average quality of an agent in that
pool to exceed the ex-ante cutoﬀ. Finally, since agents only accept dates within their class,
they always accept a match after a date.
Figure 1.3.3 shows the pooling structure of an LPPE. For women(men) in each class,
agents the region from qw(n)+c to qw(n) are below the ex-ante class cutoﬀ but above the
ex-post class cutoﬀ, and thus will be rejected ex-ante if they reveal their true type, but will
be accepted ex-post. Thus, they must pool with agents above the ex-ante cutoﬀ (classes will
always have length greater than c, so this is always possible). Note that, in this example,
q
w
> qw(4) + c, so the fourth class ends before the ex-ante cutoﬀ. While the ﬁrst J-1 classes
must end with the class's endogenous ex-post cutoﬀ, the last class J may end with the lower
limit of the support of G, which may be above qw(J) or even above qw(J) + c.
Lemma 6 shows that agents between the two cutoﬀs must pool in order to maximize
their payoﬀs. Comparing an LPPE to the larger set of equilibria, we see two primary ways
other equilibria diﬀer: we can ﬁnd equilibria where multiple classes pool reports and we have
between-class date acceptance, and we can ﬁnd equilibria where agents in a given class reject
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dates with others within that class due to coordination failures.
The lack of a complex reporting structure independent of ex-post classes make LPPE
very tractable, and thus very attractive. There are reasons beyond convenience to focus
on LPPE, though. Given linear returns to matching (LRM) and a steady-state assumption
these equilibria must exhibit the ﬁnest class partition in the set of steady-state equilibria in
terms of the number of classes.22
Additionally, in any other equilibrium some agents must pool and accept dates they will
later reject, or reject dates they'd like to accept. This means that every such agent would
strictly prefer to leave the pool and report their true class, and they are only prevented
from doing so by the absence of messages that can reveal their class.23 In particular, any
man(woman) who goes on dates outside their class or rejects dates inside their class would
prefer to unilaterally reveal their true class and commit to accepting agents in their class
ex-post, since this would allow them to match to every good draw and to reject every bad
date. This does not imply a simple equilibrium dominance argument, unfortunatelyeveryone
switching to truthful reporting of class creates higher expected payoﬀs, which induces higher
class cutoﬀs. Thus, agents between the old and new cutoﬀs could be made worse oﬀ by being
bumped from class n to class n+ 1.
However, given LRM, consider a non-LPPE equilibrium. There must be some class
where men(women) reject dates within the class or accept dates outside the class. For the
ﬁrst such class, n, class n men(women) who would remain in the class under the limited
pooling class cutoﬀ would all strictly prefer to form a coalition and report their true class, if
that were possible. Importantly, if they did, no man(woman) outside their class would have
an incentive to re-pool with their new report, since they would simply be rejected ex-post,
and any coalition attempting to repool would necessarily include agents who would be worse
oﬀ under the coalitional deviation. Thus, non-LPPE seem fragile in the sense that all agents
will deviate from the multi-class pools that deﬁne them if they can ﬁnd a way to report their
22Depending on the parameterization, there may be other equilibria with the same number of classes, but
none will have fewer.
23We'll proceed informally here. Formally modeling this game with coalitions, repeated reports, and
deviations that induce oﬀ equilibrium path beliefs and play outside of steady-state would be intractable.
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true type, and when agents deviate from these pools there is no incentive for the agents in
their former pool to unilaterally follow them to a new report.
Could this same argument also exclude the LPPE, where pooling also occurs? We'll
provide a heuristic argument to the contrary. In an LPPE, high type agents in a class would
like to reveal their true types and thus escape pooling with agents between the ex-ante and
ex-post cutoﬀs. However, all of these low type agents strictly prefer to pool with higher type
agents in the class. If we assume that agents can change reports at intervals and coalitional
deviations are signiﬁcantly more costly than unilateral deviations due to coordination costs,
we'd expect to generally see pooling as in the LPPE since it will be too costly for high types
to repeatedly coordinate on new reports only to have low types unilaterally follow them.
The ﬁnest partition and equilibrium preference arguments are formalized in Section 1.3.3.
We can now write down the explicit form of the agents optimization problem. We'll
focus on the case where the distributions of men and women and their utility functions are
symmetric for tractability. Deﬁne the number of classes as J, the proportion of agents in
class n λn ≡ G(q(n− 1))−G(q(n)), and deﬁne ql and qu as the lower and upper cutoﬀs for
a class, respectively. Given that agents accept any agent in their class and reject all others
ex-ante, every date results in a match and the probability of accepting a draw is λn. Then
equation 1.3.3 can be rewritten as
ql =
αλ
λα + r
∫ qu
ql
(x− c)g(x)
λ
dx (1.3.4)
Rearranging and applying integration by parts, we have:
ql =
α
r
(
∫ qu
ql
G(qu)−G(x)dx− λc) (1.3.5)
We can now characterize the class structure explicitly:
Proposition 3 Given G, a LPPE implies sequence of cutoﬀs for men and women {q(n)}Jn=0
satisfying q(n) = α
r
(
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
G(q(n− 1))−G(x)dx− λnc), where q(0) = q, and q(J) <= q.
Proof. The ﬁrst and third claims follow directly from Proposition 1 and equation 1.3.5, and
if the fourth were not true there would be another class J + 1.
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It also follows that agents accepting measure zero masses of agents outside their class
or rejecting measure zero masses of agents inside their class generates the same cutoﬀs and
payoﬀs.
1.3.3 Steady State in the Limited Pooling Equilibrium.
Linear Returns to Matching
The linear returns to matching equilibrium analysis closely follows Burdett and Coles (1997).
Some proofs go through nearly unchanged, but others must be amended to account for per-
date costs and the diﬀering assumptions on returns to matching. Deﬁne the distribution
of agents leaving the platform as H(q) and the mass of agents leaving the platform by O.
We can now deﬁne our complete equilibrium concept by combining the partial equilibrium
of the LPPE, which ensures all behavior and beliefs are rational and assumes steady-state,
with a balanced ﬂow condition that ensures steady-state holds by equating the endogenous
outﬂows with the exogenous inﬂows, closing the model.
Deﬁnition 5 (LPPE Steady-State Equilibrium (LSSE)): given exogenous inﬂows (F ), a
steady state equilibrium is pair (G,N) satisfying LPPE and balanced ﬂow: for every interval
[q1, q2) ∈ [q, q], O(H(q2)−H(q1)) = F (q2)− F (q1).
The cutoﬀ equation is now
q(n) =
N
r
(
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
G(q(n− 1))−G(x)dx− λnc) (1.3.6)
Within a given class, we can get a simple characterization of outﬂow. Outﬂow in a class
is given by the number of agents on the platform, N, times the proportion of agents in the
class, λn, times the rate of draws of an agent in that class Nλn. Then outﬂow from class n
is λ2nN
2. Then, in an LSSE,
λn =
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N (1.3.7)
We also have that, for any [q1, q2) in class n, λn(G(q2)−G(q1))N2 = F (q2)− F (q1) and
thus, with the diﬀerentiability of F,
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g(q) =
f(q)
λnN2
(1.3.8)
Thus the density of agents on the platform in a given class is inﬂow density times a scalar.
Combining (1.3.6) and balanced ﬂow, we can get eliminate G terms, yielding class cutoﬀs
solely in terms of inﬂows and c.
q(n) =
1
r
(
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n− 1))− F (x)
F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))dx− c)
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))) (1.3.9)
Note that in the linear returns environment, the N 's cancel out, and we have cutoﬀs
that depend on the previous cutoﬀ. We can now explicitly characterize the LSSE in this
environment:
Proposition 4 Given F, then (G,N) deﬁnes a LSSE if and only if G satisﬁes (1.3.8) and
λn satisﬁes (1.3.6), (1.3.7), q(0) = q, q(J) ≤ q, and
∑
n λn = 1.
Proof.
∑
n λn = 1, the boundary conditions, and (1.3.6)-(1.3.8) are necessary in an LSSE by
construction. Conversely, the assumptions guarantee G(q) = 1, G(q) = 0 and G increasing,
so G is a well deﬁned steady state distribution and any G and N satisfying them form a
valid LSSE.
Thus, equilibrium requires that each class cutoﬀ is the solution to the agents' optimal
stopping problem and the density on the platform is consistent with balanced ﬂow.
∑
n λn =
1 ensures that g is well deﬁned.
To ensure existence of an LSSE, we'll need to make some distributional assumptions. An
increasing hazard function will ensure that the class structure is unique. Note that, while
Burdett and Coles need this assumption to deal with a multiplicity of cutoﬀs due to N ,
that channel is shut down in the linear returns environment. However, this assumption also
constrains multiplicity induced by per-date costs, so it is still necessary in this environment.
• Assumption 3 (HAZ) : The hazard function f(q)/(1− F (q)) is increasing in q.
Proposition 5 Given F , the partition satisfying (1.3.6)-(1.3.8) and the boundary conditions
is unique.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.
The intuition for this proposition is that the RHS of (1.3.9) is decreasing in q(n), while
the LHS q(n) is obviously increasing, yielding a single crossing. The RHS can be interpreted
as the expected surplus quality of an accepted match over the cutoﬀ quality, multiplied by
the probability of acceptance. Generally, we'd expect this to be decreasing in cutoﬀ type
q(n), since a higher cutoﬀ lowers the surplus over cutoﬀ for any given draw, and, were G
exogenous, a higher cutoﬀ would lower the probability of accepting a draw. However, due to
the endogenous nature of G, it's possible for the density to rise as q(n) increases, swamping
the aforementioned eﬀects. The hazard rate assumption ensures that the density can't rise
too fast, excluding this possibility.
In this environment, existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium follow directly. The
class cutoﬀs are unique and these cutoﬀs imply a unique steady-state mass on the platform,
N . This in turn ensures a unique density g(q) = f(q)√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))N and thus a unique
distribution on the platform G.
Proposition 6 A unique LSSE exists.
Proof. The class summation condition and (1.3.7) yield
N =
∑
n
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))) (1.3.10)
and N does not enter the cutoﬀ equation so q(n) is not a function of N and uniqueness is
ensured. Existence is similarly direct.
We can also show that the cutoﬀs are decreasing in cthat is, increasing per-date costs
generally makes classes coarser, and for suﬃciently high c the class structure completely
unravels as every man(woman) accepts every woman(man) due to the high costs of continuing
their search and paying the per-date cost again.
Proposition 7 Given LRM, q(n) is decreasing and continuous in c in an LSSE for all n
and q(n)→ 0 for c suﬃciently high.
Proof. Suppose c increases. Consider the ﬁrst endogenous cutoﬀ, q(1). The RHS of (1.3.9)
is decreasing in c, and the RHS is decreasing in q(1) by Lemma 11, so the lower RHS from c
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must be compensated with a lower q(1) for equality to hold. We can now proceed inductively.
Suppose q(n−1) is decreasing in c. Lemma 11 also shows that the RHS increasing in q(n−1),
so to maintain equality, q(n) must increase in q(n − 1). Additionally the argument in the
base case ensures that, ﬁxing q(n − 1), q(n) is decreasing in c. Thus, q(n) is increasing in
the argument that decreases, q(n−1), and decreasing in the argument that increases, c, and
must decrease on net. Direct inspection shows continuity given the continuity of F . Lemma
11 shows that, for suﬃciently high per-date costs, the RHS goes to zero and thus the cutoﬀ
goes to zero.
The intuition for this result is that per-date costs lower expected match utility, and in the
optimal stopping problem cutoﬀ utility must be equal to expected match utility, so higher
per-date costs should yield lower cutoﬀs.
We're now ready to formalize the justiﬁcations for our equilibrium selection. Lemma
7 shows that LPPE classes with the same upper bound generate higher payoﬀs for agents
within the class and thus that the classes are smaller. Lemma 8 shows that the top agents
in a pool prefer revealing their class and matching to one another to remaining in the pool.
Corollary 2 shows that an LPPE induces the ﬁnest partition of the type-space in terms of
classes. Recall that q(n− 1) is the upper bound of a class n and deﬁne q(LPPE, q(n− 1))
as the cutoﬀ induced by q(n− 1) if everyone in the class accepts one another ex-ante and no
one else, as in an LPPE and nLPPE as the corresponding class starting at q(n− 1) with no
cross-class pooling or within-class rejection and where balanced ﬂow is satisﬁed. Also deﬁne
nLPPE,q(n) as the class with upper bound q(n − 1), lower bound q(n), limited pooling and
balanced ﬂow and deﬁne q(LPPE, n) as the nth cutoﬀ given an LPPE. Deﬁne Mn as the
mass of agents in class n.
Lemma 7 Given LRM, a class n starting at q(n− 1) where the probability of an agent in n
accepting a date outside the class or rejecting a date inside the class is strictly positive must
have a cutoﬀ q(n) <q(LPPE, q(n− 1)). Additionally, q(n) < q(LPPE, n).
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.
Lemma 8 Given LRM, consider an equilibrium where the probability of an agent in a class
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n accepting a date outside the class or rejecting a date inside the class is strictly posi-
tive. Further, deﬁne n as the ﬁrst class where this is true. Then agents in class n above
q(LPPE, q(n − 1)) all strictly prefer an equilibrium with class nLPPE to the one with class
n, and if they could coordinate to reveal their true class and accept only others in their class,
no agent outside their class would have an incentive to pool with them.
Proof. A class with a lower cutoﬀ of q(n) must have an expected match quality qE(n) = q(n)
and one with q(LPPE, q(n− 1)) must have qE(nLPPE) = q(LPPE, q(n− 1)). By Lemma 7,
q(n) < q(LPPE, q(n−1)), so agents must prefer the nLPPE. Additionally, any agent outside
the class that pools with them will be rejected ex-post, and thus has no incentive to pool.
Corollary 2 In any LSSE with LRM, the nth class cutoﬀ is maximal in the set of steady-
state equilibria, and the number of classes is also maximal.
Proof. By Lemma 7, q(n) < q(LPPE, n) and if q(k) exceeds the lower bound of the
distribution, q(LPPE, k) must as well.
1.4 Strategic Platforms
1.4.1 Per-Date Costs as Frictions
Monopolist Platform
Up until now, we've taken per-date costs as given, but a strategic platform such as a social
planner or proﬁt maximizing monopolist may be able to inﬂuence them, either by increasing
them via per-date pricing, or decreasing them by providing easy ways for agents to com-
municate and verify type (e.g. video chat) or verifying certain aspects of an agent's report.
We'll ﬁrst consider the frictional case with a monopolist platform. Speciﬁcally, we'll consider
a platform that charges a ﬁxed fee for both sides of the market, can provide its service cost-
lessly, faces an exogenous per-date friction c, and can decrease the per-date cost to c at a
cost τ(c), where τ(c) = 0 and τ is strictly decreasing in c. Thus the ﬁrm will charge a ﬁxed
fee p and every agent above a cutoﬀ q(p, c) will join the platform, yielding proﬁt ﬂow rate
Πfric(p, c) ≡ p(F (q) − F (q(p, c))) − τ(c), and p will equal the expected payoﬀ of the lowest
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joining agent. Formally, amend the game to include a ﬁrst stage where the platform chooses
p and c and consider the equilibrium where the maximal mass of agents join the platform.
As before, agents have an outside option of zero24. Deﬁne qn(c) as the nth endogenous cutoﬀ
given c. Deﬁne p∗(c) as the optimal price given a per-date cost c. Then it will generally be
optimal for the platform to set a price such that the lowest type joining the platform is also
the cutoﬀ type for the last class joining the platform. Speciﬁcally,
Lemma 9 Suppose LRM and c suﬃciently high. Either:
i) a positive c is optimal for the monopolist platform, or
ii) choosing a price that yields a cutoﬀ q(p, c) that does not coincide with the lowest
joining class' endogenous cutoﬀ is suboptimal for the platform if q(p, c) < q1(0).
Proof. Suppose the optimal contract yields a cutoﬀ q(p, c) such that q(p, c) > q1(c) and
q(p, c) < q1(0). Then a positive c is optimal. Now suppose the platform induces an individual
rationality (IR) cutoﬀ q(p, c) < q1(c), and q(p, c) 6= qn(c) for any n. For suﬃciently high c,
there must be a c′ such that c ≥ c′ > c and q(p, c) = q1(c′) since q1 is continuous, decreasing
in c, and goes to zero as c increases. Note that the cutoﬀ type is equal to discounted
expected utility. Thus, any class with the same lower cutoﬀ yields the same expected match
quality for agents in that class. Then if the ﬁrm chooses c′ and a p′ to induce the same
cutoﬀ, the quantity of agents on the platform is identical, but the cutoﬀ agent is willing to
pay φ(q(p, c))ψ(q(p, c)), while under the original regime the cutoﬀ agent is willing to pay
φ(qn(c))ψ(q(p, c)). q(p, c) > qn(c) implies p′ > p, and since cutoﬀs are decreasing in c,
τ(c′) < τ(c). Thus the ﬁrm will increase proﬁt by inducing q(p′, c′) = q1(c′).
We can use this to result to show that the platform generally will not have an incentive
to lower per-date costs to zero:
24This can be relaxed throughout Section 4. For example, the outside option can easily be re-speciﬁed
as a time discounted random draw from the distribution of agents oﬀ the platform (large platform) or the
overall distribution of agents in the market (small platform). Assuming that the search technology (draw
rate) oﬀ platform is suﬃciently slow, agents will optimally accept any draw oﬀ platform, rationalizing these
speciﬁcations. All the results of Section 4 go through with these endogenous outside options, though the
ﬁrm's optimal prices will change. If the search technology oﬀ platform isn't slow, high types may have better
outside options than low types, limiting the extent to which a platform can proﬁtably raise per-date prices
or allow per-date frictions. Generally, the greater the eﬃciency advantage of the platform relative to the
outside option, the more ﬂexibility the platform will have to support high per-date costs and manipulate
user behavior.
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Proposition 8 Suppose LRM. If c is suﬃciently high and q(p∗(0), 0) < q1(0), the monopolist
platform never has an incentive to lower per-date costs to zero.
Proof. q(p∗(0), 0) < q1(0), so since q(1, c) → 0 as c increases and q(1,c) is continuous
in c, the intermediate value theorem (IVT) ensures that there will be a c∗ > 0 such that
q(1, c∗) = q(p∗(0), 0), p∗(c∗) ≥ p∗(0), and τ(c∗) < τ(0). Thus proﬁt will be higher with a
per-date cost c∗ than with a zero per-date cost.
Thus, even when per-date costs are frictions, a monopolist platform can proﬁtably with-
hold higher eﬃciency search technologies, even when the cost of implementing such tech-
nologies is minimal. Lemma 9 shows that inducing endogenous class cutoﬀs equal to the IR
cutoﬀ is typically optimal, since that is the highest class cutoﬀ that indiﬀerent agent can
have and the higher a cutoﬀ is, the higher the utility agents in the class receive due to the
equality of the cutoﬀ and the continuation value. Then, given that prices and per-date costs
are chosen to induce this coincidence between the platform and last class cutoﬀ, higher per
date costs have a direct eﬀect of decreasing total surplus via eﬀort spent on dates, but at the
same time transfer surplus from high types to low types. Generally, the net eﬀect of these
countervailing forces would be ambiguous, but because the cutoﬀ is held constant they must
cancel out exactly, again due to the equality between cutoﬀs and continuation values. Thus,
in terms of revenue, the platform is indiﬀerent between any per-date costs that induce the
appropriate cutoﬀ, and strictly prefers higher per-date costs in terms of its own cost τ .
Social Planner
We can now consider analogous social planner's problem. Here, it is much less likely that it
will be eﬃcient to have positive per-date frictions. However, as was mentioned before and
will be elaborated in the next section, there are externalities that can make agents too picky,
and this can lead to ineﬃciently small classes and large utility losses due to discounting
agents spend too much time searching due to other agents' pickiness, and end up worse
oﬀ. Also, the last class is qualitatively diﬀerent then the preceding J-1 classesit may not
end at the endogenous cutoﬀ, but rather at the bottom of the support of the distribution,
which may be above the endogenous cutoﬀ. This can lead to tiny rump classes with very
low payoﬀs since there are very few agents in the class and thus the average search time is
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extremely high. In addition to directly lowering payoﬀs through frictions, c can thus speed
up matching and change the size of this last rump class, potentially avoiding ineﬃciently
sized ﬁnal classes. Note that the ﬂow of total surplus can be expressed as
TS ≡
J∑
n=1
qjE(n)
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
ψ(q)f(q)dq (1.4.1)
That is, for each class n, the rate of total surplus generation is the expected match utility
for each agent integrated over the distribution of inﬂow in class n, where expected match
quality for the class qjE(n) is constant across agents and can be pulled out of the integral.
Total surplus is the sum over these classes. For ease of exposition, suppose for now that
ψ(q) = 1. As shown in Appendix 1.6.2, we can express ∂TS
∂c
as the sum of the eﬀects of the
change in each class cutoﬀ ∂q(n)
∂c
on the surpluses generated in the classes above and below
it. In particular, the net eﬀect of a change in cutoﬀ q(n) is proportional to
F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))− f(q(n)) · (q(n)− q(n+ 1)) (1.4.2)
as shown in Figure 1.4.1. If F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)) > f(q(n))·(q(n)−q(n+1)) for all n (with a
caveat for the last class discussed in the Appendix), TS decreases in c, and if the inequality
is reversed the opposite holds. While the condition itself is simple, the class cutoﬀs are
determined by a highly non-homogeneous recurrence relation, so ﬁnding conditions for either
case is quite diﬃcult in general. Below, we treat the case when utility is highly supermodular,
which ensures Equation 1.4.2 is positive because the trade-oﬀ is between utility for class n,
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)), and utility for class n+1, f(q(n)) ·(q(n)−q(n+1)). Supermodularity
ensures that higher classes generate more surplus since they are populated by higher type
agents, so for suﬃcient supermodularity the eﬀect on class n dominates the eﬀect on class
n-1.
Proposition 9 Suppose LRM,ψ(q) = qα, and τ(c) = 0. If α is suﬃciently high, total
surplus is decreasing in c.
Proof. See Appendix 1.6.2.
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Figure 1.4.1: The trade-oﬀ induced by q(2) shifting due to an increase in c.
Class 2 surplus decreases proportionally to its mass (in green) due to the class cutoﬀ q(2) shifting
down and thus lowering expected match quality, which is equal to the class cutoﬀ. Lowering q(2)
also bumps top class 3 agents up to class 2. The surplus increase induced by this is proportional to
the change in payoﬀ q(2)−q(3) (red) multiplied by the density of agents at the cutoﬀ f(q(2)) (blue).
Geometrically, this is the blue rectangle in Class 3. If the former decrease (green area) exceeds the
latter increase (blue area) for each class, increasing c will lower total surplus.
In the Appendix 1.6.2 we run numerical simulations for the modular utility case, and
ﬁnd that increasing c typically decreases total surplus, and must decrease it above a certain
point (if c gets suﬃciently high no one can get positive utility from joining the platform).
The primary reason for this is that lower type classes tend to be smaller, since agents choose
their reservation types based on a trade-oﬀ between quality and discounting, which causes
a proportional decrease in match utility. Thus, agents who get high expected payoﬀs must
be less selective, as waiting is more costly for them. Since ∂TS
∂c
is negative when the surplus
loss for higher classes of shifting a cutoﬀ down outweighs the gain to lower classes, lower
classes having less mass and thus generating less surplus makes ∂TS
∂c
< 0 likely. Equivalently,
the direct eﬀect of decreasing surplus due to frictions overwhelms any eﬃciency gains due to
lower selectivity. However, at some values of c ∂TS
∂c
can be increasing, due to the eﬀect of c on
time discounting and the rump class. This is especially common with decreasing distributions
that yield more mass in lower classes. Decreasing distributions also put more weight on the
rump class, creating periodicity in the surplus as the class cutoﬀs shift downward in c and
the rump class goes from being a large, relatively eﬃcient class to a small class whose size
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is limited by the support of the distribution, and then to a large class again as the last class
cutoﬀ passes the bottom of the support of the distribution and the next class becomes the last
class. Thus, for friction reduction costs where small decreases in frictions are asymptotically
costless like τ(c) = (c¯−c)2, we can ﬁnd cases where there is no incentive to decrease per-date
frictions even a little bit, since total surplus is locally increasing in c.
1.4.2 Additively Separable Match Utility and Per-Date Prices
Monopolist Platform
We'll now consider the case of per-date costs as prices. We'll need to restrict our attention to
the case when ψ(q) = 1 for tractabilityplatforms charging a per-date price proportional to
agent type is inconsistent with the unobservable types assumption of this paper. Conversely,
charging a ﬁxed per-date price with supermodular match utility won't induce the class
structure that makes this analysis tractablehigher type agents in any potential class will
be less aﬀected by the per-date cost than lower type agents in that class, and will thus have
diﬀerent cutoﬀs. We study numerical simulations for supermodular cases in Appendix 1.6.1.
First consider the case of a monopolist platform. The platform charges a ﬁxed fee p and a per-
date price c. Consider the equilibrium where the maximal mass of agents join the platform.
Since ψ(q) = 1, social surplus is modularthe total surplus is just the sum of the match
payoﬀs φ(q) for each side, discounted by the expected time to match. Thus the structure of
matching has no eﬀect on payoﬀs, only the speed of assignment matters. Of course, individual
agents beneﬁt from matching to high types, but their beneﬁt comes at a cost to other agents
who don't get high type matches. Thus, externalities generally induce agents to be selective
when matching, even though a social planner would assign every agent on the ﬁrst draw.
Thus, increasing per-date prices improves social surplus. It is also clear that, if a monopolist
prefers positive per-date frictions, they will prefer positive per-date prices as well, which is the
basis on which Corollary 3 extends the frictional results of the last subsection to the per-date
price environment. Given proﬁts under frictions of Πfric(p, c) ≡ p(F (q)− F (q(p, c)))− τ(c),
proﬁts under prices are Πprice(p, c) ≡ (p+w(p, c)c)(F (q)−F (q(p, c))), where w is the average
of the expected discounting for each class weighted by the inﬂow rate of the class.
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Corollary 3 Suppose LRM. If q(p∗(0), 0) < q1(0), the monopolist platform never has an
incentive to lower per-date prices to zero.
Proof. Note that the proofs of Lemma 9 and Proposition 8 go through with the removal of
−τ(c) in the proﬁt function and the inclusion of w(p, c)c(F (q)− F (q(p, c)).
Social Planner
As discussed above, the social planner prefers agents to leave as quickly as possible to
minimize time discounting, since assignment doesn't matter. We can prove this result very
directly for constant returns to matching (CRM):
Proposition 10 Suppose CRM. If c is a price, ψ(q) = 1, f(x) is increasing or xf(x) is
increasing and c is suﬃciently small, and there is more than one class when c is zero, a
positive c maximizes social surplus.
Proof. A suﬃciently high c will ensure a single class, and we have multiple classes with
zero per-date costs.ψ(q) = 1, so, given the inﬂow distribution F , social surplus is given by
SS = 2
∫ q
q
φ(q)f(q)E[e−rt|q]dq. This is maximized when E[e−rt|q] is maximized for all q. A
single class maximizes the exit rate, maximizing E[e−rt|q]. Thus a single class maximizes
social surplus and a positive c is necessary to induce a single class. Platforms can choose an
appropriate ﬁxed fee (possibly negative) to satisfy agent IR constraints.
In the LRM case, it's not necessarily true that the platform will want to maximize outﬂow
for every agent type. Since the mass on the platform determines the rate of draws, having
more agents on the platform can boost exit rate and thus discounted utility. If the mass
of all agents is higher, this is a second order eﬀect that must be overwhelmed by increased
agent selectiveness in order to induce larger masses on the platform in the ﬁrst place, but it is
possible that the planner would beneﬁt from inducing low types to reject other low types and
only match to high types. High types give a higher payoﬀ to their match, so time discounting
is more costly for them. By contrast, a suﬃciently low type agent contributes almost nothing
no total surplus. Thus, inducing low types to reject other low types and increase their mass
on the platform would allow high types to get quick matches and preserve their much more
valuable contribution to match surplus. In this environment, the platform has no means
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to induce this partially negatively assortative matching25 so inducing a single class will still
be optimal given the instruments available, but we'll need to amend the proof to take into
account the endogenous draw rate.
Proposition 11 If c is a price, ψ(q) = 1, LRM holds, and there is more than one class
when c is zero, a positive c maximizes social surplus.
Proof. A suﬃciently high c will ensure a single class, and we have multiple classes with zero
per-date costs.ψ(q) = 1, so, given the inﬂow distribution F , mass on the platform will be 1
by (1.3.10) and every agent will leave upon a draw, which they get at rate 1. Suppose there
is more than one class. Mass on the platform is
∑
n
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))) by (1.3.10),
and the probability an agent in class n gets a draw they will accept is
√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))∑
n
√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) .
Then the rate of accepted draws is
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))) < 1 and all agents have a
longer expected wait on the platform, getting lower utility in expectation. Platforms can
choose an appropriate ﬁxed fee (possibly negative) to satisfy agent IR constraints.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we extended the NTU search literature to an environment with a cheap talk
stage and costly type veriﬁcation. We found that the partition or class based equilibria that
have characterized this literature extend to this environment with informational frictions,
with agents only matching to one another within their respective disjoint classes. When per-
date costs are endogenously chosen by a strategic platform, positive per-date costs may be
optimal, despite being distortionary, and, in the case of per-date frictions, having a negative
direct eﬀect on surplus. A social planner can take advantage of these per-date costs by using
them to counter externalities that make agents too picky by allowing low type agents to
pool with high type agents, preventing those high type agents from ineﬃciently rejecting
them. A monopolist can use per-date costs to induce eﬀective transfers from high to low
types by forcing high types to match to low types, ﬂattening the demand curve and allowing
a monopolist that charges a ﬁxed fee to extract more surplus from consumers.
25Negatively assortative matching occurs when higher types match to lower types rather than their own
type.
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Future avenues for study include analysis of more complex contracts in this environment
to see how much proﬁt the simple contracts commonly in use leave on the table, to see
how more complex contracts interact with the externalities in these markets, and to more
precisely capture the second degree price discrimination common to the menu of contracts
in these markets. This is brieﬂy studied in Appendix 1.6.1.
Studying an analogous model with transferable utility would be extremely useful, yielding
results more applicable to job search, where cheap talk on both sides of the market can also
be important. A two-type TU model is studied in Appendix 1.6.1, and we discuss how, under
TU with linear returns to matching, agents are generally not picky enough since spending
more time on the platform increases the mass of agents and thus increases the frequency
of draws, a beneﬁt agents do not internalize even with transfers known as the thick market
externality. This is in contrast to the NTU case where agents are too picky, and thus yields
opposite implications for per-date pricing, making negative per-date prices that incentivize
an agent to stay on the platform longer optimal.
Including competition would be an obvious extension of this research program, though an
even greater multiplicity of equilibria must be contended with due to the coordination issues
with multiple platforms and network eﬀects. Including exogenous exit and match dissolution
would allow for more realistic modeling of matching behavior, especially on platforms that
focus on short term matching like Tinder. This is not likely to substantively change the
qualitative characteristics of the equilibrium, though.
1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Extensions
More Complex Contracts
So far we've assumed a simple contract structure with a single ﬁxed fee and per-date cost
motivated by the observed simplicity of contracts in this market. However, in many cases
this is not optimal. With frictions, it will generally be optimal for the monopolist to oﬀer
diﬀerent contracts based on report. We will focus on a menu of ﬁxed fees with a constant
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per-date cost. Optimal menus of per-date costs will be highly dependent on the distribution
F, and aren't amenable to a simple analysis.
Given the IR cutoﬀ induced by a single ﬁxed fee contract, if it's possible to include
multiple classes above that cutoﬀ, the original IR cutoﬀ can be maintained with additional
higher price cutoﬀs for higher types, allowing more surplus extraction. Under modular
utility it's optimal to set contract intervals coinciding with endogenous class cutoﬀs (everyone
reporting in class n must pay pn) for reasons analogous to those in Lemma 9. If utility is
supermodular it could be possible to ﬁnd cases where this is not true, due to higher utility
for higher types, but we'll assume one and only one contract per class, noting that, for
supermodular utility, this must be weakly worse than the optimal contract structure.
For the lowest class k, the IR binds as is standard, yielding pk = q(k)ψ(q(k)) For class
k − 1, note that lower class agents cannot deviate to higher classes due to rejection, even
if the contract is more favorable. Thus we only need to worry about deviations by higher
type agents to lower reports. The incentive compatability (IC) constraint ICk−1,k requires
q(k − 1)ψ(q(k − 1)) − pk−1≥q(k)ψ(q(k − 1)) − pk, based on the bottom agent k − 126 so
(q(k − 1) − q(k))ψ(q(k − 1)) ≥ pk−1 − pk and so on, with each following price pn−1 rising
based on the diﬀerence in class utilities q(n−1)−q(n) scaled by the supermodular component
ψ(q(n−1)) and with rents q(n−1)(ψ(q)−ψ(q(n−1))) accruing to class n−1 agents based on
ψ increasing in q over the class interval. This strategy maintains the same total surplus but
allows the platform to extract more from users, and is a lower bound for maximal revenue
with multiple contracts. Some rents are still left the to users if utility is supermodular.
In the modular case, however, the monopolist has full extraction and is essentially a
social planner, and thus the earlier analysis of the social planner's problem in Section 1.4
applies: increasing per-date frictions is less costly in terms of revenue than the direct eﬀect
of frictions on utility would imply, just like the social planner case, and, generally, smaller τ 's
can rationalize high per-date costs than one woud expect based on the direct eﬀect of frictions
(in particular, a suﬃcient τ would be τ(c) = c − c), especially under certain distributional
26Higher type agents in the class beneﬁt weakly more from higher quality matches, but pay the same price,
so if the IC is satisﬁed for the lowest agent in must be satisﬁed for all others. This also makes showing local
IC suﬃcient.
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assumptions as discussed in the frictional social planner case. Generally, however, positive
per-date frictions are undesirable. With per-date prices and modular utility, a single ﬁxed
fee is optimal since it's optimal for the social planner. With supermodular it may still be
optimal, especially for low degrees of supermodularity, but it may not be.
Transferable Utility
While we don' treat a transferable utility model in the main body of this paper, it is of
signiﬁcant interest, since it may be more applicable to many job market applications, and
some prefer the TU assumption in models of dating and marriage. In this environment,
externalities resulting from socially ineﬃcient acceptences and rejections are eliminated by
transfers as in the Coase theorem, but externalities resulting from the eﬀects acceptance and
rejection have the on mass of agents on the platform and their distribution persist. Under
LRM, there is no cost to having too many agents one does not want to match to on the
platform (the congestion externality), but there is a cost to having fewer agents one does
want to match to on the platform (the thick market externality). Thus, there is only one
externality in play: staying on the platform longer beneﬁts agents who would like to match
to you and has no eﬀect on agents who don't, so agents aren't picky enough because they
don't interalize the beneﬁts their presence has for others. This is the opposite of the net
eﬀect of externalities in the NTU case, and suggests that platforms ought to lower per-date
costs as much as is feasible.
We'll illustrate this by studying a TU version of this paper's model. Unfortunately,
transferable utility greatly complicates the analysis by making match payoﬀs contingent not
just on agent types but also on the endogenous outside options of each agent. However,
we can analyze a two-type analogue of the model, with high types h and low types l and
symmetric distributions. We'll focus on the match surplus function u(h, h) ≡ 1, u(h, l) ≡ β,
u(l, l) ≡ γ, 1 > β > γ. We'll say u has (weakly) supermodular payoﬀs if 2β ≥ 1 + γ and
assume this for the remainder of the section. Suppose an inﬂow rate normalized to 1, with
the inﬂow of h types f , and the proportion of h types on the platform g and a mass of agents
on the platform N . Suppose per-date costs are zero. When high types only accept high
types, gN =
√
f , (1−g)N = √1− f , g =
√
f√
f+
√
1−f . Expected discount is then
gN
gN+r
=
√
f√
f+r
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for high types and
√
1−f√
1−f+r for low types. Then, given inﬂow rates f and 1 − f , the rate
of surplus generated by a match is f
√
f√
f+r
1 for the high type and (1 − f)
√
1−f√
1−f+rγ for the
low type. When all agents accept one another, g = f and N = 1. Expected discount is
then 1
1+r
for all types and the rate of surplus generated is f 1
1+r
(f + (1− f)β) for high types
and (1 − f) 1
1+r
(fβ + (1 − f)γ) for low types. Thus, separation is optimal if and only if
(1− f) 1
1+r
(fβ + (1− f)γ) + f 1
1+r
(f + (1− f)β) ≤ (1− f)
√
1−f√
1−f+rγ + f
√
f√
f+r
.
We can now study the TU equilibrium assuming Nash Bargaining. Then, given continua-
tions values Ch and Cl, match payoﬀs after transfers are uh(h, l) = 1/2(β+Ch−Cl), ul(h, l) =
1/2(β + Cl − Ch), ul(l, l) = γ/2, uh(h, h) = 1/2. Suppose high types reject all low types.
Then a high type receives expected payoﬀ and continuation value
√
f
2(
√
f+r)
, and a low type
receives γ
√
1−f
2(
√
1−f+r) and deviation to accepting a low type yields (β +
√
f
2(
√
f+r)
− γ
√
1−f
2(
√
1−f+r))/2.
Then separation isn't supportable in equilibrium when
√
f
2(
√
f + r)
< (β +
√
f
2(
√
f + r)
− γ
√
1− f
2(
√
1− f + r))/2 (1.6.1)
However, the social planner cares about the changed utility of the low type agent who
matches to high type. Thus, the surplus for the two agents that match when the high type
deviates is
√
f
2(
√
f+r)
+ γ
√
1−f
2(
√
1−f+r) without the deviation and β when deviating. Then surplus is
increased by deviating if and only if
√
f
2(
√
f+r)
+ γ
√
1−f
2(
√
1−f+r) < β, equivalent to the high type's
inequality (1.6.1) . If the distribution on the platform was exogenous, this would conclude
the analysis and the TU equilibrium would maximize total surplus. However, the mass of
agents on the platform shrinks as agents become less picky, so a high type accepting low
types imposes costs on others, Computing g given that a proportion x of high types accept
low types and taking the limit as x→ 0, we ﬁnd that a small mass x of h types deviating to
accepting all lowers expected discount by x
(
√
fr)
2(
√
1−f+r)2
for high types and x
(
√
1−fr)
2(
√
f+r)
2 for low
types by decreasing the rate of draws. Then a high type agent accepting low types cannot
be socially eﬃcient unless
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√
f
2(
√
f + r)
< (β+
√
f
2(
√
f + r)
−γ
√
1− f
2(
√
1− f + r))/2+
r
(−f 2 (√f + r)− (f − 1)2g (√1− f + r))
4
(√
1− f + r)2 (√f + r)2
(1.6.2)
where
r(−f2(
√
f+r)−(f−1)2g(
√
1−f+r))
4(
√
1−f+r)2(
√
f+r)
2 < 0. Thus there is an interval where, under TU, high
types will accept low types despite it being socially ineﬃcient for them to do sothat is,
agents are not picky enough.
Non-Multiplicatively Separable Utility
Multiplicative separability of the own-type component utility is a strong assumption in this
paper. With modular utility and a constant per-date cost it is automatically satisﬁed since
ψ = 1, but with supermodular utility it imposes a functional form restriction on match
surplus and requires that per-date costs be a constant multiplied by ψ, meaning per-date
costs must be higher for higher types and imposing a very strong relationship between
match utility and per-date costs. This precludes constant per-date costs, making analysis
of per-date prices with supermodular utility infeasible. Thus, we'd like to be able to say
that this assumption, while necessary for tractability, is not driving our results. To assess
this, we study a discretized analogue to our model, with ﬁve types (q = .2, q = .4, q =
.6, q = .8, , q = 1) rather than a continuum. We need to limit the number of types because,
without multiplicative separability, diﬀerent agents in any candidate class will have diﬀerent
optimization problems and employ diﬀerent cutoﬀ strategies, precluding the discrete class
structure that made analysis tractable. Without this, we'll instead ﬁnd LSSE equilibria by
brute force, testing every possible combination of cutoﬀ strategies for each type for proﬁtable
deviations.27 We'll also ﬁnd optimal platform strategies as in Section 1.4 by testing every
viable ﬁrm strategy (where price is the IR of the lowest joining type) and selecting the one
that maximizes proﬁt. We'll study the case where ψ(q) = qα and per-date costs are constant.
This will also allow us to look at per-date pricing when utility is supermodular. We'll use
3 diﬀerent distributions, a decreasing distribution (.35, .3, .2, .1, .05), the discrete uniform
27We ignore mixed strategies.
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Figure 1.6.1: Cost per-date 1
From left to right: a) increasing distribution, r = .05, α = 0, b) increasing distribution, r = .1,
α = 1.
(.2, .2, .2, .2, .2), and an increasing distribution (.05, .1, .2, .3, .35), and varying assumptions
on r to study the equilibria under diﬀerent conditions. For concision, we'll only report a few
of the more salient examples here. Generally, the simulations using constant per-date costs
are consistent with the results in Section 1.4 assuming per date costs of cψ(q).
In Figure 1.6.1 a), we see the discrete type analogue to the frictional modular utility case
for a monopolist discussed in Proposition 8. As per-date frictions increase, the price that
can be charged to the lowest joining type decreases, and there is a negative direct eﬀect on
proﬁt. However, higher type agents become less selective, and when the per-date friction is
high enough to induce a higher type to accept the lowest joining type there is a discontinuous
increase in proﬁt due to the eﬀective transfer from the high type to the cutoﬀ type which
counterbalances the direct eﬀect. Thus we see multiple levels of c that are consistent with
maximizing revenue, as in the previous analysis. b) shows the case with ψ(q) = q, but unlike
the formal analysis of Proposition 8, per-date frictions are c instead of cq, meaning that the
class structure will not hold in equilibrium and the aforemention proposition does not apply.
However ,we see qualitatively similar results, with a negative direct eﬀect of c on proﬁt and
discrete jumps back to higher proﬁt when higher types accept the lowest joining type.
In Figure 1.6.2 a), we see the discrete type analogue to the per-date price modular utility
case for a monopolist discussed in Corollary 3. This case is very similar to the frictional case,
but raising per-date prices doesn't decrease the amount of surplus that can be extracted from
the lowest joining type, so the eﬀective transfers from high to low types as per-date prices
increase are the only salient eﬀect, and proﬁt increases with per-date price. b) shows the
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Figure 1.6.2: Cost Per Date 2
From left to right: a) increasing distribution, r = .1, α = 0. b) uniform distribution, r = .1, α = 1.
Figure 1.6.3: Cost Per Date 3
From left to right: a) increasing distribution, r = .2, α = 0. b) increasing distribution, r = .2,
α = 1.
case with supermodular utility ψ(q) = q, and per-date price c, a case which could not be
studied before due the lack of a class structure. In fact, however, we see the same situation,
where higher per-date prices increase proﬁt, and even though the class basis for the claim of
Corollary 3 does not hold, the argument that the IR-cutoﬀ agent's utility can be extracted
through a combination of ﬁxed fees and per-date prices, and higher per-date prices should
make higher types less selective and thus force them to match to the IR-cutoﬀ type, increasing
their expected match utility should still hold.
In Figure 1.6.3 a), we see the discrete type analogue to the frictional modular utility
case for a social planner discussed in Section 1.4.1. As discussed before, the direct negative
eﬀect of increasing per-date frictions dominates, and higher frictions generally lower surplus,
although small local increases are possible due to the non-endogenous lower bound of the
rump class. In b), we see the case with ψ(q) = q, and per-date friction c, and the eﬀect of
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Figure 1.6.4: Cost Per Date 4
From left to right: a) increasing distribution, r = .2, α = 0. b) increasing distribution, r = .2,
α = .5, c) increasing distribution, r = .2, α = 1.
increasing c is qualitatively similar.
In Figure 1.6.4 a), we see the discrete type analogue to the per-date price modular utility
case for a social planner discussed in Proposition 11. As discussed before, increasing per-
date prices lowers the time costs of search, and because of modular utility sorting doesn't
matter, so increasing per-date prices increases total surplus. We couldn't study optimal
per-date prices with supermodular utility before due to tractability problems, but b) and c)
we can examine numerical simulations of this case. As discussed before, with supermodular
utility assortation increases surplus, so when per-date prices increase and agents become less
picky, there will be a tradeoﬀ between lowering time costs on the one hand and lowering
sorting on the other. In fact, in b) with ψ(q) =
√
q and moderate supermodularity we see
exactly that, with total surplus initially increasing in per-date prices when decreasing time
costs dominates and total surplus later decreasing when sorting eﬀects dominate, yielding an
optimal per-date price that is positive. With c), ψ(q) = q and supermodularity is stronger.
We see the same story here, but the optimal per-date price is signiﬁcantly lower as the costs
of lowering sorting are higher.
1.6.2 Proofs
Steady StateLinear Returns to Matching
We'll now provide a proof of Proposition 5 via two lemmas. This closely follows Burdett and
Coles, but requires some adjustment to accommodate per-date costs. First, we'll transcribe a
useful result from Burdett and Coles. Deﬁne Γ(x1, x2) ≡ (F (x1)−F (x2))2−f(x2)
∫ x1
x2
F (x1)−
F (x)dx
41
Lemma 10 An increasing hazard rate f(x)/(1-F(x)) implies Γ(.) ≥ 0
Deﬁne φ(q(n), q(n− 1)) ≡∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− c for q(n− 1) > q. Since F is strictly
increasing and twice diﬀerentiable, φ is well deﬁned, continuous and twice diﬀerentiable
almost everywhere, restricting ourselves to right diﬀerentiation at the lower bound. It can
be shown that φ → −c as class size goes to zero and φ → q − q(n) − c as q(n − 1) → q.
Lemma 10 implies φ is decreasing in q(n):
∂
∂q(n)
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− c =
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(F (q(n−1))−F (x))f(q(n))
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))2 dx− 1 ≤ 0.
We can also show that φ is strictly increasing in q(n− 1):
∂
∂q(n−1)
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− c =
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(F (x)−F (q(n)))f(q(n))
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))2 dx > 0.
Fix N and let qn(N), λn(N), J(N) satisfy
i) q0(N) = q
ii) if qn−1(N) > q, qn(N) = φ(qn(N), qn−1(N))
Nλn(N)
r
, qn(N) = φ(qn(N), qn−1(N))
Nλn(N)
r
,
λn(N) =
√
F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N))/N
iii) if qn−1(N) <= q, qn(N) = λn(N) = 0
The following lemma shows inductively that each cutoﬀ is well behaved if the previous
one is. The main challenge is to show uniqueness, especially in the presence of a per-date
cost. In (1.3.9), the LHS is (obviously) increasing, so if we can show the RHS is decreasing,
uniqueness is guaranteed. Thus the meat of the proof is establishing the properties of the
RHS.
Lemma 11 If qn−1(N) > q and is continuous at N for some N>0, then there is a unique
solution for qn(N) if participation in search in class n can be supported, where qn(N) is
continuous at N, qn(N) < qn−1(N), λn > 0 and is continuous at N. qn and λn go to zero as
qn−1 → q. Additionally, qn(N) is increasing in qn−1(N),
Proof. ∂
∂q(n)
1
r
(φ(q(n), q(n−1))√(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))) = 1
r
(φ1
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))−
φ f(q(n))√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))). Consider the minimal c such that φ1
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))) −
φ f(q(n))√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) ≥ 0.
Then c = 1
r
(
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− (F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))f(q(n)) (
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(F (q(n−1))−F (x))f(q(n))
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))2 dx−
1)). Then the expected payoﬀ is 1
r
( (F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))
f(q(n))
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))))φ1. φ1 must
be negative and the remainder of the expression is positive, so the RHS of (1.3.9) must
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be negative. Thus, either 1
r
(φ1
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))) − φ f(q(n))√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))) ≤ 0 and
the RHS is decreasing while the LHS is increasing, ensuring a a unique solution, or c is
high enough that any draw will be accepted ex-post, which also implies a unique cutoﬀ.
Direct inspection shows continuity given continuity of the constituent functions, and thus
the continuity of qn(N) and λn(N). The RHS is negative as qn → qn−1 so qn < qn−1. Thus
λn(N) > 0. qn → 0 goes to zero as qn−1 → q since RHS is negative and λn(N) ≤ G(qn−1)−
G(q) → 0 as qn−1 → q. Finally, ∂∂q(n−1) 1r (φ(q(n), q(n − 1))
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))) =
1
r
(q(n − 1) − q(n) − c) f(q(n)
2
√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) . Consider the minimal c such that
1
r
(q(n − 1) −
q(n) − c) f(q(n)
2
√
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) ≤ 0. Then c = q(n − 1) − q(n) and continuation value is
1
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+r
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(x−c)g(x)dx = 1
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+r
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(x−q(n−1)+q(n))g(x)dx≤
1
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+r
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
q(n)g(x)dx= G(q(n−1)u)−G(q(n))
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+rq(n) < q(n). Thus c ≥ q(n − 1) −
q(n) ensures a corner solution for the cutoﬀ, q. Thus, q(n) is unchanging in q(n-1) if c >
q(n−1)−q(n), else the RHS is increasing in q(n-1), which, given that the LHS is unchanged
and the LHS is increasing and the RHS decreasing in q(n), implies a rise in q(n-1) must
induce a rise in q(n).
We'll now prove Lemma 7. Note that (1.3.3) can be rewritten as q(n, qˆ) = (Nλn(qˆ)E[q
′|n,qˆ,match]−Nγn(qˆ)c)
Nλn(qˆ)+r
=
Nλn(qˆ)(E[q′|n,qˆ,match]−c)
Nλn(qˆ)+r
− N(γn(qˆ)−λn(qˆ))c)
Nλn(qˆ)+r
This is simply (1.3.4) minus c times a scalar on the
RHS and with the values of γn = Pr[date|n, qˆ], λn = Pr[match|n, qˆ] and E[q′|n, qˆ,match]
changed to reﬂect that agents may reject dates inside their class and accept agents out-
side their class, changing their probability of dating and matching over a given interval and
changing the distribution of matches accepted. Every agent in a class must have the same
expected match quality, so it will suﬃce to consider q(n) = Nλn(E[q
′|n,match]−c)
Nλn+r
− N(γn−λn)c)
Nλn+r
.
Lemma 12 Given LRM and 1-F log-concave, a class n starting at q(n-1) where the probabil-
ity of an agent in n rejecting a date inside the class is strictly positive must have Nλn(E[q
′|n,match]−c)
Nλn+r
≤
qE(nLPPE,q(n)).
Proof. Forthcoming.
We can now prove Lemma 7:
Proof. Let k be the ﬁrst class with a positive measure of agents deviating from the LPPE.
Lemma 12 shows that Nλk(E[q
′|k,match]−c)
Nλk+r
≤ qE(kLPPE,q(k)), with strict inequality holding if the
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probability of rejecting a match within one's class is strictly positive, and N(γk−λk)c)
Nλk+r
≥ 0, with
strict inequality holding if the probability of accepting a match outside one's class is strictly
positive. Then, since qE(q(k)) = q(k), qE(k) < qE(kLPPE,q(k)) ≤ qE(LPPE, q(k − 1)) ≤
qE(q(k)). Contradiction. We can proceed inductively from here. Suppose that q(n − 1) ≤
q(LPPE, n − 1). Then q(n) ≤ q(LPPE, q(n − 1)) as before. Lemma 11 establishes that
q(LPPE, q(n− 1)) ≤ q(LPPE, n), so q(n− 1) ≤ q(LPPE, n).
Steady StateConstant Returns to Matching
In addition to LRM, we can also study the analogous model with constant returns to match-
ing. The CRM analysis largely follows Burdett and Coles (1997). While several proofs must
be amended to account for per-date costs, some go through unchanged. Deﬁne the distribu-
tion of agents leaving the platform by H(q) and the mass of agents leaving the platform by
O.
Within a given class, we can get a simple characterization of outﬂow. Outﬂow in a class
is given by the number of agents on the platform, N, times the proportion of agents in the
class, λn, times the probability of an agent in the class drawing another agent in that class,
λn. Then outﬂow from class n is λ2nN . Then, in an LSSE,
λn =
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N (1.6.3)
We also have that, for any [z1, z2) in class n, λn(G(z2) − G(z1))N = F (z2) − F (z1) and
thus, with the diﬀerentiability of F,
g(q) =
f(q)
λnN
(1.6.4)
Thus the density of agents on the platform in a given class is inﬂow density times a scalar.
Combining equation 1.3.5 and balanced ﬂow, we can get eliminate G terms, yielding class
cutoﬀs solely in terms of inﬂows, N, and c.
q(n) =
1
r
(
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n− 1))− F (x)
F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))dx− c)
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N (1.6.5)
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We're can now characterize the LSSE in this environment:
Proposition 12 Given F, (G,N) deﬁnes a LSSE if and only if G satisﬁes (1.6.4) and
{(λn, q(n))}Jn=0 satisﬁes (1.6.3), (1.6.5), q(0) = q, q(J) <= q, and
∑
n λn = 1.
Proof.
∑
n λn = 1, the boundary conditions, and (1.6.3)-(1.6.5) are necessary in an LSSE by
construction. Conversely, the assumptions guarantee G(q) = 1, G(q) = 0 and G increasing,
so G is a well deﬁned steady state distribution and any G and N satisfying them form a valid
LSSE.
To ensure existence of an LSSE, we'll need to make some distributional assumptions. The
increasing hazard rate will ensure that, for each possible N, the class structure is unique.
We'll now provide a proof of Proposition 13 via a lemma. This closely follows Burdett and
Coles, but requires some adjustment to accommodate per-date costs.
Lemma 10 implies φ is decreasing in q(n):
∂
∂q(n)
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− c =
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(F (q(n−1))−F (x))f(q(n))
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))2 dx− 1 ≤ 0.
We can also show thatφ is strictly increasing in q(n-1):
∂
∂q(n−1)
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− c =
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(F (x)−F (q(n)))f(q(n))
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))2 dx > 0.
Fix N and let qn(N), λn(N), J(N) satisfy
i) q0(N) = q
ii) if qn−1(N) > q, qn(N) = φ(qn(N), qn−1(N))
δλ(N)
r
, qn(N) = φ(qn(N), qn−1(N))
λn(N)
r
,
λn(N) =
√
F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N))/N
iii) if qn−1(N) <= q, qn(N) = λn(N) = 0
The following Lemma shows inductively that each cutoﬀ is well behaved if the previous
one is. The main challenge is to show uniqueness, especially in the presence of a per-date
cost. In 2.8, the LHS is (obviously) increasing, so if we can show the RHS is decreasing,
uniqueness is guaranteed. Thus the meat of the proof is establishing the properties of the
RHS.
Lemma 13 If qn−1(N) > q and is continuous at N for some N>0, then there is a unique
solution for qn(N), where qn(N) is continuous at N, qn(N) < qn−1(N), and λn > 0 and
is continuous at N. qn(N) and λn(N) go to zero as qn−1(N) → q. Additionally, qn(N) is
increasing in qn−1(N),
45
Proof. ∂
∂q(n)
1
r
(φ(q(n), q(n−1))√(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N) = 1
r
(φ1
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N−
φ f(q(n))√
N(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))). Consider the minimal c such that φ1
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N−
φ f(q(n))√
N(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) ≥ 0.
Then c =
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
F (q(n−1))−F (x)
F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))dx− (F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))f(q(n)) (
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(F (q(n−1))−F (x))f(q(n))
(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))2 dx−1).
Then the RHS of (1.6.5) is 1
r
( (F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))
f(q(n))
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n))/N)φ1. By Lemma
10, φ1 must be negative and the remainder of the expression is positive, so expected payoﬀ
must be negative. Thus, either 1
r
(φ1
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N−φ f(q(n))√
N(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)))) ≤
0 and the RHS is decreasing while the LHS is increasing, ensuring a unique solution, or c
is high enough that any draw will be accepted ex-post, which also implies a unique cutoﬀ.
Direct inspection shows continuity given continuity of the constituent functions, and thus
the continuity of qn(N) and λn(N). The RHS is negative as qn → qn−1 so qn < qn−1. Thus
λn(N) > 0. qn → 0 goes to zero as qn−1 → q since RHS is negative and λn(N) ≤ G(qn−1)−
G(q) → 0 as qn−1 → q. Finally, ∂∂q(n−1) 1r (φ(q(n), q(n − 1))
√
(F (q(n− 1))− F (q(n)))/N)=
1
r
(q(n − 1) − q(n) − c) f(q(n)
2
√
N(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) . Consider the minimal c such that
1
r
(q(n −
1)− q(n)− c) f(q(n)
2
√
N(F (q(n−1))−F (q(n))) ≤ 0. Then c = q(n− 1)− q(n) and continuation value is
1
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+r
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(x−c)g(x)dx = 1
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+r
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
(x−q(n−1)+q(n))g(x)dx≤
1
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+r
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
q(n)g(x)dx= G(q(n−1)u)−G(q(n))
G(q(n−1))−G(q(n))+rq(n) < q(n). Thus c ≥ q(n − 1) −
q(n) ensures a corner solution for the cutoﬀ, q. Thus, q(n) is unchanging in q(n-1) if c >
q(n−1)−q(n), else the RHS is increasing in q(n-1), which, given that the LHS is unchanged
and the LHS is increasing and the RHS decreasing in q(n), implies a rise in q(n-1) must
induce a rise in q(n).
Proposition 13 For all N>0, there exist unique, continuous solutions for qn(N) and λn(N)
satisfying (1.6.3)-(1.6.5), q0(N) = q and qJ(N) ≤ q. such that qn(N) < qn−1(N) and
λn(N) > 0 if qn−1(N) > q.
Proof. For the base case of q0 = q, q0 is a constant function of N. Lemma 13 ensures that
qn−1(N) continuous implies qn(N) continuous, and qn(N) < qn−1(N), so induction follows.
Continuity of λn(N) follows from the continuity of qn(N), qn−1(N), and
√
(F (x)− F (y)/N .
λn(N) > 0 follows from the fact that qn(N) < qn−1(N) and f(q) > 0 for q ∈ [q, q].
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However, N may not be consistent with G(q) = 1, so we'll need an additional result. Log-
concavity ensures the continuity of class sizes, and that, along with values of N inducing
values G(q,N) above and below 1, ensures the existence of {λn}Jn=1 such that
∑
n λn = 1
. It's worth noting that the inclusion of a per-date cost makes uniqueness of the cutoﬀs
harder to obtain than in the Burdett and Coles environmentwithout per date costs, the
agent's optimization problem has convenient monotonicity properties that per-date costs
militate against. However, the already necessary assumption of log-concavity of the survivor
function also eliminates cases where per-date costs could induce a multiplicity of cutoﬀs.
Proposition 14 An LSSE exists.
Proof. Proposition 13 guarantees this result so long as
∑
n λn(N) = 1.
∑
n λn(N) =
1√
N
∑
n
√
F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N)) > 1√N
∑
n F (qn−1(N)) − F (qn(N)) = 1√N (F (q) − F (q)) =
1√
N
, so lim
N→0
∑
n λn(N) =∞.
∑
n λn(N)
⇒ q(1) = 1
r
(
∫ q
q1(N)
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N))dx− c)
√
1− F (q1(N)))/N
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N)) < 1 if x ∈ (q1(N), q] so∫ q
q1(N)
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N))dx < q − q1(N).
Then we have
q1(N) <
1
r
(q − q1(N)− c)
√
(1− F (q1(N))/N
q1(N)
1+r
r
< 1
r
(q − c)√(1− F (q1(N)))/N
q1(N) <
1
1+r
(q − c)√(1− F (q1(N)))/N
so q1(N)→ 0. For N suﬃciently large, q1(N) < q, so F (q1(N)) = 0. Then∑
n
√
F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N)) =
√
F (q0(N))− F (q1(N)) = 1∑
n λn(N) =
1√
N
→ 0.
λn(N) is continuous for all n, so
∑
n λn(N) is continuous. Then, given
∑
n λn(N) > 1 for
some N and
∑
n λn(N) < 1 for some N, the IVT ensures an N exists such that
∑
n λn(N) = 1.
Finally, we'd like to have uniqueness. This will require further distributional assump-
tions. Burdett and Coles only need that xf(x) is increasing, but the inclusion of per-date
costs again imposes stronger requirements for uniqueness. Unfortunately, in this case their
assumptions are not strong enough to resolve the monotonicity issues with per-date costs.
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For suﬃciently small per-date costs, the increasing xf(x) assumption is adequate, but to
ensure uniqueness for any per-date cost we'll need the stronger assumption that f(x) is in-
creasing. This assumption is quite onerous, so we'll stick with the weaker assumption from
Burdett and Coles and focus on suﬃciently small per-date costs in the later analysis.
Lemma 14 qn(N) is decreasing and diﬀerentiable in N.
Proof. Diﬀerentiability follows from induction on (1.6.5). For the ﬁrst class, we must have
q1(N) =
1
r
(
∫ q
q1(N)
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N))dx − c)
√
1− F (q1(N)))/N . Denote the LHS L and the RHS
R. Lemma 13 shows Rq1 =
∂
∂q1(N)
1
r
(
∫ q
q1(N)
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N))dx − c)
√
1− F (q1(N)))/N is negative
while L1 = 1 is positive. Suppose q1(N) is weakly increasing in N for some N. Then LN =
q
′
1(N) > 0 and RN = q
′
1(N)Rq1 − R/(2N) is negative. But L=R. Contradiction. We
can now procede inductively. Suppose qn−1(N) is decreasing in N. (1.6.5) must hold, and
Rqn =
∂
∂qn(N)
1
r
(
∫ qn−1(N)
qn(N)
F (qn−1(N))−F (x)
F (qn−1(N))−F (qn(N))dx − c)
√
(F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N)))/N is negative
and Rqn−1 =
∂
∂qn−1(N)
1
r
(
∫ qn−1(N)
qn(N)
F (qn−1(N))−F (x)
F (qn−1(N))−F (qn(N))dx − c)
√
(F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N)))/N is
positive by Lemma 13. Then the LN = q
′
n(N) > 0 and RN = q
′
n(N)Rqn + q
′
n−1(N)Rqn−1 −
R/(2N), which is negative since q
′
n−1(N) is negative.
Lemma 15 λn−1 ≥ λn for any N>0 with xf(x) for c suﬃciently small or any c with f(x)
increasing.
Proof. Diﬀerentiability follows from induction on (1.6.5). For the ﬁrst class, we must have
q1(N) =
1
r
(
∫ q
q1(N)
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N))dx − c)
√
1− F (q1(N)))/N . Denote the LHS L and the RHS
R. Lemma 13 shows Rq1 =
∂
∂q1(N)
1
r
(
∫ q
q1(N)
1−F (x)
1−F (q1(N))dx − c)
√
1− F (q1(N)))/N is negative
while L1 = 1 is positive. Suppose q1(N) is weakly increasing in N for some N. Then LN =
q
′
1(N) > 0 and RN = q
′
1(N)Rq1 − R/(2N) is negative. But L=R. Contradiction. We
can now procede inductively. Suppose qn−1(N) is decreasing in N. (1.6.5) must hold, and
Rqn =
∂
∂qn(N)
1
r
(
∫ qn−1(N)
qn(N)
F (qn−1(N))−F (x)
F (qn−1(N))−F (qn(N))dx − c)
√
(F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N)))/N is negative
and Rqn−1 =
∂
∂qn−1(N)
1
r
(
∫ qn−1(N)
qn(N)
F (qn−1(N))−F (x)
F (qn−1(N))−F (qn(N))dx − c)
√
(F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N)))/N is
positive by Lemma 13. Then the LN = q
′
n(N) > 0 and RN = q
′
n(N)Rqn + q
′
n−1(N)Rqn−1 −
R/(2N), which is negative since q
′
n−1(N) is negative.
Lemma 16 xf(x) strictly increasing in x guarantees λn−1 ≥ λn for c such that c′ ≥ c > 0
for some c'. f(x) increasing guarantees λn−1 ≥ λn for any c.
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Proof. Trivial for n − 1 ≥ J(N). For n − 1 < J(N), we ﬁrst want to show λn−1 ≥ λn for
all n. Deﬁne θ(ql, qh) =
∫ qh
ql
F (qh)−F (x)
F (qh)−F (ql)dx − c)
√
(F (qh)− F (ql)). Thus 1√Nr = ql/θ(ql, qh).
λ =
√
(F (qh)− F (ql))/N so it will suﬃce to show ∂∂qhF (qh) − F (ql(qh)) is increasing. The
implicit function theorem yields ∂
∂qh
F (qh) − F (ql(qh)) = f(qh) − f(ql)
δ√
N(1−δ) θ2
1− δ√
N(1−δ) θ1
= f(qh) −
f(ql)
qlθ2/θ
1−qlθ1/θ . We can show that this is non-negative if and only if
∫ qh
ql
x f(x)−ql f(ql)−c dx ≥
0. If c is suﬃciently small, this will be satisﬁed (clearly always satisﬁed for c=0 and xf(x)
increasing.) If xf(x) strictly increasing, a strictly positive c can be supported. It can be
shown that if (qh−ql)f(ql)
F (qh)−F (ql) ≤ 1, any c large enough to violate the above inequality will yield
a corner solution for any agent's optimization problem, with agents accepting any match, a
single class, and uniqueness thus ensured. if f(x) is increasing, (qh−ql)f(ql)
F (qh)−F (ql) ≤ 1.
Proposition 15 xf(x) strictly increasing in x guarantees the existence of a unique LSSE
for all c such that c′ ≥ c > 0 for some c'. f(x) increasing guarantees uniqueness for any c.
Proof. Total diﬀerentiation of λn−1(N) =
√
F (qn−1(N))− F (qn(N))/N
yields
q′n−1(N)f(qn−1(N))−q′n(N)f(qn(N))
2λnN
− λn
2N
for all but the last class and
q′n−1(N)f(qn−1(N))
2λnN
− λn
2N
for the last class. Summing over n, we have− λJ
2N
+
J(N)−1∑
n=1
(
1
2N
(
1
λn+1
− 1
λn
)q′n(N)f(qn(N))−
λn
2N
).
λn are decreasing in n by Lemma 16, so 1λn+1− 1λn increasing, and q′n(N) decreasing by Lemma
15. Thus the sum is negative, proving that
∑
n λn is strictly decreasing in N. Thus, the N
such that
∑
n λn = 1 must be unique, and so the LSSE.
Strategic Platforms
We'll now prove Proposition 9. Deﬁne λF (n) ≡ F (q(n−1))−F (q(n)), the inﬂow mass in class
n. Suppose ψ(q) = qa and deﬁne the mean ψ value in class n as mψ(n) ≡
∫ q(n−1)
q(n)
qa f(q)
λF (n)
dq.
Deﬁne the length of class n as l(n) ≡ q(n− 1)− q(n).
Proof. ∂TS
∂c
=
∑J
n=1 qEc(n, c)mψ(n)λF (n)+
qE(n, c) (qc(n− 1, c)q(n− 1, c)αf(q(n− 1, c))− qc(n, c)q(n, c)αf(q(n, c)))
Using the fact that qE(n, c) = q(n, c) for all but the last class J, manipulating the sum-
mation, and suppressing c, we have
∂TS
∂c
=
∑J−2
n=1 qc(n) (mψ(n) · λF (n)− q(n)α · f(q(n)) · l(n+ 1))
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+qc(J − 1) (mψ(J − 1) · λF (J − 1)− q(J − 1)α · f(q(J − 1))(q(J − 1)− qE(J)))
+qc(J) (mψ(J) · λF (J)− q(J)α · f(q(J)) · qE(J))
If every term in this summation is negative, ∂TS
∂c
is negative. By Proposition 7, qc(n) is
decreasing, so it suﬃces to show mψ(n) · λF (n) > q(n)α · f(q(n)) · l(n + 1) for each n<J-1,
and the corresponding inequalities for J-1 and J. By Jensen's inequality, mψ(n) > E[q|q ∈
[qn, qn−1)]α. Given that F has full support, E[q|q ∈ [qn, qn−1)]α > qn. Thus, as α → ∞,
E[q|q ∈ [qn, qn−1)]α/qα →∞. Then mψ(n) ·λF (n) > q(n)α ·f(q(n)) · l(n+1) for α suﬃciently
high, and since J is ﬁnite, an α exists ensuring mψ(n) · λF (n) > q(n)α · f(q(n)) · l(n+ 1) for
all n < J − 1, as well as the inequalities for J-1 and J.
We'll now study a selection of simulations. We focus on the modular utility case, and
ﬁnd that increasing c typically decreases total surplus. This is not surprising given that a
per-date friction of c decreases each agent's payoﬀ by c. However, eﬃciency gains due to less
selective agents and changes in the rump class due to c can outweigh the direct cost of c in
some cases. In Figure 1.6.5, we assume a decreasing density f . This puts more weight on
the rump class, creating more periodicity in the surplus as the class cutoﬀs shift downward
in c and the
rump class goes from being a large, relatively eﬃcient class to a small class whose size is
limited by the support of the distribution, and then to a large class again as the last class
cutoﬀ passes the bottom of the support of the distribution and the next class becomes the
last class. In both the case where r=.1 and r=.001, we clearly see the periodic component
to total surplus, and over some intervals total surplus is actually increasing in c. Generally,
the degree of discounting doesn't make a large diﬀerence unless agents are very impatient.
In Figure 1.6.7 a), we again assume a decreasing density f , but assume the a smaller
support for f. This largely eliminates the periodic component to total surplus and leaves
only the direct eﬀect of ctotal surplus is approximately linearly decreasing in c. Because
the lowest type agents in the distribution are still half the quality of the highest types,
there are far fewer endogenous classes, and eﬃciency losses due to excessive selectivity are
lower. Thus, eﬃciency gains due to increasing c are much less relevant. In Figure 1.6.7 b)
we consider an analogous case with a uniform distribution. The factors that could lead to
increasing total surplus are weaker in this case, but we still see some periodic eﬀect and a
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Figure 1.6.5: Total Surplus and Per-date Costs 1
From left to right: a) F (x) =
√
x− q/√1− q, r = .001, q = .01 b) F (x) = √x− q/√1− q, r = .1,
q = .01
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Figure 1.6.6: Total Surplus and Per-date Costs 2
From left to right: a) F (x) =
√
x− q/√1− q, r = .001, q = .5 b) F (x) = (x− q)/(1− q), r = .001,
q = .01
small region where total surplus is slightly increasing in c.
In Figure 1.6.7 a), we see the uniform distribution case corresponding to Figure 1.6.7 a).
Again, the narrow range of qualities yields a monotonically decreasing total surplus. Finally,
in Figure 1.6.7 b) we see total surplus when f is increasing. Here, even with a lower limit of
support close to zero the second order eﬀects are dominated by the linear friction costs.
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Figure 1.6.7: Total Surplus and Per-date Costs 2
From left to right: a) F (x) = (x− q)/(1− q), r = .001, q = .5, q = .001 b) F (x) = (x− q)2/(1− q)2,
r = .001, q = .01
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CHAPTER 2
MATCHING WITH SINGLE PEAKED PREFERENCES
2.1 Introduction
In theoretical and empirical models of matching markets it is often assumed that agents
have preferences over a single parameter which is either vertical, where all agents share a
preference ordering over types; or horizontal, where agents prefer their own type. For both
vertical (Becker (1973)) and horizontal models (Clark (2003), Clark (2007), and Klumpp
(2009)), simple matching functions have been derived for continuous and discrete cases.
However, preferences may be much more general, with diﬀerent individuals having diﬀerent
preference orderings (violating the assumptions of vertical models) while not necessarily
having a preference for their own type (violating the horizontal assumption).
In this paper we derive a simple, closed form matching function under single-peaked
univariate preferences, where each agent is characterized by a univariate type and has an
ideal type, preferring partners closer to that type, and where utility is nontransferable.
Applications include marriage and dating, as well as job search when bargaining over wages
is diﬃcult or impossible, as in many public sector and entry level professional jobs. This
result generalizes previous results like Becker (1973) and Clark (2007) to a much broader class
of preferences. Speciﬁcally, we consider the case where there are continuous distributions of
agents and, after removing perfect matches (agent a's ideal type is agent b's type and vice
versa), the remainder distributions of unmatched agents can be separated by a monotonic
curve1, and where the masses on each side of this curve are not severely imbalanced in a way
that will be described later. This assumption will often hold when the bivariate distributions
1More speciﬁcally, their graphs can be separated by this curve after one side of the market has transposed
so that own type on one side corresponds to ideal type on the other. This transposition will be critical to
our intuition throughout this paper.
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of own and ideal types for each side have relatively similar dispersion and diﬀerent mean
vectors. For example, in marriage and dating, men may generally prefer women slightly
shorter than them, with some variation, and women may generally prefer taller men, again
with some variation. Similarly, some men may prefer women with similar incomes to them,
while other men and all women may prefer higher incomes.
This paper makes contributions relevant to the empirical and theoretical literature on
matching. First, it contributes to the wide empirical literature on assortative matching.2 We
show that matching over single peaked preferences exhibits several diﬀerent forms of assorta-
tion, which form testable predictions. In particular, individuals who are perfect matches will
match stably, and they will exhibit converse positive assortative matching (CPAM), where
increases in an agent's ideal type correspond to increases in their match's type. Individuals
who don't get perfect matches, however, exhibit other forms of assortation. If the supply
for a given type of agent meets demand, in a sense that will be made explicit later, we ﬁnd
positive assortative matching (PAM), where higher types match to higher types irrespective
of ideal type, or negative assortative matching (NAM), where higher types match to lower
types, where the type of assortation depends on the relative orientation of the two distri-
butions. We see PAM when agents generally prefer higher types than their stable matches
(vertical preferences is one example of this). We see NAM when agents generally prefer
lower types than their stable matches. Finally, when one side is locally in shortage, some
will match as before, but others will be able to leverage their scarcity to match to agents of
their ideal type (CPAM for the side in shortage) who do not ﬁnd them ideal.
This paper also makes theoretical models involving embedded matching problems tractable
in a much more general preference environment. For example, it provides a framework for
studying theoretical models of marital sorting on income when diﬀerent men and women
have diﬀerent preferences.
This paper follows a rich literature on stable matching problems, starting with the sem-
inal paper by Gale and Shapley (1964). Becker (1973) found that PAM occurs when there
2In one dimension, assortation is a matching structure where the type of an agent's match is monotonic
in the agent's own type.
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is a continuum of types and the utility of a match is increasing in types and nontransfer-
able. Unlike Gale-Shapley, this requires no iterative process to ﬁnd agent pairs in the stable
matching, so it is suitable for use in theoretical models. However, it imposes the fairly oner-
ous assumption of vertical preferenceshigher types are universally preferred to lower types,
and agents only care about one trait. Legros and Newman (2007) extended PAM and NAM
results to a class of partially nontransferable utility problems, where there are limitations on
the ability of some or all agents to transfer utility to their match.
Assuming horizontal preferences over a single trait where agents want to match to their
own type, Clark (2003) gives an algorithm for ﬁnding stable matchings in a market with a
ﬁnite set of agents. Clark (2007) then treats the univariate horizontal case with an inﬁnite
set of agents, ﬁnding a very simple matching result, which, like Becker's result for vertical
preferences, is well suited to a theoretical model. Clark (2006) also gives a condition guaran-
teeing a unique stable matching. Finally, Klumpp (2009) derives a very simple inside-out
algorithm for horizontal matching with ﬁnitely many agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 demonstrates Clark's
matching algorithm for the simplest case where preferences are homophilicthat is, where
the peak preference is the agent's own type. Section 3 generalizes the model by allow
agents to have arbitrary single peaked preferences, and matching algorithms are derived
given some additional assumptions. Section 4 relates the single-peaked matching result to
the horizontal and vertical preference literature. Section 5 provides interpretation for the
results and empirical implications. Finally, the concluding section describes directions for
further study.
55
2.2 Model with homophilic preferences
2.2.1 Baseline Model
3 Consider a two sided one-to-one matching model with two continuous, integrable distribu-
tions A and B with full support on [l, u]× [l, u]. We'll abuse notation by also letting A and
B represent the set of agents on each side. We'll call the ﬁrst dimension type θ, and the
second preference p. Denote an agent i with type θ and preference p on side S as siθp, sθp if
suppressing the index is appropriate, and s if suppressing both is possible. Let preferences
be strictly single peaked. That is, for an agent aθp(bθp), if θ2 > θ1 ≥ θ or θ ≥ θ1 > θ2
, bθ1p1 
aθp
bθ2p2 (aθ1p1 
bθp
aθ2p2), with indiﬀerence over identical types. Before we address
more general single peaked preferences, it is instructive to review the horizontal preference
matching algorithm ﬁrst derived in Clark (2007). Suppose for every agent sθp p = θ that
is, agents have homophilic preferences and we can suppress p. Suppose further that agents
face no search costs or other limitations to matching, i.e. suppose agents optimize over the
entire set of agents who are willing to match to them. Note that, while we can normalize
either A or B to measure 1 without loss of generality, making both measure 1 is a simplifying
assumption, requiring an equal mass of agents on each side. We will proceed for now using
this assumption as it simpliﬁes the problem, and relax it later.
• Assumption 1 (MASS) : Suppose an equal measure of agents on each side.
This scenario aﬀords an extremely simple solution. First, we match and remove from con-
sideration the area under both curves, if such an area exists.
Lemma 17 For each type θ, a measure µθ = min(µθA, µθB) of θ agents on side A (B)
matches to θ types on side B (A), where µθS is the mass of agents of type θ on side S.
Proof. There are at least µθ agents of type θ on each side by deﬁnition. Since preferences
are homophilic, aiθ strictly prefers bjθ to any agent bks, and symmetrically biθ prefers ajθ to
any aks. Then a mass µθ of aθ's will strictly prefer to match with any of the measure µθ of
3I derived these horizontal results independently, being unaware of Clark's unpublished paper. However
I believe the derivation is a good motivation for the later, novel result, so I have retained this section.
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Figure 2.2.1: Initial distributions A and B of agents over type θ.
There is an area of overlap in the center where, for any type in the overlap, both distributions have
at least as much mass as the overlapped region.
Figure 2.2.2: Remainder distributions A′ and B
′
.
The remainder distributions A′.and B
′
that are left when the mass of overlapping agents is
matched and removed from the market.
bθ's, and the bθ's will symmetrically strictly prefer aθ's to any other agents, so they will form
stable matches.
Now we can eliminate the stably matched overlap agents from consideration. The re-
mainder distributions can be deﬁned as
fA′ (θ) = max{
fA(θ)− fB(θ)∫
Θ
max{(fA(θ)− fB(θ), 0} dθ , 0}
and
fB′ (θ) = max{
fB(θ)− fA(θ)∫
Θ
max{(fB(θ)− fA(θ), 0} dθ , 0}
where the integral ensures a well-deﬁned probability density function with mass 1. Note that
the area under both A and B is the same for both distributions, so the scalar they must be
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multiplied by is also the same and we don't have any issues of miscounting the measures of
agents on each side. Deﬁne A' and B' as the distributions with these respective densities.
We now inductively derive a very simple matching algorithm that yields the type s of
the match bjs for aiθ (ajs for biθ) as an explicit function depending only on the remainder
distributions and aiθ (biθ). The intuition here is that we start at the far right of the left
remainder distribution (A in this example) and the far left of the right distribution (B in this
example), or on other words the innermost points of each distribution, and then iteratively
match outward, with the current (innermost remaining) matchers taking the already stably
matched interior agents as unavailable. Because agents want the closest match possible, the
current matchers on each side strictly prefer the current (innermost remaining) matchers on
the other side to anyone else, so they match and the process continues. Note that, because
matching is one-to-one, the measure of agents who have been matched on one side must
equal the measure of agents who have been matched on the other. Before we complete this
proof, we make two additional assumptions.
• Assumption 2 (SEP): Suppose the probability density functions have the single
crossing property i.e. the probability density functions intersect at only one point.
• Assumption 3 (OUT): Suppose that agents prefer any match to no match.
Like MASS, SEP and OUT are not necessary for a tractable answer, but they allow for a
very simple baseline result to be derived, against which deviations from these assumptions
can later be compared.
Lemma 18 Without loss of generality, assume A
′
is to the left of B
′
. Suppose that all agents
in the interval (θA, θB) have been stably matched and are eliminated from consideration, while
no other agents in A
′
or B
′
have matched. Then a mass of agents min{fA(θA), fB(θB)} of
types θAand θB will match stably.
Proof. We know aiθA prefers bjθBto any other bkθ and vice versa, as they are mutually
distance-minimal among the set of remaining potential matches, and all agents that have
already been matched are closer to their match then they are to any remaining potential
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Figure 2.2.3: Inside-Out Matching.
The stage in the matching process when types θA and θB are the innermost unmatched types.
Note that the darkened areas that have already been matched are of equal mass and θA and θBare
mutually closest to one another among the remaining agents.
match by construction, so they will not prefer to deviate to one of the current matchers.
Thus the agents will match stably, as was to be shown.
We are now ready to present the algorithm and prove its validity.
Proposition 16 (Homophilic Matching) Suppose MASS, SEP, and OUT . A measure of
agents equal to the measure under both curves and with equal density over θ will match to
their own type. For all remaining agents of all types θ, θA agents match to agents of type
F−1B (1− FA(θA)) and θB agents match to agents of type F−1A (1− FB(θB)).
Proof. The ﬁrst portion of Proposition 16 is simply Lemma 17. The second is obtained by
inductively applying Lemma 18 starting at the innermost points on the two remainder dis-
tributions and moving outwards, and by using the fact that the measures of agents matched
on each side, 1− FA(θA) for A and FB(θB) for B, must be equal.
2.2.2 Extensions to the Baseline Model
To get the result above, we made three fairly restrictive assumptions. We will now relax
them and ﬁnd the matching outcome in the more general cases. The matching algorithm is
remains quite simple, although relaxing SEP will require a new assumption.
MASS sets the measure of agents on each side of the matching market equal. This is
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Figure 2.2.4: Matching with unbalanced distributions.
Here B has more mass than A, so the furthest (least attractive) B agents do not receive a match
unless they are matched in stage one, the overlap matching phase.
a reasonable assumption in the broader heterosexual dating market, for example, where it
is approximately true. However, if one wants to model, say, online dating platforms that
attract men and women in disproportionate numbers, or the marriage market in countries
that have a signiﬁcant deﬁcit of men due to war or women due to sex selective abortions,
then MASS must be abandoned. All this will do is leave the outermost agents of the larger
side unmatched, as the supply of agents on the other side will have run out. Speciﬁcally,
without loss of generality suppose µB > µA and A is to the left of B. Then the rightmost
µB − µA B agentsthat is, B agents to the right of θB = F−1B (µB − µA) will be unmatched,
while the rest will match as before.
SEP ensures that all agents of one distribution are above or below all agents of the
other. If this does not hold, we may have a situation like Figure 2.2.5 where some A agents
are above all B agents and some A agents are below all B agents, and of course much more
complicated situations of the same nature could occur. In order to ﬁnd the matching here,
we need to be able to relate preferences for types on the left of the agent to preferences for
types to the right of the right of the agent. Assuming we have a utility function or some
other means to compare potential matches to the left and right, we can ﬁnd cutoﬀ agents
who are indiﬀerent between their best available match on the right and left. In some cases
we can proceed as before from the innermost points on each pair of adjacent islands in the
two distributions, with indiﬀerent agents determining cutoﬀs where agents switch from the
available match on one side to the match on the other. However, we may run into situations
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Figure 2.2.5: Matching without the single crossing property.
The remainder of A is separated into two islands, with the remainder of B in the middle. B agents
to the left of the dotted line will match to the left A island, while B agents to the right will match
to the right island.
where agents in one island match to agents in a nonadjacent island. This is not the primary
focus of this paper, so we will not explore this issue any further.
OUT requires that all agents accept whatever the best match available to them is. How-
ever the most obvious qualitative characteristic of the matching outcome in this model is
that, for the agents of types that are over-represented relative to that type on the other
side, the non-perfect matches quickly deteriorate in quality for fringe agents, as the best
remaining match moves further away from them the further to the outside they are. The
outermost agents will in fact get their worst possible match, so it seems reasonable that at
a certain point agents will prefer no match to a terrible one. The result of dropping OUT ,
assuming that the reservation distance is the same for all types, is simply that matching
will terminate once the distance between the innermost remaining agents is equal to the
reservation distance, with the rest remaining unmatched.
2.3 Generalization to arbitrary single peaked preferences
2.3.1 Baseline Model
We now allow agent type and agent preference to vary independently, generalizing to arbi-
trary single peaked preferences. This allows agents to prefer types other than their own. For
example, men may prefer women of a diﬀerent level of femininity than their own, or may
prefer someone of a complementary disposition to make up for their shortcomings. Also, two
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Figure 2.2.6: Matching when agents have the option to refuse.
Agents beyond the distance where the cutoﬀ agents are indiﬀerent between matching or staying
single do not clear the matching market.
individuals with the same characteristics may have diﬀerent preferences over their match's
characteristics, rather than e.g. a man's height uniquely determining his height preference.
Note that, since the type of an individual is now a pair of the form (characteristic, peak
preference), so if we continue using the term type for an agent's characteristic, we introduce
ambiguity. For that reason, an agent's characteristic (e.g. height, BMI, etc.) will now be
referred to as their trait.
Now that agents have two characteristics, the set of agents on a given side is a bivariate
distribution over own trait and peak preference. Denote an agent i with trait θ and peak
preference p as siθp. Trait in this situation is the sole characteristic over which an agent's
potential matches have preferences, while peak preference determines that agent's most
preferred match. To facilitate easy visualization of the algorithm to be derived, we will
overlay the distributions A and B, ﬂipping the axes for B. This will put A agent traits
and B agent peak preferences on the vertical axis, and B agent traits and A agent peak
preferences on the horizontal axis.
The reason for representing the distributions like this is that A agents evaluate matches
based on the distance between their preference and a B agent's trait, which is now the
horizontal distance between aiθp and bjsn on our graph, and B agents evaluate matches
based on the distance between their preference and an A agent's trait, which is now the
vertical distance between aiθp and bjsn, so we can use the graph to easily compare agent
preferences over potential matches.
In general, this is a more complicated problem, and no simple formula of great generality
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Figure 2.3.1: Contour plot of the trait/preference distribution A.
An A agent's trait runs along the vertical axis and its peak preference over the traits of potential
matches runs along the horizontal axis. Darker colors indicate greater mass.
Figure 2.3.2: Overlaid contour plots of distributions A (teal) and B (purple).
Darker teal areas indicate more mass in A, and darker purple areas indicate more mass in B.
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Figure 2.3.3: Comparing matches graphically using the overlay. As shown above, the
vertical and horizontal distances between an A and a B agent on this representation tell us the
agents' preferences for each other.
will be oﬀered in this paper The agents under both distributions still match to their preferred
traits, but the agents in the remainder distributions are more diﬃcult to deal with. Whether
a more general simple solution is possible is a topic for further study. However, under speciﬁc
assumptions on the distributions, the problem is still very tractable. First, we'll make the
same assumptions as in Section II, with a slight variation to account for the more general
environment. Speciﬁcally, we keep MASS and OUT as is and add the following amended
assumption:
• Assumption 2' (SEP') : Deﬁne h(x) = y all ∀(x, y) ∈ s. Suppose the remainder
distributions A' and B' are separated by a single curve s. That is, ∀x and ∀y′ > h(x),
(x,y') has support only on A for all y' or only on B for all y', and ∀y′ < h(x), the only
the opposite distribution has support at (x,y').
As before, this ensures no complications due to multi-modal distributions, varying tail
weights, or ﬂat areas between the remainder distributions. Further suﬃcient but not neces-
sary conditions for a simple solution are as follows:
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• Assumption 4(CURVE1, CURVE2):
 h is monotonically increasing (decreasing) in x.
 the marginal density of A at preference x equals the marginal density of B at
preference y for (x, y) ∈ s.That is, fAX(x) = fBY (y).
Figure 2.3.4: Matching from the southwest to northeast on the remainder distributions.
B agents of trait x match to A agents of trait y, regardless of peak preference.
Under these conditions, the matching of the remainder distributions can be solved by match-
ing in an unzipping fashion, where at any stage of the matching process the agents in the
southwest (southeast) quadrant of the graph below and to the left (right) of some (x, y) on
s have all matched (analogous to the interval which has already matched in the homophilic
case), while no one else has, and the agents of interest are those on the edges of the quadrant
(analogous to the innermost remaining types in the homophilic case). First, we eliminate
the overlapping agents, as before.
Lemma 19 For each point (x, y), a measure of agents on side A(B) equal to µ(x, y) =
min{fA(x, y), fB(y, x)}, matches to the types on side B(A) with transposed θ and p.
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Proof. Analogous to Lemma 17, there are at least µθp (θ, p) A agents and (p, θ) B agents by
deﬁnition. Since preferences are homophilic, aiθp weakly prefers bjpθ to any other B agent,
and symmetrically bipθ prefers ajθp to any other A agent. Then a mass µθ of aθ's will weakly
prefer to match with any of the measure µθ of bθ's, and the bθ's will symmetrically strictly
prefer aθ's to any other agents, so they will form stable matches.
Note that in this case the matching outcome described here may not be the only one
possible, since agents don't strictly prefer their mirror agent over agents with their ideal trait
but a preference for someone other than them. This can be resolved by using lexicographic
preferences where preference over θ are as before and, if two potential matches have the same
θ, agents prefer matches whose preferences are closer to their own trait, with the rationale
that, if someone likes you better, your relationship with them will generally be better. This
gives an outcome with the same perfect matching in the ﬁrst stage and where agents of
a given trait match inside out in preference in the second stage, with agents closer to s
matching to each other ﬁrst, and agents further away from s matching later. However, this
assumption of preferences presents measure theoretic complications for the solution in the
more generalized case in section 3.2, so we will not make this assumption in the following
sections. The proof of uniqueness of the stable matching in a ﬁnite version of this model is
given in the appendix.
We now construct the remainder distributions. Deﬁne
fA′ (θ, p) = max{
fA(θ, p)− fB(p, θ)∫
p
∫
θ
(max{fA(θ, p)− fB(p, θ), 0}) dθdp, 0}
and
fB′ (θ, p) = max{
fB(θ, p)− fA(p, θ)∫
p
∫
θ
(max{fB(θ, p)− fA(p, θ), 0}) dθdp, 0}
We are now ready to prove the inductive lemma for this case:
Lemma 20 Without loss of generality assume A
′
is to the northwest of B
′
(separated by a
curve as per SEP'). Suppose that all agents with traits and preferences such that (x, y) <
(x∗, y∗) have been stably matched and are eliminated from consideration, while no other agents
in A
′
or B
′
have matched. Then the set of A′ agents {aiθp : θ = y∗} will match stably and
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arbitrarily to the set of B′ agents {biθp : θ = x∗}.
Proof. For each B agent bx∗n, n ≤ y∗, which is the trait of all A agents on the other
edge of the quadrant deﬁned by (x, y), so ay∗p

bx∗m
aθp, ∀ unmatched agents aθp where as
θ > y∗. A symmetric argument shows that all ay∗p strictly prefer bx∗n agents to any other
unmatched B agents, so the edge agents of both distributions will match to one another.
Since fAX(x) = fBY (y), these sets of agents have equal measure, so they exactly and stably
match to one another, leaving no remaining bx∗n or ay∗p.
Proposition 17 (Single Peaked Two-sided Matching I) Suppose MASS, SEP ′, OUT , and
CURV E. A measure of agents equal to the measure under both distributions and with equal
density over (x, y) will match to their preferred type, which also ﬁnds them optimal. For
agents in the remainder distributions A
′
and B
′
and for all (x, y) ∈ s, the set of A′ agents
{aθp : θ = y} will match stably and arbitrarily to the set of B′ agents {bθp : θ = x}.
Proof. The ﬁrst result is simply Lemma 17. Inductively proceeding with Lemma 2 northeast
along s, we have that ayp matches with any bxn and vice versa ∀(x, y) ∈ s. Because the
marginal densities are equal along this path, the measure of matched agents at any point in
the inductive process is identical for both sides, so we don't violate the necessary condition
of 1− 1 matching.
It's worth noting that this marginal density assumption is very important. If we did not
have CURV E2 and tried to proceed as above, we'd have unequal measures of agents being
matched at various points in the matching process, a clear contradiction. In fact, what would
happen is that each layer of A′ agents would not completely match out the corresponding
layer of B′ agents, and the remaining B′ agents would match to the next layer of A′ agents.
We would then no longer be in the the extremely convenient situation where the current
matchers are all of one trait and where every current matcher prefers the edge agents on the
other side to any other available agent. Similarly, dropping CURVE1 would invalidate the
procedure, with, for example, agents on one side matching to no one on the other side when
the slope of s was negative.
We can also obtain an algorithm for the matching in a one-sided problem with single-
peaked preferences from the two-sided algorithm by representing the one-sided problem as
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a two sided problem. Recall that a one-sided matching problem is one where there is a
single set of agents who must be matched to one another in any way that satisﬁes stability,
whereas the two sided problem imposes the additional constraint that agents can only match
to individuals on the opposite side.
Corollary 4 (Single Peaked One-sided Matching) For any distributionf(p, θ), deﬁne fA(p, θ) =
fB(p, θ) = f(p, θ). Then if fAand fB satisfy MASS, SEP ′, OUT , and CURV E and
s = (x, x)∀x ∈ R , Proposition 17 holds. Equivalently, the one-sided matching problem with
distribution f has the stable matching given by Proposition 17, where the match of a given
agent a(b) is inf rather than fB(fA).
Proof. The ﬁrst claim follows directly from Proposition 17, as it is just a special case of the
problem considered there. For the second claim, consider the one-sided matching problem
with single peaked preferences and distribution f . An agent a with trait θa and preference
pa prefers matches b based on . Similarly, b prefers matches based on|pb − θa|. Then if we
overlay fA = f with an axes-transposed copy of f , fB, a's preferences over f are given by
the vertical distance, and b's preferences over f are given by the horizontal distance. First,
we remove agents with perfect matches, so a mass min(f(p, θ), f(θ, p)) is matched to its
ideal match for each (θ, p), then we move on to the iterative stage. f, at every stage of
the matching process, the set of unmatched agents on each side in the two-sided problem
is equal to the set of unmatched agents in the one-sided problem, where all the matches
thus far derived in the two-sided problem are stable in the one sided problem, then the
current matches are optimal among the set of available matches for all agents on both sides,
so they are optimal in the one-sided problem. There is one complication herewhen agent
a is matched to agent b in the two-sided problem, the a is removed from side A and b is
removed from side B. However, in the one-sided problem both a and b are on the same side.
If some matched agents are not removed from each side, the set of available matches will
not correspond to the one-sided problem. However, because the distributions are identical,
the remainder distributions are also identical by their deﬁnitions, and x = y ∀(x, y) ∈ s, the
set of current matches is identical, and agents are indiﬀerent between all possible matches
in this set. Since there are inﬁnitely many agents at every point with nonzero support, we
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can always have half the agents of a given type match to the other half, leaving no agents
unmatched and all agents with their preference maximal match among the set of remaining
agents.
Note that this yields a very simple matching outcome where as many agents get perfect
matches as possibly can and the remainder match to their own trait (positive assortation).
2.3.2 Extensions to the Baseline Model
While the result in 3.1 is extremely simple, the assumptions, especially CURVE2, are unlikely
to be even approximately satisﬁed in a real world application. Having the marginal densities
equal at any particular point on s is unlikely, much less at every point. First, then, we will
relax this assumption. This signiﬁcantly complicates the problem, but does not render it
insoluble. Without loss of generality, assume that A and B are separated by a monotonically
decreasing h, with A above and to the right and B below and to the left. First, ﬁnd all points
(xi, yi) ∈ s such that 1 − FB′Y (yi) = FA′X(xi) for i ∈ {1, ..., n} (assume there are ﬁnitely
many such points). Then, ∀(x, y) ∈ s where (xi, yi) 5 (x, y) 5 (xi+1, yi+1), (xn, yn) 5 (x, y),
or (x, y) 5 (x1, y1),1 − FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) or 1 − FB′Y (y) = FA′X(x). Without loss of
generality, suppose 1− FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x). Then, with the following amended assumption,
we can proceed to a matching solution.
• Assumption 4' (CURVE2'):
 When A′(B′) has a larger mass matched out, the marginal density of A′(B′) at
trait x(y) is greater than or equal to the marginal density of B′(A′) at trait y(x)
for preferences greater than or equal to y(x), where y(x) is such that we have
masses ma = mb1 + mb2 (mb = ma1 + ma2). That is, fA′X(x) =
∫∞
y
fB′(x, p)dp
(fB′Y (y) =
∫ x
−∞ fA(y, p)dp), .
This assumption ensures that, for example, there is never more mass in β1 in Figure 2.3.5
than in α, which would invalidate the matching algorithm since, as x moved outward as the
matching progressed down and to the right, more mass would be matched in B than in A,
even if y didn't decrease at all.
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Finally, before we state the proposition, we'll need a deﬁnition and two equations.
Deﬁnition 6 Deﬁne MA(x) as the set of B agents that an A agent of trait x can stably
match to. That is. MA(x) = {bjθp : θ = y} ∩ {bjθp : p = x ∧ θ = y}. Similarly, MB(y) =
{ajθp : θ = x} ∩ {ajθp : p = y ∧ θ 5 x}.
We also deﬁne two equations guaranteeing equal masses of agents have been matched out
at each step (this is equivalent to the equal masses condition in CURVE2').
∞∫
−∞
x∫
−∞y
fA′(θ, p)dθdp =
x∫
−∞
∞∫
y
fB′(θ, p)dθdp (2.3.1)
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
y
fB′(θ, p)dθdp =
∞∫
y
x∫
−∞
fA′(θ, p)dθdp (2.3.2)
Proposition 18 (Single Peaked Two-sided Matching II) SupposeMASS, SEP ′, OUT , and
CURV E ′. A measure of agents equal to the measure under both distributions and with equal
density over (x, y) will match to their converse type, who also ﬁnds them optimal. For agents
in the remainder distributions A
′
and B
′
and for all (x, y) ∈ s, if 1 − FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x)
A′ agents {aiθp : θ = x} will match stably and arbitrarily to elements of the set of B′
agents MA(x) and vice versa, where y satisﬁes Eqn. 3.1 If 1−FB′Y (y) > FA′X(x) B′ agents
{biθp : θ = y} will match stably and arbitrarily to elements of the set of A′ agents MB(y) and
vice versa, where x satisﬁes Eqn. 3.2.
Proof. Then A agents of trait x will match to b agents of trait y and p 5 x or b agents
whereh−1(x) 5 p 5 y and trait x. To check that this is stable, consider a1, b1 and a2, b2
matching this way, where x2 > x1and consequently y2 < y1 . Without loss of generality,
either (1) 1 − FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for both 1 and 2, or (2)1 − FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for pair
1 and not for pair 2. If (1), a1 b1 a2 since pb1 5 θa1 < θa2 . Then we need only consider
the potential a1 − b2 blocking pair. a1 b2 a2 only if pb2 < θa2 , else a2 is b2's perfect match.
But if so then the trait of b2 is y2. Then b1 a1 b2 as y2 < θb1 < pa1 . If (2), b1 a1 b2 since
pa1 > θb1 > θb2 and a1 b1 a2as pb1 = θa1 > θa2 , so there is no blocking pair. Finally, if
both pairs come from the same stage in the matching algorithm, either the b's are indiﬀerent
between the a's or the a's are indiﬀerent between the b's, so there is no blocking pair.
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Figure 2.3.5: Matching with unequal marginal distributions.
A has more mass in ma than B has in mb1, so agents in mb2 have also been matched to equalize the
mass on both sides.
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Figure 2.3.6: Proposition 18, Case 1 Example.
1− FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for both(x1, y1) and (x2, y2).
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Figure 2.3.7: Proposition 18, Case 2 Example.
1− FB′Y (y) 5 FA′X(x) for (x1, y1) only.
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Figure 2.4.1: Horizontal preferences in the single peaked preference framework.
2.4 Relationship to the Literature
As mentioned previously, there are well known results for two-sided matching with vertical
preferences, and Clark 2007(? ) gives the results for horizontal preferences shown in section
2. It is obvious from the previous exposition that horizontal preferences are a special case
of single-peaked preferencesspeciﬁcally, they are the case where preference is set equal to
trait. Then with these preferences, we should ﬁnd that the single peaked algorithm reduces
to the horizontal preference algorithm. In fact this is the case. In the horizontal preference
case, the distributions have support only on the diagonal, where preference equals trait.
From here, we remove the overlap and can now easily draw a monotonically decreasing
curve s = (x, h(x)) that separates the two sides, and by letting h(x) =F−1B (1 − FA(x)), we
have the appropriate matches and an equal mass of matched out agents at every step in the
process, as desired.
Similarly, Becker's NTU model with vertical preferences is also a special case of single-
peaked preferences, namely, when everyone's preference is for higher traits. If there is a
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Figure 2.4.2: Horizontal matching in the single peaked preference framework
maximal trait θ¯, we can simply set preferences to θ¯. This aﬀords a simple graphical rep-
resentation, with the distributions varying along trait with support only at preference θ¯.
Choosings = (x, h(x)) and letting h(x) =F−1B (FA(x)), we have the appropriate matches and
an equal mass of matched out agents at every step in the process and the two distribu-
tions are separated by s, and we have the familiar positive assortative matching for vertical
preferences with nontransferable utility.
2.5 Interpretation and Empirical Implications
2.5.1 Interpretation
These models are amenable to some interpretation. While in the vertical case we have PAM,
and in the horizontal case we have PAM in the overlap and NAM in the remainders, in
the equal-marginals case of single peaked preferences, we have two modes of matching that
encompass these previous cases. First, we have CPAM over trait and preference in the
overlap region, where we have positive assortation in A trait and B preference and in B trait
and A preferencethat is, increase in one parameter corresponds to increase in the other
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Figure 2.4.3: Vertical preferences in the single peaked preference framework.
parameter in one's match. Note that this is more than just PAMthe matches have exactly
reversed trait and preference. We can also see that the standard PAM of the horizontal
model is actually a special case of this CPAM, where only the fact that trait and preference
are equal ensures that A trait equals B trait. For the remainders, we see PAM when the
separating curve is increasing, which is to say that agents generally prefer higher types than
their stable matches. We see NAM when the separating curve is decreasing, which is to say
that agents generally prefer lower types than their stable matches. This again corresponds
to the horizontal and vertical cases, with the line in the vertical case having a positive slope,
while the horizontal case has a negative slope.
The more general model of proposition 18 is a bit more complicated, but also yields an
intuitive interpretation. Without loss of generality, assume a strictly decreasing h and A
at the top right, with higher mass on side A as in Figure 2.3.5. In this situation, B agents
can be thought of as being in shortage at (x, h−1(x)) in Figure 2.3.5, as there aren't enough
of them to match to A agents as in the equal marginals outcome. As such, and given that
matching utilities for each agent in a match need not correlate in any way, we'd expect
that B agents will often be able to leverage this scarcity to get a matching outcome more
favorable to their side, and this is in fact the case. Notice that the entire region β1 in Figure
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2.3.5 gets perfect matches (from their perspective), while β2 agents have a similar matching
outcome to B agents in the equal marginals case. A agents, on the other hand, match to B
agents whose trait is further from their preferences than the agents with trait h−1(x) that
they'd match to in the equal marginals case, so they are worse oﬀ. In terms of assortation,
we see that, for the overlap region the result is the same as the equal-marginals case, while
in the remainders we have some of the agents exhibiting PAM or NAM in trait as before
(e.g. agents matching from α to β2), while the shortage agents get CPAM.
2.5.2 Empirical Implications
The empirical implications of this model are also fairly straightforward, though they vary
based on the orientation of the distributions. Again, without loss of generality assume a
strictly decreasing h and A at the top right, with higher mass on side A as in Figure 2.3.5.
As a's trait increases, the matching function that gives the distribution of possible matches
exhibits distributions where the maximum preference of matches is equal to a's trait and
thus increasing (β2 in Figure 2.3.5 is the set of possible matches with preferences less than
a's trait). Note that all potential matches for an A agent with trait x must have the same
trait, y, unless their preference is equal to a's trait, and that this y is decreasing in x. The
distribution of possible matches also includes B agents whose trait is greater than y but less
than the minimum preference of a agents with trait x in A', β1 in Figure 2.3.5. This region's
upper and lower bounds in B agent trait decrease in x, while the B agent's preference is of
course increasing in x as it is equal to x. Finally, we can expect a mass point of perfect
matches where preference and trait are reversed from the ﬁrst stage of the matching process.
If we only observe trait, we would expect to see a mass point at the minimum trait a matches
to, and as a's trait increases, we would expect that mass point to move downward. Analogous
predictions can be recovered for other orientations and relative surpluses.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper derived an algorithm for ﬁnding matching outcomes in a generalization of several
environments that have previously been explored in the matching literature, namely Becker's
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vertical model and Clark's horizontal model. By allowing for a wide variety of single peaked
distributions, this algorithm can be used to explore matching behavior in a much richer
environment.
There are several plausible extensions for this model which will not be explored fully in
this paper but may be worth further consideration. For example further study could include
determining how these models relate to analogous ﬁnite matching models or models with
search.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Uniqueness of the Stable Matching
As noted earlier, the stable matchings derived in this paper may not be unique. However,
with the additional assumption of lexicographic preferences where agents ﬁrst prefer match
traits close to their peak preference, then secondarily prefer match preferences close to their
trait, we can pursue a proof of uniqueness for the equal marginals case.
• Assumption 5 (LEX) : Without loss of generality, consider side A. For any A agent
aτ of type τ and B agents bθi and bθj where τ < i < j (j < i < τ),
bθi 
aτ
bθj (bθj 
aτ
bθi)
There is an additional complication, howeverthe proof technique used here only works with
ﬁnite sets of agents, so we must restrict ourselves to a ﬁnite version of the model analyzed
above. It may well be possible to extend the proof to inﬁnite case, but the measure theoretic
complications haven't been resolved as of this writing. First, we need to prove the equal
marginals proposition in this environment.
Lemma 21 Suppose LEX. For each point (x, y), a measure of agents on side A(B) equal to
µ(x, y) = min{fA(x, y), fB(y, x)}, matches to the types (y, x) on side B(A).
Proof. There are at least µxy (x, y) A agents and (y, x) B agents by assumption. aiθp strictly
prefers bjpθ to any other B agent, and symmetrically bipθ strictly prefers ajθp to any other A
agent. Then a mass µθp of aθp's strictly weakly prefer to match with any of the mass µθp of
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bpθ's, and the bpθ's will symmetrically strictly prefer aθp's to any other agents, so they will
form stable matches.
We are now ready to prove the inductive lemma for this case:
Lemma 22 Without loss of generality assume A
′
is to the northwest of B
′
(separated by a
curve as per SEP'). Suppose that all agents with traits and preferences such that (x, y) <
(x∗, y∗) have been stably matched and are eliminated from consideration, while no other agents
in A
′
or B
′
have matched. Then the set of A′ agents {aiθp : θ = y∗} will match stably to the
set of B′ agents {biθp : θ = x∗}, where for matching pair (a,b), pb = f−1B′T (fA′X(pa)).
Proof. Note that the second order preferences don't change agent preferences for matches of
diﬀerent traits. They are only relevant when considering two agents of the same trait. Thus
the types of agents in every match will remain the same as before, as proven in Lemma 20.
For a given (x,h(x)), notice that this problem mirrors the horizontal matching problem of
Section 2. Then by Lemma 18, we have that the innermost agents will match to each other
at each step, and in order to ensure an equal mass matched out at every step, we must have
pb = f
−1
B′T (fA′X(pa)).
Proposition 19 (Lexicographic Single Peaked Two-sided Matching I) SupposeMASS, SEP ′,
OUT , and CURV E. A measure of agents equal to the measure under both distributions and
with equal density over (x, y) will match to their preferred type, which also ﬁnds them opti-
mal. For agents in the remainder distributions A
′
and B
′
and for all (x, y) ∈ s, the set of
A′ agents {aθp : θ = y} will match stably to the set of B′ agents {bθp : θ = x}, where for
matching pair (a,b), pb = f
−1
B′T (fA′X(pa)).
Proof. The ﬁrst result is simply Lemma 17. Inductively proceeding with Lemma 2 northeast
along s, we have that ayp matches with any bxn and vice versa ∀(x, y) ∈ s. Because the
marginal densities are equal along this path, the measure of matched agents at any point in
the inductive process is identical for both sides, so we don't violate the necessary condition
of 1− 1 matching.
Deﬁne a member of the family of matchings given by Proposition 19 as L. Deﬁne the
type of a match for agent ai(bi) under assignment M as as mM(ai) (mM(bi))
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Figure 2.7.1: A sequence of matching pairs under L and a0, b1's assignment under M.
Proposition 20 (Single Peaked Two-sided Matching I Uniqueness) Suppose the conditions
of Proposition 17 are satisﬁed and A and B are ﬁnite sets. Then L is the unique stable
matching up to agents with identical type.
Proof. Deﬁne bi as mL(ai). We'll suppose a stable matching M exists such that mL(ai)
has a diﬀerent type vector than bi for some i. First consider stage one. Every agent gets
their unique (in terms of type vector) ideal match, which also considers them ideal. Then
no agents in either stage 1 or stage 2 could form a blocking pair with a stage 1 agent, since
the stage 1 agent strictly prefers their current match. Then any stable matching M cannot
diﬀer from L for these agents). Now consider stage 2. If the matching M diﬀers from L in
this stage, at least one agent has a diﬀerent match, and their new match in M also has a new
match relative to L. Suppose there exists b1 ∈ B′ such that mM(b1) = a0 and θa0 > θa1 or
θa0 = θa1 and Pa0 < Pa1 . If not, a0 is such that θa0 < θa1 or θa0 = θa1 and Pa0 > Pa1 . Thus b1
strictly prefers a0 to a1. Then a0 must strictly prefer their match under L, b0 = mL(a0) 6= b1,
to b1 or (b1, a0) from a blocking pair in L, contradicting its stability. In this case we could
proceed with the following argument with a0 rather than b1. Then without loss of generality,
assume ∃b1 ∈ B′ as before. Since b1 matches to a0, despite preferring a1, it must be that
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some a1 type agent matches to some b2 such that θb1 > θb2 or θb1 = θb2and Pb1 < Pb2 , else
there would be a blocking pair (a1, b1) in M since the only agents a1 would be indiﬀerent
to are other b1agents, and one of them is matching to a0 so there are not enough remaining
b1 agents to match to all a1 agents. We see that b2 is matching to a1, despite preferring
a2. From here, we can proceed by inductionfor any t, if bt is such that mM(bt) = at−1 and
θat−1 > θat or θat−1 = θat and Pat−1 < Pat , a1, it must be that some at type agent matches
to some bt+1 such that θbt > θbt+1 or θbt = θbt+1 and Pbt < Pbt+1 . But then mM(bt+1) = at
and θat > θat+1 or θat = θat+1 and Pat < Pat+1 . Since there are ﬁnitely many agents in A
and B, we will ﬁnd a t such that, e.g. at must match to some bt+1 such that θbt > θbt+1 or
θbt = θbt+1and Pbt < Pbt+1 , but there are no remaining agents in B that satisfy this condition,
so we have a blocking pair.
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CHAPTER 3
MATCHING MARKETS WITH N-DIMENSIONAL PREFERENCES
3.1 Introduction
In theoretical models of matching markets it is often assumed that agents have preferences
over a single parameter which is either vertical, where all agents share a preference ordering
over types; or horizontal, where agents prefer their own type. For both vertical (Becker
(1973)) and horizontal models (Clark (2003), Clark (2007), and Klumpp (2009)), simple
matching functions have been derived for continuous and discrete cases. However, it would
be desirable to model multiple preference dimensions representing all the traits we believe
agents have preferences over. This would allow us to make predictions about how an agent's
own multivariate type will correspond to the multivariate type of their match in a real
matching market. It would also allow us to explore the qualitative structure of matching
over many traits, which cannot be studied in a univariate model.
In this paper we derive a simple matching function for a special case of n-dimensional
horizontal preferences, where agent types are points in Rn and agents prefer matches that
are closer to them in terms of distance. Speciﬁcally, we consider the case where the set of
agents on each side are symmetric about a separating hyperplane. Because this assumption
is implausible in real world applications, we simulate matching markets with both modest
and moderate deviations from the symmetry assumption and ﬁnd that the theoretical re-
sults for symmetric markets well approximate the stable matching assignments observed in
markets with moderate deviations from symmetry. We treat both the case where utility is
nontransferable (NTU) and the case where where utility is transferable (TU). In the NTU
case the two matching agents cannot bargain over the apportionment of the utility of the
match, while in the TU case agents can divide the match payoﬀ between one another in any
way they choose.
82
While this model assumes horizontal preferences, the results can easily be extended to
a preference structure that includes vertical preferences, categorical horizontal preferences1,
and even more general single peaked preferences2, as all these preference types can be repre-
sented by horizontal preferences. Thus, these results can be applied to a matching problem
where the economist observes an arbitrary number of horizontal, vertical, categorical horizon-
tal, or single peaked preference traits. Because of this, the horizontal preference assumption
is not terribly restrictive, and these results may plausibly be directly applied to real world
matching markets.
These results make two primary contributions to the literature. First, they contribute to
the wide empirical literature on assortative matching.3 While research on assortation has
generally been conﬁned to single traits, such as whether rich individuals marry rich individu-
als and poor individuals marry poor individuals, our result yields testable predictions for the
structure of assortation among all traits simultaneously. Under a special case of symmetry,
it predicts positively assortative matching4 (PAM) along all but one trait, and negatively
assortative matching5 (NAM) along the remaining trait. More generally, it predicts that an
agent's match's type will be a linear function of their own type. Lindenlaub (2013) recovers
matching functions and studies assortation in a similar n-dimensional matching environment,
but focuses exclusively on vertical preferences and TU.
The second contribution is to the theoretical matching literature. Univariate models are
the norm in the literature because with theoretical models it is easier to work with closed form
solutions, and these are much easier to obtain in a univariate model. By providing closed form
matching functions for multivariate matching problems, our results open up new possibilities
1For example, there are several ethnic categories and agents prefer their own category.
2For example, women most prefer men who are 80% their height plus 18 inches, with preference decreasing
in distance from this ideal.
3In one dimension, assortation is a matching structure where the type of an agent's match is monotonic
in the agent's own type.
4PAM means an agent's match's type is monotonically increasing in the agent's own type.
5NAM means agent's match's type is monotonically decreasing in the agent's own type.
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for analyzing matching models with multiple preference traits in a theoretical setting. There
are already matching theory results for more general preference structures, such as the famous
Gale-Shapley algorithm. However, while these algorithms can solve matching problems with
arbitrary preferences, including multiple preference dimensions, they are iterative algorithms
that do not give closed form solutions. Thus, while analyzing multivariate matching problems
has been tractable in empirical settings for some time, theoretically tractable n-dimensional
matching models have only begun to be studied, and our results provide extremely simple
matching functions for a wide range of preferences in both TU and NTU environments.
Additionally, we ﬁnd that the NTU and TU matching assignments are identical in our
environment given a common assumption on match utility. A major implication of this is
that the NTU assignment maximizes total match surplus and internalizes any externalities.
Also, the equilibria of ﬁnite NTU matching markets with search frictions must approach
surplus maximization as frictions go to zero (low search costs or high patience) in many
environments6. The assumptions of our paper may frequently be satisﬁed in future theoretical
work due to the need for tractability, so we can expect surplus maximization to be a common
feature in tractable multivariate NTUmodels. However, the strong distributional assumption
of symmetry needed to get this result suggests that this absence of externalities is a property
of a special class of matching markets and cannot be expected to hold generally. Externalities
in matching markets may drive rationales for intervention and provide opportunities for
matching platform owners to proﬁtably manipulate user matching behavior, so this is of
practical interest.
This paper follows a rich literature on stable matching problems, starting with the seminal
paper by Gale and Shapley (1964) mentioned above. Becker (1973) found that PAM occurs
when there is a continuum of types and the utility of a match is increasing in types and
nontransferable and that PAM also occurs when utility is transferable and the total utility
of a match exhibits increasing diﬀerences in the two agents' types. Unlike Gale-Shapley, this
requires no iterative process to ﬁnd agent pairs in the stable matching, so it is suitable for
6Environments that satisfy the assumptions of this paper and those of e.g. Lauermann and Nï¾÷ldeke
(2014).
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use in theoretical models. However, it imposes the fairly onerous assumption of univariate
vertical preferenceshigher types are universally preferred to lower types, and agents only
care about one trait. Legros and Newman (2007) extended PAM and NAM results to a class
of partially nontransferable utility problems, where there are limitations on the ability of
some or all agents to transfer utility to their match.
Assuming horizontal preferences over a single trait where agents want to match to their
own type, Clark (2003) gives an algorithm for ﬁnding stable matchings in a market with a
ﬁnite set of agents. Clark (2007) then treats the univariate horizontal case with an inﬁnite
set of agents, ﬁnding a very simple matching result, which, like Becker's result for vertical
preferences, is well suited to a theoretical model. Clark (2006) also gives a condition guaran-
teeing a unique stable matching. Finally, Klumpp (2009) derives a very simple inside-out
algorithm for horizontal matching with ﬁnitely many agents.
Multivariate matching has been studied empirically for some time. Choo and Siow (2003)
develop an empirical model of TU marriage matching on age and education. Hitsch, Hor-
taï¾÷su, and Ariely (2010) study online dating, recovering preferences over many traits using
a multivariate NTU model with horizontal and vertical preference dimensions. Chiaporri et
al. (2012) study multivariate marriage matching empirically and recover a simple match-
ing function by assuming that preferences can be aggregated to a single index of quality.
Theoretical treatments of multidimensional matching include Chiaporri et al. (2010), which
applies optimal transport theory to multidimensional TU matching problems and ﬁnds a
very general (but not closed form) characterization of TU matching functions. Lindenlaub
(2013) ﬁnds closed form solutions to multivariate matching problems in a very similar envi-
ronment to this paper, and studies the eﬀects of varying complementarities between traits.
The analysis, however, is restricted to vertical preferences and TU. This paper extends the
literature by ﬁnding closed form matching functions for TU and NTU in a framework where
agents have preferences over multiple traits and where they can have a wider variety of
preferences over each trait.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the basic theoretical
framework this paper uses and explores issues surrounding the modeling of agent preferences
that shape the paper. Section 3 derives the main propositions of the paper, characterizing the
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matching functions for various symmetric n-dimensional horizontal matching problems. It
also includes discussion of how these results might extend to asymmetric matching problems.
Section 4 outlines the simulation model that is used to analyze the asymmetric case. Section
5 reviews the results. Section 6 summarizes the paper and suggests avenues for further re-
search. Section 7, the in-text appendix, provides many Monte Carlo simulations to test the
robustness of the theoretical results to deviations from the theoretical assumptions. It also
includes several proofs not included in the main body of the article. An online appendix (lo-
cated at http://sﬂanders.web.unc.edu/ﬁles/2013/09/ndimmatching_online_appendixc.pdf)
provides additional Monte Carlo simulations, an extension of the results of this paper to the
Roommates Problem, and background information on the various matching algorithms used
and referenced in this paper.
3.2 Theoretical Preliminaries
3.2.1 The Model
The environment we'll be considering is a matching market with two sides, or sets of agents,
A and B7. We'll denote speciﬁc agents in A as a, and speciﬁc agents in B as b. These
sides could be interpreted as men and women in a heterosexual dating market. Agents of
each side seek exclusive matches with agents of the other side. These agents can costlessly
and perfectly observe every other agent in the market and costlessly propose and accept
or reject any number of matches. Time is not modeled in this environment; everything
happens simultaneously and with no time discounting. Agents have preferences over potential
matches, and if b 
a
b′ we'll say a strictly prefers b to b′, and if b <
a
b′ we'll say a prefers b to
b′ or is indiﬀerent between them.
The goal of our analysis will be to ﬁnd stable matchings in this environment. In this
environment, a matching or assignment is a function µ : A∪B → A∪B such that, for each
agent x ∈ A∪B, µ(x) is an agent on the opposite side or the empty set (no match), and µ is a
7We will sometimes abuse notation by denoting the type distributions associated with these sets by A
and B as well.
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bijection. This tells us what a match is, but our real goal is to predict how they will form. To
do this, we need to specify agent preferences over matches. We will assume that, when agents
a and b match, they produce a match surplus u(a, b) which will be split between the two
agents. In the nontransferable utility (NTU) environment, we will assume that agents cannot
bargain over the apportionment of u(a, b). For example, if a and b match, each agent will get
u(a, b)/2. Agents want to maximize their own utility, so an agent a will prefer agents b that
yield a higher u(a, b). In the NTU environment, a stable matching is a matching in which
there is no a and b such that b 
a
µ(a) and a 
b
µ(b). Such an (a, b) is a called a blocking pair.
In the transferable utility (TU) environment, match surplus can be apportioned between
the two agents in any way. Because of this, the utility an agent gets from a match is not
entirely determined by the agent she matches tothe transfers between agents must also be
accounted for. Thus, a stable matching with TU is a matching µ such that there exists an
allocation rule v : A∪B → R giving the utility for each matched agent such that is feasible:
v(a) + v(µ(a)) ≤ u(a, µ(a)) ∀a ∈ A and v(b) + v(µ(b)) ≤ u(b, µ(b)) ∀b ∈ B, and under which
the match is stable: there is no a and b such that u(a, b) > v(a) + v(b). Such an (a, b) is
called a blocking pair.
We focus on matchings because we want to ﬁnd out how agents pair up in this environ-
ment, and we restrict our consideration to stable matchings as we assume that, if agents are
matched in an unstable way, it's likely that some matches will dissolve as poorly matched
agents pursue better matches that also prefer them. In stable matchings, by contrast, the
matching should remain unchanged over time so long as preferences and the distribution of
agents remain the same.
Preferences can be very general in the framework outlined so far, but we'll restrict them
to horizontal preferences, where agents prefer matches with types closer to their own. Specif-
ically, we look at an environment where agents s of each side S have n traits, and their type
is an n-vector, θs ∈ Rn. When unambiguous, we'll use s to denote an agent's type vec-
tor to conserve notation. The ith trait in this environment is θi. These could be income,
height, BMI, risk aversion, etc. The horizontal preference assumption means that agents pre-
fer matches whose n-dimensional type is closer to their own n-dimensional type in a given
distance metric on Rn. Typically we'll use the Euclidean distance.
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Figure 3.2.1: Mapping vertical preferences to a horizontal model.
Side A's type remains the same in θ′, but B's type is multiplied by -1 and translated by a constant,
so that the highest A type is below the lowest B type. Thus the highest A and lowest B types
in θ′ are the highest θ type agents and are mutually most desirable in the horizontal framework,
while the lowest A and highest B types are the low types in the original vertical framework and are
mutually least desirable in the horizontal mapping.
We'll also specify utility functions corresponding to these preferences, where utility is
decreasing in distance. In our ﬁrst case, we'll assume nontransferable utility in this matching
problem so that agents cannot oﬀer some of their matching utility to a potential mate to
induce them to match. We'll then assume transferable utility with an additional assumption
that the utility function is convex in distance.
3.2.2 Modeling Various Preference Types in a Horizontal Frame-
work
As mentioned previously, we are considering agents with horizontal preferences over n traits.
However, there are many traits where preferences are manifestly not horizontal for most
individuals. For example, people generally prefer more attractive partners, not a partner
of their own level of attractiveness.8 Luckily, while the horizontal preference assumption
8A common result in matching models with vertical preferences is that agents match to mates of their
own quality, but this is a characteristic of the equilibrium, not of agents' own preferences.
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requires preferences to correspond to a shared distance function over all n traits, it still allows
considerable ﬂexibility. Many types of preferences can be mapped into this framework. We'll
show how vertical preferences can be mapped into this framework below. More general single
peaked preferences, and certain types of categorical preferences can be also mapped into the
horizontal framework, as shown in Online Appendix 1.1.1.
In the attractiveness example, we assume agents prefer more attractive individuals. If
everyone can agree on the relative attractiveness of any two individuals, and everyone prefers
more attractive to less attractive individuals, we call this a vertical preference. Vertical
preferences can be represented in a horizontal framework, as shown in Figure 3.2.3. Given
two distributions over a single trait θ with vertical preferences (the higher the type, the more
desirable to all agents on the other side), we can generate a new trait θ′ by mapping the
two distributions to the real line with preferences based on least-distance. For example, we
could have attractiveness for A and B, θ, range from 0 to 1. Then we can map to the new
A attractiveness using the identity function θ′A = θA and the new B attractiveness using
θ′B = 2 − θB. Since higher θ′ type A agents (lower θ′ type B agents) had better vertical
types, and are also closer to and thus more preferred by all B (A) agents, we preserve the
preference orderings of all agents. Thus, if we expect agents to have vertical preferences over
a trait we'd like to include in the model, we can preserve that preference structure in the
horizontal model we've developed. 9
3.2.3 Aggregation to a Single Dimension
An obvious question we might ask is the following: can we reduce multivariate preferences to
a single variable? Many theoretical models use univariate preferences, and existing research
has already discovered closed form matching functions for many types of preferences over a
single trait. Thus, if we could transform a multidimensional problem into a one-dimensional
problem, that would be an attractive way to proceed. Speciﬁcally, we'll consider the following
problem: we have an n-dimensional matching problem as described in Section 2.1, with either
9Note that we need the best A agent to be below the best B agent in the horizontal mapping. If not,
there will be overlap in the support of A and B, and overlap agents will most prefer their own θ′ type, rather
than the best agent of the other side.
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horizontal or vertical preferences over each trait. Our goal is to construct a univariate type
and corresponding values along that one parameter for each agent such that the salient
features of the n-dimensional matching model are preserved in the one-dimensional model.
Ideally, we'd like to preserve preference orderings over potential matches for each agent and
stable matching outcomes for each agent. In fact, a single aggregated type is used in a
number of papers in the literature, such as pizzazz in Burdett and Coles (1997). More
recently, the ability to aggregate type vectors into a univariate index has been used as an
identifying assumption in empirical work such as Chiappori et al. (2012).
As shown in Online Appendix 1.1.2, aggregation that preserves the set of stable match-
ings is possible with vertical preferences under an additional assumption. However, when
horizontal traits are introduced, mapping from n dimensions to one dimension will generally
lead to a larger set of stable matches. Most importantly, it cannot preserve the full prefer-
ence orderings of each agent (Online Appendix 1.1.2). Because the full preference orderings
are not preserved, if we change some parameter of the matching problem and cause the
stable matching to change, we cannot expect those changes to be the same in the univariate
model as in the underlying multivariate model. For example, if we want to examine a model
where a market designer is optimizing over some parameters10 that change the structure of
the matchings, aggregation will render this optimization invalid with respect to the original
n-dimensional problem. Generally, we cannot assume theoretical economic models involving
univariate matching problems are valid stand-ins for those same models with multivariate
matching problems unless we have a speciﬁc reason to believe such aggregation preserves the
characteristics of the model we consider salient11. Thus, we'll now consider the problem of
explicitly solving multivariate matching problems.
10e.g. a price of entry into the matching platform.
11In a companion paper (Flanders (2014)), we ﬁnd just such an environment where aggregation does not
change the salient characteristics of the model.
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3.3 Theoretical Results for Symmetric Distributions
3.3.1 Nontransferable Utility Matching with Symmetric Distribu-
tions
If we cannot reduce an n-dimensional horizontal problem to a one-dimensional one, we must
consider how to directly solve an n-dimensional problem. We will see that, given a form of
symmetry between the distributions of each side and the condition that the distributions are
separated, we can solve the matching problem. We can even characterize the type of one's
match as a linear function of one's own traits. The model here is still the one outlined in
Section 2.1, with disutility of distance given by an increasing function f of the negation of
the Euclidean distance metric: u(a, b) ≡ f(−d(a, b)), where d is shared by all agents on both
sides.
Deﬁne the unit normal to a hyperplane h with origin at zero as η(h). Denote the normal
to a hyperplane h beginning in h and terminating at a point a as η(h, a). Deﬁne dη(a, b)
as the distance between a and b along vector η(h, a) and dhi(a, b) as the distance between a
and b along the ith basis vector of h. Deﬁne d(a, h) ≡ ||η(h, a)|| = dη(a, h). Note that this
is the minimal distance between a and the hyperplane h, and also the distance between a
and a's projection onto h. We'll need to make several assumptions to get a simple matching
function:
• Assumption 1 (SEP) : ∃h = {x : ax = k} for some a and k such h separates A and
B. That is, ay < k < az ∀y ∈ A,z ∈ B.
Separation of the two distributions ensures that no one can get their own type as a match,
which they would always accept. We could eliminate overlap by matching out identical
agents and using the proposition to be proved on the remaining agents, but typically these
remainder distributions will still not satisfy the separation criterion, as this condition is
stronger than a requirement that the sets be disjoint. While this assumption appears strong,
it will often be quite easy to satisfy: if there is at least one vertical trait, this condition is
automatically satisﬁed, since vertical preferences require that the distributions of the two
sides be separated along the vertical dimension, and by constructing a hyperplane with a
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normal along the vertical dimension, we can separate the entire n-dimensional distributions.
Thus, if there are any traits that can be assumed to be quality based, such as income in
a dating/marriage application, this condition imposes no further restriction. Alternatively,
if more general preferences are decomposed into vertical and horizontal components, as
done in Hitsch, Hortaï¾÷su, and Ariely (2010) and discussed in Online Appendix 1.1.1,
then the vertical component will be suﬃcient for Assumption 1. If the distance between
the distributions is large enough, we can ﬁnd a hyperplane that satisﬁes SEP as well as
assumption 3.2. To state assumption 2, we must ﬁrst deﬁne the reﬂection or Householder
matrix of h as R(h) ≡ I − 2η(h)η(h)T .
• Assumption 2 (REF) : the set A is the reﬂection about h of the distribution B.
That is, R(h) · A = B.
We'll need this assumption to ensure that every agent has a reﬂected agent, which, combined
with the shared distance metric, will ensure that we can match every agent to their reﬂection
stably. Note that this assumption is a generalization of univariate symmetry assumptions
(e.g. FM(x) = FW (x) for type distributions FS and sides M and W ) common to many
matching papers (e.g. Burdett and Coles (1997), Bloch and Ryder (2000), etc.) that also
allows for more general forms of symmetry.
• Assumption 3 (EUC) : the distance metric on which preferences are based is the
Euclidean distance.
Using the Euclidean distance, we'll be able to restate the distance between two points in
terms of distance along the normal to a hyperplane and the distance along the basis vectors
of that hyperplane, which will be crucial for proving the that agents stably match to their
reﬂections (this will not generally be true for other norms). The important characteristic of
the Euclidean norm is that it is rotationally symmetric. That is, the indiﬀerence curve of
any agent with distance preferences based on the Euclidean norm is a hypersphere, which
has rotational symmetry. In contrast, for the 1-norm or sup-norm the indiﬀerence curve will
be a hypercube, which is not invariant to rotation.
Essentially, we want to do what is seen in Figure 3.4.1. Given a matching problem
with distributions A and B that are symmetric about some hyperplane which may have any
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arbitrary orientation in the typespace, we want to solve an equivalent problem where the
typespace is redeﬁned through a change of basis such that the reﬂecting hyperplane is now
normal to one of the new basis vectors. Then an agent and their reﬂection will diﬀer only
along one dimensionalong the vector normal to the hyperplane. This will be critical in
the proof, and rotational symmetry of the Euclidean norm ensures that the rotation of the
typespace due to the change of basis will not change the matching problem.
Now we can state the result. Recall the property of reﬂection matrices that R(h) · a =
a− 2η(h, a):
Proposition 21 (Continuous Symmetric NTU Matching) Given a two sided NTU matching
market with sides A and B, suppose there exists a hyperplane h ⊂ Rn satisfying SEP and
REF. Suppose agents prefer closer matches in the Euclidean distance metric (EUC). Then
all agents matching to their reﬂection is stable. That is,µ(a) = a− 2η(h, a)=R(h) · a.
Proof. For a contradiction, consider the matching outcome of Proposition 21 and suppose
there is a blocking pair (a1, b2) such that b2 
a1
µ(a1) = b1 and a1 
b2
µ(b2) = a2. Then
d(a1, b2) < min{d(a1, b1), d(a2, b2)}. Since the agents in pairs (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) are each
reﬂections of their respective matches, we know d(a1, b1) = 2d(a1, h) = dη(a1, h), d(a2, b2) =
2d(b2, h) = dη(b2, h). Since d is the Euclidean distance,
d(a1, b2) =
√√√√√∑ n
i = 1
di(a1, b2)2
and equivalently, we have
d(a1, b2) =
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a1, b2)
2 + dη(a1, b2)2
≥
√
dη(a1, b2)2
= dη(a1, b2)
= dη(a1, h) + dη(b2, h)
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= (d(a1, b1) + d(a2, b2))/2
≥ min{d(a1, b1), d(a2, b2)}
Contradiction.
Since an agent's a's match is R(h) ·a where R is a matrix, the matching function is linear.
To interpret this, we'll introduce a new deﬁnition of assortation for multiple dimensions.
Deﬁne ai as the value of the ith trait of agent a, and a¬i as the vector of a's traits excluding
i.
Deﬁnition 7 (Unconditional PAM(NAM)) We'll say a matching µ satisﬁes unconditional
PAM (NAM) in trait i if ai > a
′
i implies µi(a) > µi(a
′) (µi(a) < µi(a′)) ∀a, a′ ∈ A.
This extends the univariate deﬁnition to multiple dimensions by ensuring the one dimensional
assortation holds throughout the typespace. We could imagine a weaker deﬁnition requiring
only, say, ai > a′i implies µi(a) > µi(a
′) (ai > a′i implies µi(a) < µi(a
′)) for a given a¬i vector
(a¬i = a′¬i). Then we could have, for example, PAM in income for low education individuals
and NAM in income for high education individuals. Deﬁnition 7, by contrast, requires a
much stronger notion of assortation.
Given this deﬁnition and the fact that µ is linear in own type, the following holds:
Corollary 5 (n-Dimensional Assortation) for each i, µi either satisﬁes unconditional PAM,
satisﬁes unconditional NAM, or, for each a¬i, all (· , a¬i) type agents match to B agents of
type (bi, · ) for some bi.
While the direction of assortation for each trait depends on the orientation of the two distri-
butions, the linear matching pattern ensures that if matching on one trait is PAM (NAM) for
one vector of other traits, it is PAM (NAM) for every vector of other traits. This yields strong
testable implications about the structure of matching, but to fully characterize the qualita-
tive structure of matching, it will be helpful to normalize the typespace. Deﬁning a rotated
typespace with the normal to h as the ﬁrst dimension and n−1 orthogonal spanning vectors
of h as the remaining n − 1 dimensions and denoting the vector with all zero components
except a value of one at component i as ei, we can immediately derive a characterization of
the matching function from Proposition 21:
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Corollary 6 (Normal n-Dimensional Assortation) Where deﬁned,
∂µ(a)
∂a1
= −e1, ∂µ(a)
∂ai
=
ei for i > 1
Proof. Note that µ(a) = a− 2η(h, a) = a− 2d(h, a)e1. Then ∂µi(a)
∂ai
= ei− 2∂d(h, a)e1
∂ai
and
∂d(h, a)e1
∂ai
is 0 if i > 1 and ei if i = 1.
Corollary 6 has a simple interpretation: along the normal to the hyperplane dividing
the two distributions, the matching exhibits NAM. Along vectors orthogonal to the ﬁrst,
the matching exhibits PAM. Additionally, match type along one dimension depends only on
own type along that same dimension. This is very intuitive given the fact that matches are
reﬂections of one another along the hyperplane.
Note that Corollary 6 hold only for the synthetic traits of the rotated typespace, which
are vectors in the original typespace. Further, the original typespace itself may be composed
of synthetic traits generated from the original traits in order to map non-horizontal prefer-
ences into the horizontal preference framework, as shown in Section 2.2. Thus, if we want
to interpret the assortation results with respect to the original traits, we'll need to map the
rotated, synthetic traits back to the original set of traits. For a simple example, consider an
n-dimensional matching problem with n− 1 horizontal dimensions and 1 vertical dimension,
where no rotation is required. Then there will be PAM in all horizontal traits. Horizontal
traits do not need to be mapped into the horizontal framework and we assumed they are un-
rotated, so no no mappingor equivalently the identity mappingis required. Thus the PAM
of Corollary 6 applies directly to the horizontal traits. The vertical trait is still unrotated,
but one side's values have been multiplied by -1. Thus, the NAM of Corollary 6 corresponds
to PAM in the original vertical trait. Thus in this example we have PAM along all traits,
and every agent matches to their own type.
3.3.2 Transferable Utility Matching with Symmetric Distributions
We now move on to an analogous matching problem for transferable utility. Just as Becker
showed that TU and NTU-stable matchings coincide for univariate vertical preferences when
match utility is supermodular in types, we ﬁnd that the NTU-stable matching derived above
is also TU-stable given the appropriate analogue for supermodularity in this framework.
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That analogue is convexity of the disutility of distance. This will ensure that the marginal
cost of a closer pair being moved further apart is greater than the marginal cost of further
pairs being separated further. Convexity is important in the TU framework since agents are
free to bargain with each other over that division of match surplus. Due to that bargaining,
TU-stability requires that the sum of match surpluses be maximized, and the aggregate
surplus maximizing allocation depends on convexity. As with our previous result, we will
see NAM along the vertical dimension. Convexity ensures that a distant pairing and a
close pairing has a higher total match surplus than two mediocre pairings, so in order to
maximize match surplus the closest pairs will be preferentially matched together. Along all
other dimensions agents will match to their own type (after the typespace has been rotated),
as this is their ideal match.12
Generally, explicitly solving for TU-stable matchings is more diﬃcult, since one must ﬁnd
not just the matching but also show there are surplus allocations that support that matching
as stable. Finding those surplus allocations can be very diﬃcult in general, but the REF
assumption ensures that an even split of the match surplus for every pair will admit a stable
matching. Generally, the allocations can be thought of as a shadow price for the agent's
presence in the matching market (Browning et al. (2014)). As such, stable allocations vary
widely depending on the outside options of each agent in the matchcolloquially, whether
they are in shortage or surplus. However, we've assumed that the two distributions are
symmetric, and in the stable matching agents will turn out to match to their mirror type,
as before. Thus, every agent's decision problem is mirrored by the decision problem of their
mirror match, and neither has any sort of advantage or disadvantage relative to the other in
bargaining over the split, so an even split is supportable.
12Becker also found a result for TU stability with submodular match utility, and we conjecture that this
result too can be generalized to the n-dimensional framework, where the disutility of distance is instead
concave. In this framework, instead of the two distributions being reﬂections of one another, they must
instead be translations of one anotherthe same distributions up to an oﬀset. This is actually a less restrictive
assumption than the reﬂective symmetry assumption, as it does not require any sort of rotation, or that
the distributions be separated. Given this framework, we conjecture (and Monte Carlo simulations support)
that agents will match to their translated twin in the opposing distribution. However, proving this result
will be more diﬃcult than in the convex disutility case, and, as with Becker's result for submodular utility,
the result is of less interest since it implies NAM, which is typically not observed empirically. Thus, the
proof is not pursued here.
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Proposition 22 (Continuous Symmetric TU Matching) Given a two sided TU matching
market with sides A and B, suppose there exists a hyperplane h ⊂ Rn satisfying SEP and
REF. Suppose agents prefer closer matches in the Euclidean distance metric (EUC) and the
match utility is weakly convex and decreasing in distance. Then all agents matching to their
reﬂection is a stable matching assignment. That is, µ(a) = a− 2η(h, a)=R(h) · a. Further,
every pair splitting the match surplus equally is an allocation consistent with stability. If
match utility is strictly convex in distance and there are ﬁnitely many agents, the stable
assignment is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.1.2
We can extend this result beyond two-sided matching problems as well. Online Appendix
1.2 gives an analogous result for the one-sided matching or Stable Roommates problema
result that is in some ways more robust, as it does not require rotation of the typespace.
3.3.3 Matching with Asymmetric Distributions
Propositions 21 and 22 gives us an easily derived and interpreted matching function. How-
ever, we are very unlikely to encounter perfectly symmetric sides empirically; we cannot
expect the n-dimensional distribution of men to be the exact reﬂection of the n-dimensional
distribution of women about a separating hyperplane. However, we can easily ﬁnd an approx-
imate reﬂection. For example, we can choose a hyperplane that reﬂects the center of mass
of distribution A to the center of mass of distribution B. The natural question to ask, then,
is whether the sort of approximate symmetry we might see in the data corresponds to ap-
proximately the same matching structure. Unfortunately, deriving more general closed form
matching functions for n-dimensional horizontal matching markets is extremely diﬃcult.
However, we can make some conjectures. The factors that ensure the assortation in the
symmetric case are still at work in an asymmetric market. In an asymmetric case like Figure
3.3.1, agents still want closer matches, which means A agents closer to B (more desirable to
all B agents) will match to agents in B that are themselves close to A (also more desirable).
Similarly, agents on the top right of B are likely to match to agents on the right side of A,
who they prefer and to whom they're among the more attractive options. However, because
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Figure 3.3.1: Failure of the symmetry assumption.
In any empirical application, the symmetry assumption will never be fully satisﬁed. In this example,
distributions A and B are uniform square distributions, identical up to translation. Because they
are oﬀset from each other along the horizontal dimension, no hyperplane can perfectly reﬂect one
onto the other, so the symmetry assumption fails.
there is not a symmetric match for all agents, one side or another will be in shortage at
various times in the inside-out algorithm, so the matching outcome will be distorted from
the ideal symmetric case. Thus we would expect some attenuation in the eﬀect of own
traits on corresponding match traits and possibly some modest eﬀect of own traits on non-
corresponding match traits. Notice that, while the reﬂection may not be a perfect match,
as long as there is suﬃcient separation between the two distributions we will be able to ﬁnd
a separating hyperplane that maps the center of mass of A onto the center of mass of B,
giving an approximate reﬂection. At least one vertical dimension will guarantee that the
two distributions are separated, as seen in Section 3.2.2. If the separation of the two sides
is large enough, we should have enough space between the distributions to ﬁt a hyperplane
that both separates them and reﬂects the center of mass of one onto the center of mass of
the other. Thus, while a lack of symmetry may change the matching outcome, getting an
approximate reﬂection should not generally be a problem in an empirical setting.
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3.4 Simulation Framework
3.4.1 Simulation Setup
We'll now develop a framework to test the validity of symmetric distribution results in
situations with asymmetric distributions. We'll consider two cases: ﬁrst, we assume a best
case scenario where the underlying distributions for A and B are symmetric but the realized
observations are drawn randomly and thus do not exhibit perfect symmetry. Note that this
will completely eliminate the matching structure we relied on for Proposition 21, since agents
no longer have mirror matches. However, the overall distribution should be approximately
the same, so we can hope that the results will be almost identical. Second, we consider a
less optimistic scenario where the underlying distributions are not perfectly symmetric, but
exhibit moderate asymmetry when reﬂected onto one another, as in Figure 3.3.1. In this case
we can expect same-trait eﬀects signiﬁcantly below one and other eﬀects may be nonzero.
To simplify the analysis and facilitate visualization of the model, we'll primarily focus
on a two-dimensional typespace, and later look at how increasing the number of dimensions
changes the outcome. In both the symmetric and asymmetric cases, the observations on
both sides are drawn from square bivariate uniform distributions. In the ﬁrst case, they are
stacked vertically as in the right-hand portion of Figure 3.4.1. In this case A and B are
symmetric about h, h is horizontal, and the assortation should be along θ1 and θ2. For the
second case, the distributions are oﬀset along θ1, yielding a market like that seen in Figure
3.3.1. In this case, h is not horizontal. To match the predicted eﬀects to the axes of the
model, it will be necessary to rotate the typespace such that h becomes horizontal as seen
in Figure 3.4.1.
3.4.2 Simulation Model Speciﬁcations
In the simulation model, the two dimensional matching market is as described in section 4.1.
For higher dimensions, only the asymmetric case is simulated: the distribution is uniform
over an n-cube, oﬀset greatly along one dimension, and slightly oﬀset along all others. With
the simulated agents in hand and their preferences speciﬁed, we can simply run a version of
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Figure 3.4.1: Rotation example
An example where A and B are symmetric about the separating hyperplane h, but the hyperplane
is not normal to any of the basis vectors of the type-space. To observe the predicted assortation,
we must rotate the typespace so that h is normal to one of the newly created synthetic traits.
Klumpp's inside-out algorithm in the NTU case to ﬁnd the stable matching outcome.13 In
the TU case, we can solve for the stable assignment and transfers pair by formulating the
matching problem as a linear program (Shapley and Shubik (1972)).14 Given a separating
hyperplane along the horizontal axis, we can then run regressions with one b trait as the
dependent variable and both a = µ(b) traits as the independent variables, where the resulting
coeﬃcients estimate the eﬀects of a change in each on the b trait. In the idealized symmetric
case we would expect the coeﬃcients to be one for trait one on trait one, -1 for trait two
on trait two, and zero otherwise. We run each speciﬁcation many times and ﬁnd the mean
of recovered coeﬃcient values, as well as a 90% conﬁdence interval. More detailed model
speciﬁcations can be found in Appendix 7.2.1.
While a few simulations are shown in Section 5 below, many more simulations are included
in Appendix 3.7.2 and Online Appendix 1.3. The environments simulated include alternate
distributions for A and B, non-uniform distributions, an example with a categorical variable,
deviations from the 2-norm assumption, simulations with correlated traits, diﬀerent levels of
13See Online Appendix 1.4.3 for a summary of the algorithm.
14See Online Appendix 1.4.2 for a summary of the algorithm.
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Predicting µ1(a) (vertical characteristic) by a
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile -0.89 0.05 0.99
mean -0.98 0.00 0.97
5th %ile -1.09 -0.04 0.95
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile -0.87 0.05 0.98
mean -0.98 0.00 0.97
5th %ile -1.08 -0.04 0.94
Symmetric, n=100
Asymmetric, n=100
Table 3.1: MC Results for the Vertical trait: NTU, 200 iterations, baseline speciﬁcation.
convexity with TU, and NTU and TU simulations for various market sizes and numbers of
preference traits.
3.5 Results
First, we'll look at the two dimensional case with NTU and a very coarse market of 100
agents on each side (Table 3.1). We start with the 100 agent case so that we can compare
the NTU results to the TU results, which cannot easily be simulated for larger markets.
We'll initially look at the match's ﬁrst trait, the vertical or separating trait. We see that
in this case the linear same-trait eﬀects explain virtually all of the variation in one's match's
vertical trait, and the coeﬃcient is very close to -1 for both the symmetric and asymmetric
distributions. The opposite-trait eﬀects are quite close to zero, as predicted. The R2 is very
close to 1, showing that almost all the variation in your match's vertical trait is explained
by your own vertical trait, with no noticeable drop oﬀ for the asymmetric case. The range
of coeﬃcient estimates is fairly tight around both traits, showing that we can expect the
estimated coeﬃcients to be consistently close to their predicted values in this environment.
Now we'll look at the match's second trait, the horizontal trait (Table 3.2). In the
symmetric case, we see that the linear same-trait eﬀects explain much of the variation in
one's match's horizontal trait, and the coeﬃcient is fairly close to 1, as predicted. However,
there is much more attenuation than with the vertical coeﬃcient for both the symmetric and
the asymmetric case. The opposite-trait eﬀects are quite close to zero, as before. The R2
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Predicting µ2(a) (horizontal characteristic) by a
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile 0.15 0.96 0.77
mean -0.02 0.83 0.67
5th %ile -0.21 0.72 0.55
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile 0.15 0.85 0.67
mean -0.01 0.75 0.56
5th %ile -0.20 0.65 0.45
Symmetric, n=100
Asymmetric, n=100
Table 3.2: MC Results for the Horizontal trait: NTU, 200 iterations, baseline speciﬁcation.
Predicting µ1(a) (vertical characteristic) by a
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile -0.87 0.16 0.94
mean -0.96 -0.02 0.92
5th %ile -1.08 -0.16 0.88
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile -0.84 0.13 0.92
mean -0.96 -0.02 0.88
5th %ile -1.10 -0.21 0.84
Symmetric, n=100
Asymmetric, n=100
Table 3.3: MC Results for the Vertical trait: TU, 60 iterations, baseline speciﬁcation.
is signiﬁcantly lower than for the vertical coeﬃcient, and drops oﬀ more signiﬁcantly in the
asymmetric case. The range of coeﬃcient estimates is still fairly tight around both traits.
As we'll see later, the results much better approximate the ideal symmetric case as the size
of the market increases.
Now, we'll look at the analogous two dimensional case with TU (Table 3.3). We'll initially
look at the match's ﬁrst trait, the vertical or separating trait. We see that the linear same-
trait eﬀects still explain virtually all of the variation in one's match's vertical trait, and the
coeﬃcient is very close to -1 for both the symmetric and asymmetric distributionsthough
not quite as close as in the NTU case. The opposite-trait eﬀects are also quite close to zero,
as predicted. The R2 is fairly close to 1, showing that most of the variation in your match's
vertical trait is explained by your own vertical trait, with a small drop oﬀ for the asymmetric
case. The range of coeﬃcient estimates is fairly tight around both traits, showing that we
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Predicting µ2(a) (horizontal characteristic) by a
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile 0.09 1.07 0.97
mean 0.01 1.00 0.96
5th %ile -0.09 0.88 0.93
a1 a2 R
2
95th %ile 0.03 1.07 0.96
mean -0.04 0.95 0.94
5th %ile -0.12 0.87 0.90
Symmetric, n=100
Asymmetric, n=100
Table 3.4: MC Results for the Horizontal trait: TU, 60 iterations, baseline speciﬁcation.
can expect the estimated coeﬃcients to be consistently close to their predicted values in this
environment.
Finally, we'll look at the match's horizontal trait in the TU case (Figure 3.4). In the
symmetric case, we see that in this case the linear same-trait eﬀects explain virtually all
of the variation in one's match's horizontal trait, and the coeﬃcient is fairly close to 1, as
predicted, with modest attenuation in the asymmetric case. The opposite-trait eﬀects are
quite close to zero, as before. The R2 is quite close to 1 and the range of coeﬃcient estimates
is still fairly tight around both traits.
These results are quite auspicious for applications of the theoretical result to empirical
data. Even in very small, coarse matching markets of two hundred agents, the idealized result
well approximates the actual outcome. The only exception to this is the weaker horizontal
assortation results in the NTU case. We'll see that the NTU case's horizontal results improve
markedly as the number of agents on each side grows. The primary question we are left with
is why the horizontal trait's eﬀect is signiﬁcantly weaker and why it explains less of the
horizontal variation in the NTU case. This question is treated in Appendix 3.7.2.2.
So far, we've considered very small, coarse matching markets. How do the results we've
seen change when when there are more agents on each side? Do the results more closely
mirror the theoretical predictions? In particular, do the less than ideal results we saw in the
horizontal NTU case improve with more agents on each side? Also, so far we've looked at
models with just two traits over which agents have preferences. What happens if there are
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Figure 3.5.1: NTU with baseline speciﬁcations 1.
Predicting match's vertical trait from own vertical trait for diﬀerent number of agents and diﬀerent
numbers of preference dimensions. 200 iterations per speciﬁcation.
more traits? We now address these questions.15
In Figure 3.5.1 we see that, for an agent's match's vertical trait, the average coeﬃcient
on the corresponding trait of the agent appears to asymptotically approach 1 as the number
of agents on each side increases. We see some slight attenuation from this result as we
increase the number of preference dimensions, but even with ﬁve dimensions the result is
quite strong. To the extent that the coeﬃcient values do not monotonically decrease as the
number of agents increases and as the number of traits decreases, we can attribute this to
the ﬁnite sample size for the Monte Carlo simulations, which introduces some noise into the
mean coeﬃcient estimates.
15Before we proceed, a note on some diﬀerences in the TU and NTU simulations: the inside-out algorithm
is faster than Gale-Shapley, which is already an extremely fast algorithm. However, the method used to
solve for TU stable matches is extremely slow. Thus TU simulations in this paper are for markets with
between 30 and 100 agents per side, while NTU simulations go up to 4,000 agents per side. This is because,
for TU simulations, the linear program to be solved has 10,200 constraints with just 100 agents to a side. If
we were to attempt to solve the model with 4,000 agents to a side, there would be 16,008,000 constraints.
Thus, the computation time increases very quickly with larger markets. In the 100 agents per side case, the
inside-out algorithm takes about 0.001 seconds, while the TU algorithm takes 2-4 minutes per simulation.
Even increasing the market size to 150 per side requires at least an hour of computation, if not more. Thus, it
is not possible to run Monte Carlo simulations for large markets in the TU case, and the number of iterations
must be lower than in the NTU case.
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Figure 3.5.2: NTU with baseline speciﬁcations 2.
Predicting match's vertical trait from own horizontal trait for diﬀerent number of agents and diﬀerent
numbers of preference dimensions. 200 iterations per speciﬁcation.
In Figure 3.5.2 we see that, for an agent's match's vertical trait, the average coeﬃcient
on the horizontal trait of the agent appears to asymptotically approach a value just slightly
below 0. To the extent that the coeﬃcient values are not monotonic in sample size, we can
probably attribute this to the ﬁnite sample size for the Monte Carlo simulations, noting
the extremely small region of the y-axis that's being graphed. The fact that the coeﬃcient
seems slightly biased from the predicted coeﬃcient of 0 should not be surprisingour baseline
speciﬁcation includes asymmetry in both the draws and the underlying distributions, and
while asymmetry in the draws should asymptotically approach zero as the size of the market
increases, the asymmetry of the underlying distributions will not. If anything, it is quite
impressive that there is so little bias, given the signiﬁcant deviation from symmetry we've
speciﬁed.
In Figure 3.5.3 we see that, for an agent's match's vertical trait, the average R2 appears
to asymptotically approach 1 as the number of agents on each side increases. We also see that
the R2 is attenuated as we increase the number of preference traits. Note that, to recover
the R2, we regress only the same trait coeﬃcient so that the R2 gives us the variation in
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Figure 3.5.3: NTU with baseline speciﬁcations 3.
Average predicted R2 for the regression of own vertical trait on match's vertical trait for diﬀerent
number of agents and diﬀerent numbers of preference dimensions. 200 iterations per speciﬁcation.
one's match trait solely attributable to the predicted same own trait eﬀect.
For the NTU case, we've looked at simulations where both the individual draws and
underlying distributions have signiﬁcant asymmetry, and we generally see that the predic-
tions from the theoretical results for symmetric distribution are a good approximation for
the actual stable assignments. As the size of the market increases, the stable assignments
appear to asymptotically approach the predicted assortation in the vertical trait. As seen
in Appendix 3.7.2.3, we also come fairly close to the predicted assortation along horizontal
traits, though the results are not quite as strong. Additionally, this asymptotic behavior
appears quite quickly as the size of the market increasesjust a few thousand agents to a
side gives us extremely strong ﬁdelity to the predicted result. In many applications such as
online dating, the market will be more than large enough to see asymptotic behavior. We do
see that we need larger and larger markets to get the same level of ﬁdelity to the predicted
results as we increase the number of traits. This is not terribly surprising, as increasing the
number of traits while holding the number of agents on each side constant eﬀectively makes
the distributions on each side sparser, since they vary over a larger type-space. A concern
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Table 3.5: MC Results for Five Dimensions.
Here we compare the ﬁdelity of a ﬁve dimensional NTU stable matching to the predicted results
for two cases. In the equal weights case, each trait is given equal weight in the distance metric. In
the unequal weights case, trait two is given ten times as much weight as the others. The reported
values are the means of 200 stable matchings with 1000 agents on each side. The model used is the
asymmetric baseline for ﬁve dimensions.
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here is that we could presumably enumerate dozens or hundreds of traits over which agents
have preferences. The simulations above suggest we might need millions or billions of agents
on each side to get a good approximation to the symmetric result if there are too many traits.
Luckily, not all preferences are created equal, and some traits will be of great importance,
while others are of little. Then, as we see in Table 3.5, the traits that are very important to
agents should have good ﬁdelity to the predicted results at reasonable market sizes even if
there are many more less important traits. The less important traits, conversely, will have
very poor ﬁdelity to the predicted result. However, traits which agents do not care much
about are probably not of great interest to begin with.
As mentioned before, we can only simulate very small markets for the TU case. Thus, we
cannot observe the asymptotic TU trends the way we did in with NTU. The TU simulations
for various market sizes and numbers of traits appear quite similar to those for NTU. The
main diﬀerence is that, as seen before, there is a relatively better ﬁt for the horizontal traits
and a relatively worse ﬁt for the vertical trait compared to NTU. However, the inability to
simulate to markets of many hundreds of agents and the very small number of iterations
that were possible for the Monte Carlo simulations makes the interpretation much more
diﬃcult. Generally, the TU results seem consistent with the NTU results in the range we
can examine them in, and we assume that they would continue to mirror the NTU results
in larger markets. The TU simulations are presented in Appendix 3.7.2.4.
3.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we found a simple, closed form matching function for a special case of fric-
tionless two-sided matching where agents have preferences over multi-dimensional types. To
get this result, we needed to make strong assumptions on the distributions of agents and
the structure of preferences, most notably that the distribution of agents on each side was
the reﬂection of the distribution of agents on the other. However, the simulations in Section
5 and in the appendix strongly support the symmetric mirror-matching result's applicabil-
ity to modestly asymmetric markets. While, as expected, there is some attenuation of the
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anticipated same-trait eﬀects on matches, the coeﬃcients are relatively close to their pre-
dicted values even in small matching markets of a few hundred, and improve as the size of
the market increases. Thus, these results may plausibly be applied to empirical matching
data. These results also have relevance for theory work. We can embed the closed form
matching functions into more complex economic models, such as models of online dating
markets. This allows for the theoretical study of matching phenomena involving multiple
traits, such as how agents tradeoﬀ between various match traits. It also allows one to com-
pare the highly aggregated, univariate theoretical matching models that are typical in the
literature to multivariate models, in order to see whether the qualitative characteristics of a
multivariate model are preserved in a more stylized univariate model.
One major implication of our result is that the NTU assignment maximizes total match
surplus when the match utility function is convex. In an analogue to the Coase Theorem,
the frictionless TU assignment maximizes total surplus (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and
internalizes externalities via transfers, and the two assignments coincide, so the NTU as-
signment has the same properties. Also, Adachi (2003), Eeckhout (1999), and Lauermann
and Nï¾÷ldeke (2014) show that, in many search environments with NTU, search equilibria
approach the frictionless stable assignment as frictions go to zero, provided that assignment
is unique. Thus, there are a wide range of environments16 where ﬁnite17 NTU search mar-
kets must have equilibria that approach surplus maximization as frictions go to zero. The
setting of this paper encompasses many environments with univariate vertical or horizontal
preferences and symmetric distributions, and future theoretical work in both search and fric-
tionless multi-dimensional matching will likely often satisfy the assumptions imposed in this
paper due to the tractability issues with asymmetric distributions. Thus, tractable models
with NTU, especially with multiple preference dimensions, will likely have these qualities.
This implies, for instance, that externality issues with NTU search markets of this type can
be resolved by simply improving the search technology. However, the strong assumptions
needed in this paperand the divergence of TU and NTU assignments in simulations that
16e.g. those satisfying the assumptions of one of the above papers and this paper.
17The NTU uniqueness result in this paper is only proved for ﬁnite markets.
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relax these assumptionsillustrate how special these environments are and suggest that these
eﬃciency results cannot be expected to hold generally in the broader universe of possible
matching markets. Failure of NTU matching to maximize social surplus due to externali-
ties may provide a justiﬁcation for market intervention or for platform owners like online
dating websites to inﬂuence consumer matching behavior through contracts, platform struc-
ture, etc., so this issue has practical importance. Indeed, a recent survey of the search and
matching literature (Chade, Eeckhout, and Smith (2015)) identiﬁes the role of externalities
in matching markets as one of the most important open questions in the ﬁeld.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proofs
Uniqueness of Symmetric stable matching with ﬁnitely many agents.
While we've proven in Section 3 that the symmetric matching outcome is stable for NTU, we
have not proven that it is unique. While the following proof technique does not work in the
inﬁnite case. In the ﬁnite case, we can construct the only possible type of stable matching
and show that, under certain conditions, the set of stable matchings is a singleton.
Proposition 23 (NTU Finite Symmetric Matching) Suppose ∃ a hyperplane h ⊂ Rn such
that the ﬁnite set of agents A is the reﬂection of the ﬁnite set of agents B about h and h
separates A and B. Suppose agents prefer closer matches in the Euclidean distance metric.
Then all agents match to their reﬂection. That is,µ(a) = a− 2η(h, a)=R(h).a.
Proof. Consider the ﬁrst step of Klumpp's inside-out algorithm and a pair (a, b) such that
d(a, b) is distance minimal among all a ∈ A and b ∈ B . We will show that a and b are
reﬂections of each other. Without loss of generality, consider a's matching problem. Suppose
d(a, b) > d(a, b′), whereb′ = R(h).a. Then (a,b) is not distance minimal, a contradiction.
Supposed(a, b) ≤ d(a, b′) where b′ = R(h).a and b 6= b′. Since Euclidean distance is rotation
invariant, we can ﬁnd n-1 orthogonal vectors spanning h and decompose d(a,b) into distance
along the normal and distance along h,
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a, b)
2 + dη(a, b)2. Then
110
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a, b)
2 + dη(a, b)2 ≤
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a, b
′)2 + dη(a, b′)2
Since b′ is the reﬂection of a about h, dhi(a, b
′) = 0. Therefore we have
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a, b)
2 + dη(a, b)2 ≤
√
dη(a, b′)2
∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a, b)
2 + dη(a, b)
2 ≤ dη(a, b′)2
dη(a, b)
2 < dη(a, b
′)2
dη(a, b) < dη(a, b
′)
Note that distance dη(a, b) = d(a, h) + d(b, h), so we have
d(a, h) + d(b, h) < 2d(a, h)
d(b, h) < d(a, h)
But we know that a′ = R(h).b is an agent in A since A is the reﬂection of B about h, and
d(a′, b) = 2d(b, h) < d(a, h) + d(b, h) = dη(a, b) <
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a, b)
2 + dη(a, b)2 = d(a, b),
so (a,b) is not distance minimal, a contradiction. Continuing inductively, if all previous steps
in the inside-out algorithm have resulted in mirror pairs matching out, every agent remaining
unmatched has a mirror pair still unmatched, and the result just proved applies. Thus all
agents getting a mirror match is a stable matching. Note that having at least one vertical
trait will ensure the separation condition, as along the vertical axis, all agents in A will be
above (below) all agents in B. Since this is just a special case of the inside out algorithm,
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the properties of that algorithm's matching outcome are preserved, most importantly the
uniqueness of the stable match given strict preferences (Klumpp (2009)).
Continuous Symmetric TU Matching.
Proof. First, we'll show stability. For a contradiction, consider the matching outcome
of Proposition 22 and suppose there is a blocking pair (a1, b2) such that u(d(a1, b2)) >
u(d(a1, b1))/2 + u(d(a2, b2))/2 . But by convexity, we know u(d(a1, b1))/2 + u(d(a2, b2))/2 ≥
u((d(a1, b1) + d(a2, b2))/2). Since the agents in pairs (a1, b1) and (a2, b2) are each reﬂections
of their respective matches, we know d(a1, b1) = 2d(a1, h) = dη(a1, h), d(a2, b2) = 2d(b2, h) =
dη(b2, h). Since d is the Euclidean distance,
d(a1, b2) =
√√√√√∑ n
i = 1
di(a1, b2)2
and equivalently, we have
d(a1, b2) =
√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(a1, b2)
2 + dη(a1, b2)2
≥
√
dη(a1, b2)2
= dη(a1, b2)
= dη(a1, h) + dη(b2, h)
= (d(a1, b1) + d(a2, b2))/2
Thus
u(d(a1, b1))/2 + u(d(a2, b2))/2 ≥ u((d(a1, b1) + d(a2, b2))/2) ≥ u(d(a1, b2))
Contradiction.
Now, we show uniqueness. Recall that a stable allocation must maximize the aggregate
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match surplus. Suppose there are k agents on each side and that mirror agents have identical
indices. Suppose that each agent's type is unique.18 Then for any potential stable allocation
µ, we must have
∑k
i=1 u(d(ai, µ(ai))) =
∑k
i=1 u(d(ai, bi)). As before, we can decompose the
distances along the basis vectors, noting again that d(ai, bi) = dη(ai, bi). Then we have
k∑
i=1
u(dη(ai, bi)) =
k∑
i=1
u

√√√√√∑ n− 1
i = 1
dhi(ai, µ(ai))
2 + dη(ai, µ(ai))2

k∑
i=1
u(dη(ai, bi)) ≤
k∑
i=1
u(dη(ai, µ(ai)))
Note that, having removed all horizontal components, we have a condition on a single
vertical component. This condition is analogous to the optimality condition in the standard
Becker TU matching problem. For any distinct pairs i and j, we have that dη(ai, bi) +
dη(aj, bj) = dη(ai, bj) + dη(aj, bi) and dη(ai, bj) = dη(aj, bi). Then convexity ensures that
u(dη(ai, bj)) = u(dη(ai, bj)/2+dη(aj, bi)/2) = u(dη(ai, bi)/2+dη(aj, bj)/2) < u(dη(ai, bi))/2+
u(dη(aj, bj))/2. For any µ(ai), deﬁne bj(i) ≡ µ(ai). Then
∑k
i=1 u(dη(ai, µ(ai))) =
∑k
i=1 u(dη(ai, bj(i))) ≤∑k
i=1 u(dη(ai, bi))/2 + u(dη(aj(i), bj(i)))/2 =
∑k
i=1 u(dη(ai, bi)) since µ is a bijection, and the
inequality is strict if j(i) 6= i for some i. In fact, if µ is some matching other than the stable
matching described above, it must be that j(i) 6= i for some i. Then this alternate matching
cannot be stable and the stable assignment is in fact unique. 19
18If there is more than one agent of a given type, we can easily amend the proof to account for this. The
stable allocation will remain unique up to agent type, though not up to individuals, since two identical agents
can have their matches switched without changing total surplus.
19This uniqueness result is proved in much greater generality in Theorem 4.11 of Chiappori et al., but
mapping the match surplus functions from this environment to their framework and showing their conditions
are satisﬁed to demonstrate that it is a special case of their result would be too long-winded for this paper.
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3.7.2 Monte Carlo Simulations
Detailed Simulation Model Speciﬁcations
In the NTU case we simulate 100, 200, 400, 800, 2,000, or 4,000 agents for each side for both
the symmetric and asymmetric speciﬁcations. The agents are drawn from an independent
bivariate uniform distribution with support from 0 to 3.5. In the symmetric case, the two
distributions are oﬀset by 10 along the second trait (thus, along the second trait, A agents
range from -5 to 0 and B agents range from 5 to 10). They are not oﬀset along the ﬁrst
trait. In the asymmetric case A and B are oﬀset by 10 along the second trait and 3.2.5
along the ﬁrst. Therefore, they are not symmetric about the hyperplane that approximately
mirrors them. For higher dimensions, the distribution is uniform over an n-cube whose edges
are of length 5, and the oﬀsets are 10 along one trait, and 3.2.5 along all others. For TU
simulations, the matching disutility is the square root of the two-norm distance. In the TU
case 30, 50, 70, or 100 agents are drawn for each side. For future reference, we'll call the
above class of models our baseline speciﬁcation. We'll run models with 2, 3, 4, or 5 traits
over which agents have preferences. Larger numbers of traits were not simulated because
the formulae deﬁning the general form of the rotation matrix increase in both number and
length as n increases, becoming unmanageable with more than a few dimensions.
With the simulated agents in hand and their preferences speciﬁed, we can simply run
a version of Klumpp's inside-out algorithm in the NTU case to ﬁnd the stable matching
outcome.20 In the TU case, we can solve for the stable assignment and transfers pair by
formulating the matching problem as a linear program (Shapley and Shubik (1972)).21 Given
a separating hyperplane along the horizontal axis, we can then run regressions with one b
trait as the dependent variable and both a = µ(b) traits as the independent variables, where
the resulting coeﬃcients estimate the eﬀects of a change in each on the b trait. In the
idealized symmetric case we would expect the coeﬃcients to be one for trait one on trait
one, -1 for trait two on trait two, and zero otherwise. We run each speciﬁcation a number of
20See Online Appendix 1.4.3 for a summary of the algorithm.
21See Online Appendix 1.4.2 for a summary of the algorithm.
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times200 times for NTU speciﬁcations, and either 60 or 20 for TU depending on the model
speciﬁcationand ﬁnd the mean of recovered coeﬃcient values, as well as a 90% conﬁdence
interval.
Before we can run the regressions in the asymmetric case, we must derive a rotation
matrix and rotate the typespace to one where the hyperplane is horizontal. We ﬁnd the
vector from the center of mass (mean) of A to the center of mass of B, and construct the
rotation matrix that maps that vector to the vertical axis. We then rotate the typespace,
creating new synthetic traits 1 and 2 which should correspond to the vectors along which
matching is positively assortative or negatively assortative. Finally, we run the regression
using th e synthetic traits.
Understanding Diﬀerences in TU and NTU Simulation Results
In Section 5, we saw that, in the NTU case, we had better ﬁdelity to the predicted assortation
results along the vertical trait. In the TU case we saw the opposite, though in this case the
diﬀerence between the vertical and horizontal results was smaller. We'll now try to ﬁnd
some intuition as to why we'd see these results, starting with the NTU case. Recall that
one's predicted matchtheir reﬂection about the hyperplane hgenerally will not exist in
these simulations. Thus, agents will have to match to some substitute with a diﬀerent trait
vector. Because the Euclidean distance is used and agents diﬀer from their predicted match
only along the vertical parameter, small changes from this outcome are much more costly in
utility terms if they result in vertical change than if they result in horizontal change. In fact,
the utility eﬀect of a horizontal deviation per unit distance asymptotically approaches zero
for small horizontal deviations. Thus, deviations from this ideal matching due to shortage or
surplus of agents on a given side are likely to be realized primarily via horizontal deviations
which are less costly. For example, in Figure 3.7.1 we see that a large horizontal deviation
is on the same indiﬀerence curve as a tiny vertical deviation.
This explains the results in the NTU case, but what about TU? Why do TU stable match-
ings seem to better approximate the theoretical assortation prediction along the horizontal
dimension, and approximate the vertical assortation prediction relatively less well? First,
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Figure 3.7.1: Horizontal deviations have small utility eﬀects relative to vertical deviations.
An agent b is predicted to match to their reﬂection, a. Because a and b diﬀer only along the vertical
dimension, the distance between b and an agent near a has a much larger vertical component than
horizontal component, so in the Euclidean distance horizontal deviations cause a much smaller
change in distance and thus utility.
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let's consider the simpliﬁed example in Figure 3.7.2. In this example the symmetry assump-
tion does not hold, and we see how the unique stable matchings under the two transferability
assumptions diﬀer. In both the NTU and TU cases, the stable matches are shown by lines
between agents, and the reﬂection matches for B agents predicted by propositions 1 and 3
are shown as µ(bi). Notice that, in the NTU case, the actual stable matching {a1b2, a2b1} has
matches for B agents with the same θ2 values (vertical types) as the predicted matches for
those B agents. However, the θ1 or horizontal types of the actual matches are very diﬀerent
than the symmetric matching prediction. In the TU case, by contrast, stable matches for the
B agents have the same horizontal types as their predicted matches, but the vertical types
diﬀer. In the NTU case we have the predicted vertical assortation, but not the horizontal
assortation, and in the TU case we have the predicted horizontal assortation, but not the
vertical assortation. Note also that we cannot have both at the same timethe predicted
matches do not actually exist, and the two conﬁgurations shown in 3.7.2 are the only pos-
sible matchings. While matching problems with more agents and less carefully chosen trait
values will not be as extreme as this example, Figure 3.7.2 distills an important quality
of n-dimensional matching problems of the sort we've been studying: there will generally
be a tradeoﬀ between assortation along one dimension and assortation along another. In
the two dimensional case, we can come up with matchings (not necessarily stable) that get
closer to the horizontal assortation prediction, but this will often result in less ﬁdelity to the
vertical assortation prediction, and vice versa. We will see below that TU stable matching
puts a greater premium on horizontal assortation than vertical assortation relative to NTU,
so the stable matches in the TU framework will exhibit better horizontal assortation and
commensurately worse vertical assortation.
Why is this? Whenever an A agent matches to a B agent, they create a negative exter-
nality for any A agents that would have liked to match to that B agent, since that B agent is
now removed from the set of possible matches. In the NTU case, however, agents only care
about their own match. It is irrelevant to an A agent whether matching to a particular B
agent leaves another A agent with a far worse outcome. We can see exactly this in the NTU
case of Figure 3.7.2. First, the closest agents, b1 and a2, match. This leaves a1 and b2 with
an extremely bad pairing, but since transfers are impossible, they have no recourse. In the
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TU case, by contrast, agents can freely trade their match surplus with their match in order
to entice potential mates. In the TU case of Figure 7.2, we see that the stable matching is
a1 matching with b1 and a2 matching with b2. Notice that these matches are almost as good
(close) for b1 and a2 as the a2b1 match, and that they are vastly better for a1 and b2 than
the a1b2 match. Essentially, a1 and b2 are able to oﬀer more of their surplus to a2 and b1 in
order to attract them, and they greatly prefer this to getting a terrible match. We can think
of the TU stable matching structure in terms analogous to the Coase Theoremagents cause
externalities by removing mates from the pool of potential matches, but they internalize
those externalities since those aﬀected can oﬀer transfers embodying the cost that has been
imposed on them.
How does this relate to horizontal and vertical preferences? Consider how vertical assor-
tation aﬀects individual utility: everyone agrees on the rank ordering of potential matches,
so if one A agent matchesf to a B agent they ﬁnd more desirable along this dimension,
another A agent must match to someone they ﬁnd less desirable. That is, one agent's gain
is another agent's lossthis is the negative externality discussed before. In light of this, we
see that vertical assortation will make some agents better oﬀ, but it will make other agents
worse oﬀ. Along the horizontal dimension, however, diﬀerent agents prefer diﬀerent matches,
since they prefer their own type. In fact, horizontal assortation will make all agents better
oﬀ, since it will give all agents their ideal type along that dimension. Thus, when we move
from an NTU framework where externalities are ignored to a TU framework where they are
accounted for, we can expect to see a shift towards horizontal assortation at the expense of
vertical assortation.
Note that we've been running simulations where the support and variance of the distribu-
tion along each dimension is identical. If we were to increase the support of the distribution
along the ith trait, or equivalently we were to increase the weight on the ith trait in the
distance metric, the relative ﬁdelity of the simulations to the horizontal and vertical assor-
tation predictions would change. Speciﬁcally, putting more weight on a trait will generally
improve the assortation along that trait, while worsening it along all others. An illustration
of this can be seen in Table 3.5 in Section 5, where the coeﬃcient and R2 dramatically im-
prove for predicting a match's second trait by own second trait, while all other assortation
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Figure 3.7.2: TU and NTU stable assignments diﬀer when the symmetry assumption fails.
Here we consider the simplest nontrivial matching problemtwo agents on each sideand assume mild
convex preferences for distance for the TU case. Assume uTU (a) = −
√
d(a, µ(a)). The predicted
but nonexistent symmetric matches for B agents are shown as µ(bi).
results worsen. Intuitively, we can think about this in much the same way we looked at the
better vertical assortation results in the NTU case. As in that case, the stable matching in
the approximate symmetry environment is going to be a close approximation to the perfect
symmetry stable matching, which has perfect assortation. However, it will not be possible
to match each agent to their exact mirror-type because of the lack of perfect symmetry,
so agents must deviate from their predicted matches. When a given trait is assigned more
weight in agents' utility functions, they will be relatively more sensitive to deviations along
this axis, and relatively less sensitive to deviations along other axes, so the assortation result
will be stronger along the higher-weight axis and weaker along all others.
Additional NTU simulations for various market sizes and numbers of traits
Below we have the remainder of the baseline NTU simulations from Section 5. These are
the the horizontal same trait coeﬃcients and the corresponding R2.
In Figure 3.7.3 we see that, for an agent's match's horizontal trait, the average value for
the agent's horizontal coeﬃcient increases as the number of agents on each side increases.
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Figure 3.7.3: NTU with baseline speciﬁcations 4.
Predicting match's horizontal trait from own horizontal trait for diﬀerent number of agents and
diﬀerent numbers of preference dimensions. 200 iterations per speciﬁcation.
Recall that this this the case where the ﬁdelity of the average coeﬃcient values to the
predicted result of 1 was poorest in the small market simulations. Here we see that increasing
the number of agents on each side signiﬁcantly improves the result. We also see that adding
more traits causes more attenuation from the predicted result. It may be the case that, even
with an arbitrarily large market, the average coeﬃcient will remain below 1. Again, the
baseline speciﬁcation has asymmetric distributions, so there may be some deviation from
the predicted symmetric result even with very large markets.
In Figure 3.7.4 we see that, for an agent's match's horizontal trait, the average R2 in-
creases as the number of agents on each side increases. Recall that this this the case where
the ﬁdelity of the average coeﬃcient values to the predicted result of 1 was poorest in the
small market simulations. Here we see that increasing the number of agents on each side sig-
niﬁcantly improves the result. We also see that adding more traits causes more attenuation
from the predicted result, except that the two dimension case improves more slowly with
more agents on each side. It may be the case that, even with an arbitrarily large market,
the average coeﬃcient will remain below 1. Again, the baseline speciﬁcation has asymmetric
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Figure 3.7.4: NTU with baseline speciﬁcations 5.
Average predicted R2 for the regression of own horizontal trait on match's horizontal trait for
diﬀerent number of agents and diﬀerent numbers of preference dimensions. 200 iterations per
speciﬁcation.
distributions, so there may be some deviation from the predicted result even with very large
markets. The nature of the asymmetry also changes slightly as the number of dimensions
changes, since the n-cube distributions are oﬀset along each dimension. This could be the
source of the strange behavior for the two dimensional case. Note that, to recover the R2,
we regress only the same trait coeﬃcient so that the R2 gives us the variation in one's match
trait solely attributable to the predicted same own trait eﬀect.
TU simulations for various market sizes and numbers of traits
Below, we have simulations for the TU environment analogous to the NTU simulations
for various numbers of traits and diﬀerent market sizes presented in Section 5. As discussed
in Section 5, TU simulations are much more computationally intensive, so only small markets
are simulated here, and the number of iterations in the Monte Carlo process is smalljust 20
per speciﬁcation. While these limitations make evaluation of the asymmetric stable matching
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Figure 3.7.5: TU with baseline speciﬁcations 1.
Predicting match's vertical trait from own vertical trait for diﬀerent number of agents and diﬀerent
numbers of preference dimensions. 20 iterations per speciﬁcation.
outcomes much more diﬃcult in than in the NTU case, we see that the results are qualita-
tively similar to the NTU results. Including more preference traits worsen cause attenuation
in the same-trait coeﬃcients from the predicted value of 1 or -1, and also worsen the R2,
while the diﬀerent-trait coeﬃcients remain around the predicted value of zero. Increasing
the size of the matching market improves the ﬁt of the asymmetric model to the predictions
of the symmetric model, though the inability to simulate markets with many hundreds or
thousands of agents prevents us from seeing the limit behavior that we saw with the NTU
simulations. The primary diﬀerence is a relatively better ﬁt for the horizontal traits, and
a relatively worse ﬁt for the vertical traits, as compared the the NTU case. This is the
same behavior we saw in the 2 dimensional, 100 agent per side TU vs. NTU comparison in
Section 5. Given the similarity of the TU and NTU results in the region in which we can
compare them (small markets), we can conjecture that the ﬁdelity of the asymmetric stable
assignments to the symmetric model predictions should drastically improve as the number of
agents increases, as in the NTU case. It should become quite good even for several preference
traits as the number of agents on each side reaches several thousand.
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Figure 3.7.6: TU with baseline speciﬁcations 2.
Predicting match's vertical trait from own horizontal trait for diﬀerent number of agents and diﬀerent
numbers of preference dimensions. 20 iterations per speciﬁcation.
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Figure 3.7.7: TU with baseline speciﬁcations 3.
Average predicted R2 for the regression of own vertical trait on match's vertical trait for diﬀerent
number of agents and diﬀerent numbers of preference dimensions. 20 iterations per speciﬁcation.
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Figure 3.7.8: TU with baseline speciﬁcations 4.
Predicting match's horizontal trait from own horizontal trait for diﬀerent number of agents and
diﬀerent numbers of preference dimensions. 20 iterations per speciﬁcation.
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Figure 3.7.9: TU with baseline speciﬁcations 5.
Average predicted R2 for the regression of own horizontal trait on match's horizontal trait for diﬀer-
ent number of agents and diﬀerent numbers of preference dimensions. 20 iterations per speciﬁcation.
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